RFC2535 日本語訳
2535 Domain Name System Security Extensions. D. Eastlake 3rd. March 1999. (Format: TXT=110958 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2065) (Obsoleted by RFC4033, RFC4034, RFC4035) (Updates RFC2181, RFC1035, RFC1034) (Updated by RFC2931, RFC3007, RFC3008, RFC3090, RFC3226, RFC3445, RFC3597, RFC3655, RFC3658, RFC3755, RFC3757, RFC3845) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
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英語原文
Network Working Group D. Eastlake Request for Comments: 2535 IBM Obsoletes: 2065 March 1999 Updates: 2181, 1035, 1034 Category: Standards Track
Network Working Group D. Eastlake Request for Comments: 2535 IBM Obsoletes: 2065 March 1999 Updates: 2181, 1035, 1034 Category: Standards Track
Domain Name System Security Extensions
Domain Name System Security Extensions
Status of this Memo
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
Abstract
Extensions to the Domain Name System (DNS) are described that provide data integrity and authentication to security aware resolvers and applications through the use of cryptographic digital signatures. These digital signatures are included in secured zones as resource records. Security can also be provided through non-security aware DNS servers in some cases.
Extensions to the Domain Name System (DNS) are described that provide data integrity and authentication to security aware resolvers and applications through the use of cryptographic digital signatures. These digital signatures are included in secured zones as resource records. Security can also be provided through non-security aware DNS servers in some cases.
The extensions provide for the storage of authenticated public keys in the DNS. This storage of keys can support general public key distribution services as well as DNS security. The stored keys enable security aware resolvers to learn the authenticating key of zones in addition to those for which they are initially configured. Keys associated with DNS names can be retrieved to support other protocols. Provision is made for a variety of key types and algorithms.
The extensions provide for the storage of authenticated public keys in the DNS. This storage of keys can support general public key distribution services as well as DNS security. The stored keys enable security aware resolvers to learn the authenticating key of zones in addition to those for which they are initially configured. Keys associated with DNS names can be retrieved to support other protocols. Provision is made for a variety of key types and algorithms.
In addition, the security extensions provide for the optional authentication of DNS protocol transactions and requests.
In addition, the security extensions provide for the optional authentication of DNS protocol transactions and requests.
This document incorporates feedback on RFC 2065 from early implementers and potential users.
This document incorporates feedback on RFC 2065 from early implementers and potential users.
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
The significant contributions and suggestions of the following persons (in alphabetic order) to DNS security are gratefully acknowledged:
The significant contributions and suggestions of the following persons (in alphabetic order) to DNS security are gratefully acknowledged:
James M. Galvin
John Gilmore
Olafur Gudmundsson
Charlie Kaufman
Edward Lewis
Thomas Narten
Radia J. Perlman
Jeffrey I. Schiller
Steven (Xunhua) Wang
Brian Wellington
James M. Galvin John Gilmore Olafur Gudmundsson Charlie Kaufman Edward Lewis Thomas Narten Radia J. Perlman Jeffrey I. Schiller Steven (Xunhua) Wang Brian Wellington
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Abstract...................................................1 Acknowledgments............................................2 1. Overview of Contents....................................4 2. Overview of the DNS Extensions..........................5 2.1 Services Not Provided..................................5 2.2 Key Distribution.......................................5 2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity...............6 2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record..............................7 2.3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-existence...........7 2.3.3 Special Considerations With Time-to-Live.............7 2.3.4 Special Considerations at Delegation Points..........8 2.3.5 Special Considerations with CNAME....................8 2.3.6 Signers Other Than The Zone..........................9 2.4 DNS Transaction and Request Authentication.............9 3. The KEY Resource Record................................10 3.1 KEY RDATA format......................................10 3.1.1 Object Types, DNS Names, and Keys...................11 3.1.2 The KEY RR Flag Field...............................11 3.1.3 The Protocol Octet..................................13 3.2 The KEY Algorithm Number Specification................14 3.3 Interaction of Flags, Algorithm, and Protocol Bytes...15 3.4 Determination of Zone Secure/Unsecured Status.........15 3.5 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses..............17 4. The SIG Resource Record................................17 4.1 SIG RDATA Format......................................17 4.1.1 Type Covered Field..................................18 4.1.2 Algorithm Number Field..............................18 4.1.3 Labels Field........................................18 4.1.4 Original TTL Field..................................19
Abstract...................................................1 Acknowledgments............................................2 1. Overview of Contents....................................4 2. Overview of the DNS Extensions..........................5 2.1 Services Not Provided..................................5 2.2 Key Distribution.......................................5 2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity...............6 2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record..............................7 2.3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-existence...........7 2.3.3 Special Considerations With Time-to-Live.............7 2.3.4 Special Considerations at Delegation Points..........8 2.3.5 Special Considerations with CNAME....................8 2.3.6 Signers Other Than The Zone..........................9 2.4 DNS Transaction and Request Authentication.............9 3. The KEY Resource Record................................10 3.1 KEY RDATA format......................................10 3.1.1 Object Types, DNS Names, and Keys...................11 3.1.2 The KEY RR Flag Field...............................11 3.1.3 The Protocol Octet..................................13 3.2 The KEY Algorithm Number Specification................14 3.3 Interaction of Flags, Algorithm, and Protocol Bytes...15 3.4 Determination of Zone Secure/Unsecured Status.........15 3.5 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses..............17 4. The SIG Resource Record................................17 4.1 SIG RDATA Format......................................17 4.1.1 Type Covered Field..................................18 4.1.2 Algorithm Number Field..............................18 4.1.3 Labels Field........................................18 4.1.4 Original TTL Field..................................19
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
4.1.5 Signature Expiration and Inception Fields...........19 4.1.6 Key Tag Field.......................................20 4.1.7 Signer's Name Field.................................20 4.1.8 Signature Field.....................................20 4.1.8.1 Calculating Transaction and Request SIGs..........21 4.2 SIG RRs in the Construction of Responses..............21 4.3 Processing Responses and SIG RRs......................22 4.4 Signature Lifetime, Expiration, TTLs, and Validity....23 5. Non-existent Names and Types...........................24 5.1 The NXT Resource Record...............................24 5.2 NXT RDATA Format......................................25 5.3 Additional Complexity Due to Wildcards................26 5.4 Example...............................................26 5.5 Special Considerations at Delegation Points...........27 5.6 Zone Transfers........................................27 5.6.1 Full Zone Transfers.................................28 5.6.2 Incremental Zone Transfers..........................28 6. How to Resolve Securely and the AD and CD Bits.........29 6.1 The AD and CD Header Bits.............................29 6.2 Staticly Configured Keys..............................31 6.3 Chaining Through The DNS..............................31 6.3.1 Chaining Through KEYs...............................31 6.3.2 Conflicting Data....................................33 6.4 Secure Time...........................................33 7. ASCII Representation of Security RRs...................34 7.1 Presentation of KEY RRs...............................34 7.2 Presentation of SIG RRs...............................35 7.3 Presentation of NXT RRs...............................36 8. Canonical Form and Order of Resource Records...........36 8.1 Canonical RR Form.....................................36 8.2 Canonical DNS Name Order..............................37 8.3 Canonical RR Ordering Within An RRset.................37 8.4 Canonical Ordering of RR Types........................37 9. Conformance............................................37 9.1 Server Conformance....................................37 9.2 Resolver Conformance..................................38 10. Security Considerations...............................38 11. IANA Considerations...................................39 References................................................39 Author's Address..........................................41 Appendix A: Base 64 Encoding..............................42 Appendix B: Changes from RFC 2065.........................44 Appendix C: Key Tag Calculation...........................46 Full Copyright Statement..................................47
4.1.5 Signature Expiration and Inception Fields...........19 4.1.6 Key Tag Field.......................................20 4.1.7 Signer's Name Field.................................20 4.1.8 Signature Field.....................................20 4.1.8.1 Calculating Transaction and Request SIGs..........21 4.2 SIG RRs in the Construction of Responses..............21 4.3 Processing Responses and SIG RRs......................22 4.4 Signature Lifetime, Expiration, TTLs, and Validity....23 5. Non-existent Names and Types...........................24 5.1 The NXT Resource Record...............................24 5.2 NXT RDATA Format......................................25 5.3 Additional Complexity Due to Wildcards................26 5.4 Example...............................................26 5.5 Special Considerations at Delegation Points...........27 5.6 Zone Transfers........................................27 5.6.1 Full Zone Transfers.................................28 5.6.2 Incremental Zone Transfers..........................28 6. How to Resolve Securely and the AD and CD Bits.........29 6.1 The AD and CD Header Bits.............................29 6.2 Staticly Configured Keys..............................31 6.3 Chaining Through The DNS..............................31 6.3.1 Chaining Through KEYs...............................31 6.3.2 Conflicting Data....................................33 6.4 Secure Time...........................................33 7. ASCII Representation of Security RRs...................34 7.1 Presentation of KEY RRs...............................34 7.2 Presentation of SIG RRs...............................35 7.3 Presentation of NXT RRs...............................36 8. Canonical Form and Order of Resource Records...........36 8.1 Canonical RR Form.....................................36 8.2 Canonical DNS Name Order..............................37 8.3 Canonical RR Ordering Within An RRset.................37 8.4 Canonical Ordering of RR Types........................37 9. Conformance............................................37 9.1 Server Conformance....................................37 9.2 Resolver Conformance..................................38 10. Security Considerations...............................38 11. IANA Considerations...................................39 References................................................39 Author's Address..........................................41 Appendix A: Base 64 Encoding..............................42 Appendix B: Changes from RFC 2065.........................44 Appendix C: Key Tag Calculation...........................46 Full Copyright Statement..................................47
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
1. Overview of Contents
1. Overview of Contents
This document standardizes extensions of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to support DNS security and public key distribution. It assumes that the reader is familiar with the Domain Name System, particularly as described in RFCs 1033, 1034, 1035 and later RFCs. An earlier version of these extensions appears in RFC 2065. This replacement for that RFC incorporates early implementation experience and requests from potential users.
This document standardizes extensions of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to support DNS security and public key distribution. It assumes that the reader is familiar with the Domain Name System, particularly as described in RFCs 1033, 1034, 1035 and later RFCs. An earlier version of these extensions appears in RFC 2065. This replacement for that RFC incorporates early implementation experience and requests from potential users.
Section 2 provides an overview of the extensions and the key distribution, data origin authentication, and transaction and request security they provide.
Section 2 provides an overview of the extensions and the key distribution, data origin authentication, and transaction and request security they provide.
Section 3 discusses the KEY resource record, its structure, and use in DNS responses. These resource records represent the public keys of entities named in the DNS and are used for key distribution.
Section 3 discusses the KEY resource record, its structure, and use in DNS responses. These resource records represent the public keys of entities named in the DNS and are used for key distribution.
Section 4 discusses the SIG digital signature resource record, its structure, and use in DNS responses. These resource records are used to authenticate other resource records in the DNS and optionally to authenticate DNS transactions and requests.
Section 4 discusses the SIG digital signature resource record, its structure, and use in DNS responses. These resource records are used to authenticate other resource records in the DNS and optionally to authenticate DNS transactions and requests.
Section 5 discusses the NXT resource record (RR) and its use in DNS responses including full and incremental zone transfers. The NXT RR permits authenticated denial of the existence of a name or of an RR type for an existing name.
Section 5 discusses the NXT resource record (RR) and its use in DNS responses including full and incremental zone transfers. The NXT RR permits authenticated denial of the existence of a name or of an RR type for an existing name.
Section 6 discusses how a resolver can be configured with a starting key or keys and proceed to securely resolve DNS requests. Interactions between resolvers and servers are discussed for various combinations of security aware and security non-aware. Two additional DNS header bits are defined for signaling between resolvers and servers.
Section 6 discusses how a resolver can be configured with a starting key or keys and proceed to securely resolve DNS requests. Interactions between resolvers and servers are discussed for various combinations of security aware and security non-aware. Two additional DNS header bits are defined for signaling between resolvers and servers.
Section 7 describes the ASCII representation of the security resource records for use in master files and elsewhere.
Section 7 describes the ASCII representation of the security resource records for use in master files and elsewhere.
Section 8 defines the canonical form and order of RRs for DNS security purposes.
Section 8 defines the canonical form and order of RRs for DNS security purposes.
Section 9 defines levels of conformance for resolvers and servers.
Section 9 defines levels of conformance for resolvers and servers.
Section 10 provides a few paragraphs on overall security considerations.
Section 10 provides a few paragraphs on overall security considerations.
Section 11 specified IANA considerations for allocation of additional values of paramters defined in this document.
Section 11 specified IANA considerations for allocation of additional values of paramters defined in this document.
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Appendix A gives details of base 64 encoding which is used in the file representation of some RRs defined in this document.
Appendix A gives details of base 64 encoding which is used in the file representation of some RRs defined in this document.
Appendix B summarizes changes between this memo and RFC 2065.
Appendix B summarizes changes between this memo and RFC 2065.
Appendix C specified how to calculate the simple checksum used as a key tag in most SIG RRs.
Appendix C specified how to calculate the simple checksum used as a key tag in most SIG RRs.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Overview of the DNS Extensions
2. Overview of the DNS Extensions
The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol security extensions provide three distinct services: key distribution as described in Section 2.2 below, data origin authentication as described in Section 2.3 below, and transaction and request authentication, described in Section 2.4 below.
The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol security extensions provide three distinct services: key distribution as described in Section 2.2 below, data origin authentication as described in Section 2.3 below, and transaction and request authentication, described in Section 2.4 below.
Special considerations related to "time to live", CNAMEs, and delegation points are also discussed in Section 2.3.
Special considerations related to "time to live", CNAMEs, and delegation points are also discussed in Section 2.3.
2.1 Services Not Provided
2.1 Services Not Provided
It is part of the design philosophy of the DNS that the data in it is public and that the DNS gives the same answers to all inquirers. Following this philosophy, no attempt has been made to include any sort of access control lists or other means to differentiate inquirers.
It is part of the design philosophy of the DNS that the data in it is public and that the DNS gives the same answers to all inquirers. Following this philosophy, no attempt has been made to include any sort of access control lists or other means to differentiate inquirers.
No effort has been made to provide for any confidentiality for queries or responses. (This service may be available via IPSEC [RFC 2401], TLS, or other security protocols.)
No effort has been made to provide for any confidentiality for queries or responses. (This service may be available via IPSEC [RFC 2401], TLS, or other security protocols.)
Protection is not provided against denial of service.
Protection is not provided against denial of service.
2.2 Key Distribution
2.2 Key Distribution
A resource record format is defined to associate keys with DNS names. This permits the DNS to be used as a public key distribution mechanism in support of DNS security itself and other protocols.
A resource record format is defined to associate keys with DNS names. This permits the DNS to be used as a public key distribution mechanism in support of DNS security itself and other protocols.
The syntax of a KEY resource record (RR) is described in Section 3. It includes an algorithm identifier, the actual public key parameter(s), and a variety of flags including those indicating the type of entity the key is associated with and/or asserting that there is no key associated with that entity.
The syntax of a KEY resource record (RR) is described in Section 3. It includes an algorithm identifier, the actual public key parameter(s), and a variety of flags including those indicating the type of entity the key is associated with and/or asserting that there is no key associated with that entity.
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Under conditions described in Section 3.5, security aware DNS servers will automatically attempt to return KEY resources as additional information, along with those resource records actually requested, to minimize the number of queries needed.
Under conditions described in Section 3.5, security aware DNS servers will automatically attempt to return KEY resources as additional information, along with those resource records actually requested, to minimize the number of queries needed.
2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity
2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity
Authentication is provided by associating with resource record sets (RRsets [RFC 2181]) in the DNS cryptographically generated digital signatures. Commonly, there will be a single private key that authenticates an entire zone but there might be multiple keys for different algorithms, signers, etc. If a security aware resolver reliably learns a public key of the zone, it can authenticate, for signed data read from that zone, that it is properly authorized. The most secure implementation is for the zone private key(s) to be kept off-line and used to re-sign all of the records in the zone periodically. However, there are cases, for example dynamic update [RFCs 2136, 2137], where DNS private keys need to be on-line [RFC 2541].
Authentication is provided by associating with resource record sets (RRsets [RFC 2181]) in the DNS cryptographically generated digital signatures. Commonly, there will be a single private key that authenticates an entire zone but there might be multiple keys for different algorithms, signers, etc. If a security aware resolver reliably learns a public key of the zone, it can authenticate, for signed data read from that zone, that it is properly authorized. The most secure implementation is for the zone private key(s) to be kept off-line and used to re-sign all of the records in the zone periodically. However, there are cases, for example dynamic update [RFCs 2136, 2137], where DNS private keys need to be on-line [RFC 2541].
The data origin authentication key(s) are associated with the zone and not with the servers that store copies of the data. That means compromise of a secondary server or, if the key(s) are kept off line, even the primary server for a zone, will not necessarily affect the degree of assurance that a resolver has that it can determine whether data is genuine.
The data origin authentication key(s) are associated with the zone and not with the servers that store copies of the data. That means compromise of a secondary server or, if the key(s) are kept off line, even the primary server for a zone, will not necessarily affect the degree of assurance that a resolver has that it can determine whether data is genuine.
A resolver could learn a public key of a zone either by reading it from the DNS or by having it staticly configured. To reliably learn a public key by reading it from the DNS, the key itself must be signed with a key the resolver trusts. The resolver must be configured with at least a public key which authenticates one zone as a starting point. From there, it can securely read public keys of other zones, if the intervening zones in the DNS tree are secure and their signed keys accessible.
A resolver could learn a public key of a zone either by reading it from the DNS or by having it staticly configured. To reliably learn a public key by reading it from the DNS, the key itself must be signed with a key the resolver trusts. The resolver must be configured with at least a public key which authenticates one zone as a starting point. From there, it can securely read public keys of other zones, if the intervening zones in the DNS tree are secure and their signed keys accessible.
Adding data origin authentication and integrity requires no change to the "on-the-wire" DNS protocol beyond the addition of the signature resource type and the key resource type needed for key distribution. (Data non-existence authentication also requires the NXT RR as described in 2.3.2.) This service can be supported by existing resolver and caching server implementations so long as they can support the additional resource types (see Section 9). The one exception is that CNAME referrals in a secure zone can not be authenticated if they are from non-security aware servers (see Section 2.3.5).
Adding data origin authentication and integrity requires no change to the "on-the-wire" DNS protocol beyond the addition of the signature resource type and the key resource type needed for key distribution. (Data non-existence authentication also requires the NXT RR as described in 2.3.2.) This service can be supported by existing resolver and caching server implementations so long as they can support the additional resource types (see Section 9). The one exception is that CNAME referrals in a secure zone can not be authenticated if they are from non-security aware servers (see Section 2.3.5).
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
If signatures are separately retrieved and verified when retrieving the information they authenticate, there will be more trips to the server and performance will suffer. Security aware servers mitigate that degradation by attempting to send the signature(s) needed (see Section 4.2).
If signatures are separately retrieved and verified when retrieving the information they authenticate, there will be more trips to the server and performance will suffer. Security aware servers mitigate that degradation by attempting to send the signature(s) needed (see Section 4.2).
2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record
2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record
The syntax of a SIG resource record (signature) is described in Section 4. It cryptographicly binds the RRset being signed to the signer and a validity interval.
The syntax of a SIG resource record (signature) is described in Section 4. It cryptographicly binds the RRset being signed to the signer and a validity interval.
Every name in a secured zone will have associated with it at least one SIG resource record for each resource type under that name except for glue address RRs and delegation point NS RRs. A security aware server will attempt to return, with RRs retrieved, the corresponding SIGs. If a server is not security aware, the resolver must retrieve all the SIG records for a name and select the one or ones that sign the resource record set(s) that resolver is interested in.
Every name in a secured zone will have associated with it at least one SIG resource record for each resource type under that name except for glue address RRs and delegation point NS RRs. A security aware server will attempt to return, with RRs retrieved, the corresponding SIGs. If a server is not security aware, the resolver must retrieve all the SIG records for a name and select the one or ones that sign the resource record set(s) that resolver is interested in.
2.3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-existence
2.3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-existence
The above security mechanism only provides a way to sign existing RRsets in a zone. "Data origin" authentication is not obviously provided for the non-existence of a domain name in a zone or the non-existence of a type for an existing name. This gap is filled by the NXT RR which authenticatably asserts a range of non-existent names in a zone and the non-existence of types for the existing name just before that range.
The above security mechanism only provides a way to sign existing RRsets in a zone. "Data origin" authentication is not obviously provided for the non-existence of a domain name in a zone or the non-existence of a type for an existing name. This gap is filled by the NXT RR which authenticatably asserts a range of non-existent names in a zone and the non-existence of types for the existing name just before that range.
Section 5 below covers the NXT RR.
Section 5 below covers the NXT RR.
2.3.3 Special Considerations With Time-to-Live
2.3.3 Special Considerations With Time-to-Live
A digital signature will fail to verify if any change has occurred to the data between the time it was originally signed and the time the signature is verified. This conflicts with our desire to have the time-to-live (TTL) field of resource records tick down while they are cached.
A digital signature will fail to verify if any change has occurred to the data between the time it was originally signed and the time the signature is verified. This conflicts with our desire to have the time-to-live (TTL) field of resource records tick down while they are cached.
This could be avoided by leaving the time-to-live out of the digital signature, but that would allow unscrupulous servers to set arbitrarily long TTL values undetected. Instead, we include the "original" TTL in the signature and communicate that data along with the current TTL. Unscrupulous servers under this scheme can manipulate the TTL but a security aware resolver will bound the TTL value it uses at the original signed value. Separately, signatures include a signature inception time and a signature expiration time. A
This could be avoided by leaving the time-to-live out of the digital signature, but that would allow unscrupulous servers to set arbitrarily long TTL values undetected. Instead, we include the "original" TTL in the signature and communicate that data along with the current TTL. Unscrupulous servers under this scheme can manipulate the TTL but a security aware resolver will bound the TTL value it uses at the original signed value. Separately, signatures include a signature inception time and a signature expiration time. A
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
resolver that knows the absolute time can determine securely whether a signature is in effect. It is not possible to rely solely on the signature expiration as a substitute for the TTL, however, since the TTL is primarily a database consistency mechanism and non-security aware servers that depend on TTL must still be supported.
resolver that knows the absolute time can determine securely whether a signature is in effect. It is not possible to rely solely on the signature expiration as a substitute for the TTL, however, since the TTL is primarily a database consistency mechanism and non-security aware servers that depend on TTL must still be supported.
2.3.4 Special Considerations at Delegation Points
2.3.4 Special Considerations at Delegation Points
DNS security would like to view each zone as a unit of data completely under the control of the zone owner with each entry (RRset) signed by a special private key held by the zone manager. But the DNS protocol views the leaf nodes in a zone, which are also the apex nodes of a subzone (i.e., delegation points), as "really" belonging to the subzone. These nodes occur in two master files and might have RRs signed by both the upper and lower zone's keys. A retrieval could get a mixture of these RRs and SIGs, especially since one server could be serving both the zone above and below a delegation point. [RFC 2181]
DNS security would like to view each zone as a unit of data completely under the control of the zone owner with each entry (RRset) signed by a special private key held by the zone manager. But the DNS protocol views the leaf nodes in a zone, which are also the apex nodes of a subzone (i.e., delegation points), as "really" belonging to the subzone. These nodes occur in two master files and might have RRs signed by both the upper and lower zone's keys. A retrieval could get a mixture of these RRs and SIGs, especially since one server could be serving both the zone above and below a delegation point. [RFC 2181]
There MUST be a zone KEY RR, signed by its superzone, for every subzone if the superzone is secure. This will normally appear in the subzone and may also be included in the superzone. But, in the case of an unsecured subzone which can not or will not be modified to add any security RRs, a KEY declaring the subzone to be unsecured MUST appear with the superzone signature in the superzone, if the superzone is secure. For all but one other RR type the data from the subzone is more authoritative so only the subzone KEY RR should be signed in the superzone if it appears there. The NS and any glue address RRs SHOULD only be signed in the subzone. The SOA and any other RRs that have the zone name as owner should appear only in the subzone and thus are signed only there. The NXT RR type is the exceptional case that will always appear differently and authoritatively in both the superzone and subzone, if both are secure, as described in Section 5.
There MUST be a zone KEY RR, signed by its superzone, for every subzone if the superzone is secure. This will normally appear in the subzone and may also be included in the superzone. But, in the case of an unsecured subzone which can not or will not be modified to add any security RRs, a KEY declaring the subzone to be unsecured MUST appear with the superzone signature in the superzone, if the superzone is secure. For all but one other RR type the data from the subzone is more authoritative so only the subzone KEY RR should be signed in the superzone if it appears there. The NS and any glue address RRs SHOULD only be signed in the subzone. The SOA and any other RRs that have the zone name as owner should appear only in the subzone and thus are signed only there. The NXT RR type is the exceptional case that will always appear differently and authoritatively in both the superzone and subzone, if both are secure, as described in Section 5.
2.3.5 Special Considerations with CNAME
2.3.5 Special Considerations with CNAME
There is a problem when security related RRs with the same owner name as a CNAME RR are retrieved from a non-security-aware server. In particular, an initial retrieval for the CNAME or any other type may not retrieve any associated SIG, KEY, or NXT RR. For retrieved types other than CNAME, it will retrieve that type at the target name of the CNAME (or chain of CNAMEs) and will also return the CNAME. In particular, a specific retrieval for type SIG will not get the SIG, if any, at the original CNAME domain name but rather a SIG at the target name.
There is a problem when security related RRs with the same owner name as a CNAME RR are retrieved from a non-security-aware server. In particular, an initial retrieval for the CNAME or any other type may not retrieve any associated SIG, KEY, or NXT RR. For retrieved types other than CNAME, it will retrieve that type at the target name of the CNAME (or chain of CNAMEs) and will also return the CNAME. In particular, a specific retrieval for type SIG will not get the SIG, if any, at the original CNAME domain name but rather a SIG at the target name.
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Security aware servers must be used to securely CNAME in DNS. Security aware servers MUST (1) allow KEY, SIG, and NXT RRs along with CNAME RRs, (2) suppress CNAME processing on retrieval of these types as well as on retrieval of the type CNAME, and (3) automatically return SIG RRs authenticating the CNAME or CNAMEs encountered in resolving a query. This is a change from the previous DNS standard [RFCs 1034/1035] which prohibited any other RR type at a node where a CNAME RR was present.
Security aware servers must be used to securely CNAME in DNS. Security aware servers MUST (1) allow KEY, SIG, and NXT RRs along with CNAME RRs, (2) suppress CNAME processing on retrieval of these types as well as on retrieval of the type CNAME, and (3) automatically return SIG RRs authenticating the CNAME or CNAMEs encountered in resolving a query. This is a change from the previous DNS standard [RFCs 1034/1035] which prohibited any other RR type at a node where a CNAME RR was present.
2.3.6 Signers Other Than The Zone
2.3.6 Signers Other Than The Zone
There are cases where the signer in a SIG resource record is other than one of the private key(s) used to authenticate a zone.
There are cases where the signer in a SIG resource record is other than one of the private key(s) used to authenticate a zone.
One is for support of dynamic update [RFC 2136] (or future requests which require secure authentication) where an entity is permitted to authenticate/update its records [RFC 2137] and the zone is operating in a mode where the zone key is not on line. The public key of the entity must be present in the DNS and be signed by a zone level key but the other RR(s) may be signed with the entity's key.
One is for support of dynamic update [RFC 2136] (or future requests which require secure authentication) where an entity is permitted to authenticate/update its records [RFC 2137] and the zone is operating in a mode where the zone key is not on line. The public key of the entity must be present in the DNS and be signed by a zone level key but the other RR(s) may be signed with the entity's key.
A second case is support of transaction and request authentication as described in Section 2.4.
A second case is support of transaction and request authentication as described in Section 2.4.
In additions, signatures can be included on resource records within the DNS for use by applications other than DNS. DNS related signatures authenticate that data originated with the authority of a zone owner or that a request or transaction originated with the relevant entity. Other signatures can provide other types of assurances.
In additions, signatures can be included on resource records within the DNS for use by applications other than DNS. DNS related signatures authenticate that data originated with the authority of a zone owner or that a request or transaction originated with the relevant entity. Other signatures can provide other types of assurances.
2.4 DNS Transaction and Request Authentication
2.4 DNS Transaction and Request Authentication
The data origin authentication service described above protects retrieved resource records and the non-existence of resource records but provides no protection for DNS requests or for message headers.
The data origin authentication service described above protects retrieved resource records and the non-existence of resource records but provides no protection for DNS requests or for message headers.
If header bits are falsely set by a bad server, there is little that can be done. However, it is possible to add transaction authentication. Such authentication means that a resolver can be sure it is at least getting messages from the server it thinks it queried and that the response is from the query it sent (i.e., that these messages have not been diddled in transit). This is accomplished by optionally adding a special SIG resource record at the end of the reply which digitally signs the concatenation of the server's response and the resolver's query.
If header bits are falsely set by a bad server, there is little that can be done. However, it is possible to add transaction authentication. Such authentication means that a resolver can be sure it is at least getting messages from the server it thinks it queried and that the response is from the query it sent (i.e., that these messages have not been diddled in transit). This is accomplished by optionally adding a special SIG resource record at the end of the reply which digitally signs the concatenation of the server's response and the resolver's query.
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Requests can also be authenticated by including a special SIG RR at the end of the request. Authenticating requests serves no function in older DNS servers and requests with a non-empty additional information section produce error returns or may even be ignored by many of them. However, this syntax for signing requests is defined as a way of authenticating secure dynamic update requests [RFC 2137] or future requests requiring authentication.
Requests can also be authenticated by including a special SIG RR at the end of the request. Authenticating requests serves no function in older DNS servers and requests with a non-empty additional information section produce error returns or may even be ignored by many of them. However, this syntax for signing requests is defined as a way of authenticating secure dynamic update requests [RFC 2137] or future requests requiring authentication.
The private keys used in transaction security belong to the entity composing the reply, not to the zone involved. Request authentication may also involve the private key of the host or other entity composing the request or other private keys depending on the request authority it is sought to establish. The corresponding public key(s) are normally stored in and retrieved from the DNS for verification.
The private keys used in transaction security belong to the entity composing the reply, not to the zone involved. Request authentication may also involve the private key of the host or other entity composing the request or other private keys depending on the request authority it is sought to establish. The corresponding public key(s) are normally stored in and retrieved from the DNS for verification.
Because requests and replies are highly variable, message authentication SIGs can not be pre-calculated. Thus it will be necessary to keep the private key on-line, for example in software or in a directly connected piece of hardware.
Because requests and replies are highly variable, message authentication SIGs can not be pre-calculated. Thus it will be necessary to keep the private key on-line, for example in software or in a directly connected piece of hardware.
3. The KEY Resource Record
3. The KEY Resource Record
The KEY resource record (RR) is used to store a public key that is associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name. This can be the public key of a zone, a user, or a host or other end entity. Security aware DNS implementations MUST be designed to handle at least two simultaneously valid keys of the same type associated with the same name.
The KEY resource record (RR) is used to store a public key that is associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name. This can be the public key of a zone, a user, or a host or other end entity. Security aware DNS implementations MUST be designed to handle at least two simultaneously valid keys of the same type associated with the same name.
The type number for the KEY RR is 25.
The type number for the KEY RR is 25.
A KEY RR is, like any other RR, authenticated by a SIG RR. KEY RRs must be signed by a zone level key.
A KEY RR is, like any other RR, authenticated by a SIG RR. KEY RRs must be signed by a zone level key.
3.1 KEY RDATA format
3.1 KEY RDATA format
The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a protocol octet, the algorithm number octet, and the public key itself. The format is as follows:
The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a protocol octet, the algorithm number octet, and the public key itself. The format is as follows:
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| flags | protocol | algorithm |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ public key /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | flags | protocol | algorithm | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | / / public key / / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
The KEY RR is not intended for storage of certificates and a separate certificate RR has been developed for that purpose, defined in [RFC 2538].
The KEY RR is not intended for storage of certificates and a separate certificate RR has been developed for that purpose, defined in [RFC 2538].
The meaning of the KEY RR owner name, flags, and protocol octet are described in Sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.5 below. The flags and algorithm must be examined before any data following the algorithm octet as they control the existence and format of any following data. The algorithm and public key fields are described in Section 3.2. The format of the public key is algorithm dependent.
The meaning of the KEY RR owner name, flags, and protocol octet are described in Sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.5 below. The flags and algorithm must be examined before any data following the algorithm octet as they control the existence and format of any following data. The algorithm and public key fields are described in Section 3.2. The format of the public key is algorithm dependent.
KEY RRs do not specify their validity period but their authenticating SIG RR(s) do as described in Section 4 below.
KEY RRs do not specify their validity period but their authenticating SIG RR(s) do as described in Section 4 below.
3.1.1 Object Types, DNS Names, and Keys
3.1.1 Object Types, DNS Names, and Keys
The public key in a KEY RR is for the object named in the owner name.
The public key in a KEY RR is for the object named in the owner name.
A DNS name may refer to three different categories of things. For example, foo.host.example could be (1) a zone, (2) a host or other end entity , or (3) the mapping into a DNS name of the user or account foo@host.example. Thus, there are flag bits, as described below, in the KEY RR to indicate with which of these roles the owner name and public key are associated. Note that an appropriate zone KEY RR MUST occur at the apex node of a secure zone and zone KEY RRs occur only at delegation points.
A DNS name may refer to three different categories of things. For example, foo.host.example could be (1) a zone, (2) a host or other end entity , or (3) the mapping into a DNS name of the user or account foo@host.example. Thus, there are flag bits, as described below, in the KEY RR to indicate with which of these roles the owner name and public key are associated. Note that an appropriate zone KEY RR MUST occur at the apex node of a secure zone and zone KEY RRs occur only at delegation points.
3.1.2 The KEY RR Flag Field
3.1.2 The KEY RR Flag Field
In the "flags" field:
In the "flags" field:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| A/C | Z | XT| Z | Z | NAMTYP| Z | Z | Z | Z | SIG |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ | A/C | Z | XT| Z | Z | NAMTYP| Z | Z | Z | Z | SIG | +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Bit 0 and 1 are the key "type" bits whose values have the following meanings:
Bit 0 and 1 are the key "type" bits whose values have the following meanings:
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
10: Use of the key is prohibited for authentication.
01: Use of the key is prohibited for confidentiality.
00: Use of the key for authentication and/or confidentiality
is permitted. Note that DNS security makes use of keys
for authentication only. Confidentiality use flagging is
provided for use of keys in other protocols.
Implementations not intended to support key distribution
for confidentiality MAY require that the confidentiality
use prohibited bit be on for keys they serve.
11: If both bits are one, the "no key" value, there is no key
information and the RR stops after the algorithm octet.
By the use of this "no key" value, a signed KEY RR can
authenticatably assert that, for example, a zone is not
secured. See section 3.4 below.
10: Use of the key is prohibited for authentication. 01: Use of the key is prohibited for confidentiality. 00: Use of the key for authentication and/or confidentiality is permitted. Note that DNS security makes use of keys for authentication only. Confidentiality use flagging is provided for use of keys in other protocols. Implementations not intended to support key distribution for confidentiality MAY require that the confidentiality use prohibited bit be on for keys they serve. 11: If both bits are one, the "no key" value, there is no key information and the RR stops after the algorithm octet. By the use of this "no key" value, a signed KEY RR can authenticatably assert that, for example, a zone is not secured. See section 3.4 below.
Bits 2 is reserved and must be zero.
Bits 2 is reserved and must be zero.
Bits 3 is reserved as a flag extension bit. If it is a one, a second
16 bit flag field is added after the algorithm octet and
before the key data. This bit MUST NOT be set unless one or
more such additional bits have been defined and are non-zero.
Bits 3 is reserved as a flag extension bit. If it is a one, a second 16 bit flag field is added after the algorithm octet and before the key data. This bit MUST NOT be set unless one or more such additional bits have been defined and are non-zero.
Bits 4-5 are reserved and must be zero.
Bits 4-5 are reserved and must be zero.
Bits 6 and 7 form a field that encodes the name type. Field values have the following meanings:
Bits 6 and 7 form a field that encodes the name type. Field values have the following meanings:
00: indicates that this is a key associated with a "user" or
"account" at an end entity, usually a host. The coding
of the owner name is that used for the responsible
individual mailbox in the SOA and RP RRs: The owner name
is the user name as the name of a node under the entity
name. For example, "j_random_user" on
host.subdomain.example could have a public key associated
through a KEY RR with name
j_random_user.host.subdomain.example. It could be used
in a security protocol where authentication of a user was
desired. This key might be useful in IP or other
security for a user level service such a telnet, ftp,
rlogin, etc.
01: indicates that this is a zone key for the zone whose name
is the KEY RR owner name. This is the public key used
for the primary DNS security feature of data origin
authentication. Zone KEY RRs occur only at delegation
points.
10: indicates that this is a key associated with the non-zone
"entity" whose name is the RR owner name. This will
commonly be a host but could, in some parts of the DNS
00: indicates that this is a key associated with a "user" or "account" at an end entity, usually a host. The coding of the owner name is that used for the responsible individual mailbox in the SOA and RP RRs: The owner name is the user name as the name of a node under the entity name. For example, "j_random_user" on host.subdomain.example could have a public key associated through a KEY RR with name j_random_user.host.subdomain.example. It could be used in a security protocol where authentication of a user was desired. This key might be useful in IP or other security for a user level service such a telnet, ftp, rlogin, etc. 01: indicates that this is a zone key for the zone whose name is the KEY RR owner name. This is the public key used for the primary DNS security feature of data origin authentication. Zone KEY RRs occur only at delegation points. 10: indicates that this is a key associated with the non-zone "entity" whose name is the RR owner name. This will commonly be a host but could, in some parts of the DNS
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
tree, be some other type of entity such as a telephone
number [RFC 1530] or numeric IP address. This is the
public key used in connection with DNS request and
transaction authentication services. It could also be
used in an IP-security protocol where authentication at
the host, rather than user, level was desired, such as
routing, NTP, etc.
11: reserved.
tree, be some other type of entity such as a telephone number [RFC 1530] or numeric IP address. This is the public key used in connection with DNS request and transaction authentication services. It could also be used in an IP-security protocol where authentication at the host, rather than user, level was desired, such as routing, NTP, etc. 11: reserved.
Bits 8-11 are reserved and must be zero.
Bits 8-11 are reserved and must be zero.
Bits 12-15 are the "signatory" field. If non-zero, they indicate
that the key can validly sign things as specified in DNS
dynamic update [RFC 2137]. Note that zone keys (see bits
6 and 7 above) always have authority to sign any RRs in
the zone regardless of the value of the signatory field.
Bits 12-15 are the "signatory" field. If non-zero, they indicate that the key can validly sign things as specified in DNS dynamic update [RFC 2137]. Note that zone keys (see bits 6 and 7 above) always have authority to sign any RRs in the zone regardless of the value of the signatory field.
3.1.3 The Protocol Octet
3.1.3 The Protocol Octet
It is anticipated that keys stored in DNS will be used in conjunction with a variety of Internet protocols. It is intended that the protocol octet and possibly some of the currently unused (must be zero) bits in the KEY RR flags as specified in the future will be used to indicate a key's validity for different protocols.
It is anticipated that keys stored in DNS will be used in conjunction with a variety of Internet protocols. It is intended that the protocol octet and possibly some of the currently unused (must be zero) bits in the KEY RR flags as specified in the future will be used to indicate a key's validity for different protocols.
The following values of the Protocol Octet are reserved as indicated:
The following values of the Protocol Octet are reserved as indicated:
VALUE Protocol
VALUE Protocol
0 -reserved
1 TLS
2 email
3 dnssec
4 IPSEC
5-254 - available for assignment by IANA
255 All
0 -reserved 1 TLS 2 email 3 dnssec 4 IPSEC 5-254 - available for assignment by IANA 255 All
In more detail:
1 is reserved for use in connection with TLS.
2 is reserved for use in connection with email.
3 is used for DNS security. The protocol field SHOULD be set to
this value for zone keys and other keys used in DNS security.
Implementations that can determine that a key is a DNS
security key by the fact that flags label it a zone key or the
signatory flag field is non-zero are NOT REQUIRED to check the
protocol field.
4 is reserved to refer to the Oakley/IPSEC [RFC 2401] protocol
and indicates that this key is valid for use in conjunction
In more detail: 1 is reserved for use in connection with TLS. 2 is reserved for use in connection with email. 3 is used for DNS security. The protocol field SHOULD be set to this value for zone keys and other keys used in DNS security. Implementations that can determine that a key is a DNS security key by the fact that flags label it a zone key or the signatory flag field is non-zero are NOT REQUIRED to check the protocol field. 4 is reserved to refer to the Oakley/IPSEC [RFC 2401] protocol and indicates that this key is valid for use in conjunction
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
with that security standard. This key could be used in
connection with secured communication on behalf of an end
entity or user whose name is the owner name of the KEY RR if
the entity or user flag bits are set. The presence of a KEY
resource with this protocol value is an assertion that the
host speaks Oakley/IPSEC.
255 indicates that the key can be used in connection with any
protocol for which KEY RR protocol octet values have been
defined. The use of this value is discouraged and the use of
different keys for different protocols is encouraged.
with that security standard. This key could be used in connection with secured communication on behalf of an end entity or user whose name is the owner name of the KEY RR if the entity or user flag bits are set. The presence of a KEY resource with this protocol value is an assertion that the host speaks Oakley/IPSEC. 255 indicates that the key can be used in connection with any protocol for which KEY RR protocol octet values have been defined. The use of this value is discouraged and the use of different keys for different protocols is encouraged.
3.2 The KEY Algorithm Number Specification
3.2 The KEY Algorithm Number Specification
This octet is the key algorithm parallel to the same field for the SIG resource as described in Section 4.1. The following values are assigned:
This octet is the key algorithm parallel to the same field for the SIG resource as described in Section 4.1. The following values are assigned:
VALUE Algorithm
VALUE Algorithm
0 - reserved, see Section 11
1 RSA/MD5 [RFC 2537] - recommended
2 Diffie-Hellman [RFC 2539] - optional, key only
3 DSA [RFC 2536] - MANDATORY
4 reserved for elliptic curve crypto
5-251 - available, see Section 11
252 reserved for indirect keys
253 private - domain name (see below)
254 private - OID (see below)
255 - reserved, see Section 11
0 - reserved, see Section 11 1 RSA/MD5 [RFC 2537] - recommended 2 Diffie-Hellman [RFC 2539] - optional, key only 3 DSA [RFC 2536] - MANDATORY 4 reserved for elliptic curve crypto 5-251 - available, see Section 11 252 reserved for indirect keys 253 private - domain name (see below) 254 private - OID (see below) 255 - reserved, see Section 11
Algorithm specific formats and procedures are given in separate documents. The mandatory to implement for interoperability algorithm is number 3, DSA. It is recommended that the RSA/MD5 algorithm, number 1, also be implemented. Algorithm 2 is used to indicate Diffie-Hellman keys and algorithm 4 is reserved for elliptic curve.
Algorithm specific formats and procedures are given in separate documents. The mandatory to implement for interoperability algorithm is number 3, DSA. It is recommended that the RSA/MD5 algorithm, number 1, also be implemented. Algorithm 2 is used to indicate Diffie-Hellman keys and algorithm 4 is reserved for elliptic curve.
Algorithm number 252 indicates an indirect key format where the actual key material is elsewhere. This format is to be defined in a separate document.
Algorithm number 252 indicates an indirect key format where the actual key material is elsewhere. This format is to be defined in a separate document.
Algorithm numbers 253 and 254 are reserved for private use and will never be assigned a specific algorithm. For number 253, the public key area and the signature begin with a wire encoded domain name. Only local domain name compression is permitted. The domain name indicates the private algorithm to use and the remainder of the public key area is whatever is required by that algorithm. For number 254, the public key area for the KEY RR and the signature begin with an unsigned length byte followed by a BER encoded Object
Algorithm numbers 253 and 254 are reserved for private use and will never be assigned a specific algorithm. For number 253, the public key area and the signature begin with a wire encoded domain name. Only local domain name compression is permitted. The domain name indicates the private algorithm to use and the remainder of the public key area is whatever is required by that algorithm. For number 254, the public key area for the KEY RR and the signature begin with an unsigned length byte followed by a BER encoded Object
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Identifier (ISO OID) of that length. The OID indicates the private algorithm in use and the remainder of the area is whatever is required by that algorithm. Entities should only use domain names and OIDs they control to designate their private algorithms.
Identifier (ISO OID) of that length. The OID indicates the private algorithm in use and the remainder of the area is whatever is required by that algorithm. Entities should only use domain names and OIDs they control to designate their private algorithms.
Values 0 and 255 are reserved but the value 0 is used in the algorithm field when that field is not used. An example is in a KEY RR with the top two flag bits on, the "no-key" value, where no key is present.
Values 0 and 255 are reserved but the value 0 is used in the algorithm field when that field is not used. An example is in a KEY RR with the top two flag bits on, the "no-key" value, where no key is present.
3.3 Interaction of Flags, Algorithm, and Protocol Bytes
3.3 Interaction of Flags, Algorithm, and Protocol Bytes
Various combinations of the no-key type flags, algorithm byte, protocol byte, and any future assigned protocol indicating flags are possible. The meaning of these combinations is indicated below:
Various combinations of the no-key type flags, algorithm byte, protocol byte, and any future assigned protocol indicating flags are possible. The meaning of these combinations is indicated below:
NK = no key type (flags bits 0 and 1 on) AL = algorithm byte PR = protocols indicated by protocol byte or future assigned flags
NK = no key type (flags bits 0 and 1 on) AL = algorithm byte PR = protocols indicated by protocol byte or future assigned flags
x represents any valid non-zero value(s).
x represents any valid non-zero value(s).
AL PR NK Meaning
0 0 0 Illegal, claims key but has bad algorithm field.
0 0 1 Specifies total lack of security for owner zone.
0 x 0 Illegal, claims key but has bad algorithm field.
0 x 1 Specified protocols unsecured, others may be secure.
x 0 0 Gives key but no protocols to use it.
x 0 1 Denies key for specific algorithm.
x x 0 Specifies key for protocols.
x x 1 Algorithm not understood for protocol.
AL PR NK Meaning 0 0 0 Illegal, claims key but has bad algorithm field. 0 0 1 Specifies total lack of security for owner zone. 0 x 0 Illegal, claims key but has bad algorithm field. 0 x 1 Specified protocols unsecured, others may be secure. x 0 0 Gives key but no protocols to use it. x 0 1 Denies key for specific algorithm. x x 0 Specifies key for protocols. x x 1 Algorithm not understood for protocol.
3.4 Determination of Zone Secure/Unsecured Status
3.4 Determination of Zone Secure/Unsecured Status
A zone KEY RR with the "no-key" type field value (both key type flag bits 0 and 1 on) indicates that the zone named is unsecured while a zone KEY RR with a key present indicates that the zone named is secure. The secured versus unsecured status of a zone may vary with different cryptographic algorithms. Even for the same algorithm, conflicting zone KEY RRs may be present.
A zone KEY RR with the "no-key" type field value (both key type flag bits 0 and 1 on) indicates that the zone named is unsecured while a zone KEY RR with a key present indicates that the zone named is secure. The secured versus unsecured status of a zone may vary with different cryptographic algorithms. Even for the same algorithm, conflicting zone KEY RRs may be present.
Zone KEY RRs, like all RRs, are only trusted if they are authenticated by a SIG RR whose signer field is a signer for which the resolver has a public key they trust and where resolver policy permits that signer to sign for the KEY owner name. Untrusted zone KEY RRs MUST be ignored in determining the security status of the zone. However, there can be multiple sets of trusted zone KEY RRs for a zone with different algorithms, signers, etc.
Zone KEY RRs, like all RRs, are only trusted if they are authenticated by a SIG RR whose signer field is a signer for which the resolver has a public key they trust and where resolver policy permits that signer to sign for the KEY owner name. Untrusted zone KEY RRs MUST be ignored in determining the security status of the zone. However, there can be multiple sets of trusted zone KEY RRs for a zone with different algorithms, signers, etc.
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
For any particular algorithm, zones can be (1) secure, indicating that any retrieved RR must be authenticated by a SIG RR or it will be discarded as bogus, (2) unsecured, indicating that SIG RRs are not expected or required for RRs retrieved from the zone, or (3) experimentally secure, which indicates that SIG RRs might or might not be present but must be checked if found. The status of a zone is determined as follows:
For any particular algorithm, zones can be (1) secure, indicating that any retrieved RR must be authenticated by a SIG RR or it will be discarded as bogus, (2) unsecured, indicating that SIG RRs are not expected or required for RRs retrieved from the zone, or (3) experimentally secure, which indicates that SIG RRs might or might not be present but must be checked if found. The status of a zone is determined as follows:
1. If, for a zone and algorithm, every trusted zone KEY RR for the
zone says there is no key for that zone, it is unsecured for that
algorithm.
1. If, for a zone and algorithm, every trusted zone KEY RR for the zone says there is no key for that zone, it is unsecured for that algorithm.
2. If, there is at least one trusted no-key zone KEY RR and one
trusted key specifying zone KEY RR, then that zone is only
experimentally secure for the algorithm. Both authenticated and
non-authenticated RRs for it should be accepted by the resolver.
2. If, there is at least one trusted no-key zone KEY RR and one trusted key specifying zone KEY RR, then that zone is only experimentally secure for the algorithm. Both authenticated and non-authenticated RRs for it should be accepted by the resolver.
3. If every trusted zone KEY RR that the zone and algorithm has is
key specifying, then it is secure for that algorithm and only
authenticated RRs from it will be accepted.
3. If every trusted zone KEY RR that the zone and algorithm has is key specifying, then it is secure for that algorithm and only authenticated RRs from it will be accepted.
Examples:
Examples:
(1) A resolver initially trusts only signatures by the superzone of zone Z within the DNS hierarchy. Thus it will look only at the KEY RRs that are signed by the superzone. If it finds only no-key KEY RRs, it will assume the zone is not secure. If it finds only key specifying KEY RRs, it will assume the zone is secure and reject any unsigned responses. If it finds both, it will assume the zone is experimentally secure
(1) A resolver initially trusts only signatures by the superzone of zone Z within the DNS hierarchy. Thus it will look only at the KEY RRs that are signed by the superzone. If it finds only no-key KEY RRs, it will assume the zone is not secure. If it finds only key specifying KEY RRs, it will assume the zone is secure and reject any unsigned responses. If it finds both, it will assume the zone is experimentally secure
(2) A resolver trusts the superzone of zone Z (to which it got securely from its local zone) and a third party, cert-auth.example. When considering data from zone Z, it may be signed by the superzone of Z, by cert-auth.example, by both, or by neither. The following table indicates whether zone Z will be considered secure, experimentally secure, or unsecured, depending on the signed zone KEY RRs for Z;
(2) A resolver trusts the superzone of zone Z (to which it got securely from its local zone) and a third party, cert-auth.example. When considering data from zone Z, it may be signed by the superzone of Z, by cert-auth.example, by both, or by neither. The following table indicates whether zone Z will be considered secure, experimentally secure, or unsecured, depending on the signed zone KEY RRs for Z;
c e r t - a u t h . e x a m p l e
c e r t - a u t h . e x a m p l e
KEY RRs| None | NoKeys | Mixed | Keys |
S --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+
u None | illegal | unsecured | experim. | secure |
p --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+
e NoKeys | unsecured | unsecured | experim. | secure |
r --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+
Z Mixed | experim. | experim. | experim. | secure |
KEY RRs| None | NoKeys | Mixed | Keys | S --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+ u None | illegal | unsecured | experim. | secure | p --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+ e NoKeys | unsecured | unsecured | experim. | secure | r --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+ Z Mixed | experim. | experim. | experim. | secure |
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Eastlake Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
o --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+
n Keys | secure | secure | secure | secure |
e +-----------+-----------+----------+----------+
o --+-----------+-----------+----------+----------+ n Keys | secure | secure | secure | secure | e +-----------+-----------+----------+----------+
3.5 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses
3.5 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses
An explicit request for KEY RRs does not cause any special additional information processing except, of course, for the corresponding SIG RR from a security aware server (see Section 4.2).
An explicit request for KEY RRs does not cause any special additional information processing except, of course, for the corresponding SIG RR from a security aware server (see Section 4.2).
Security aware DNS servers include KEY RRs as additional information in responses, where a KEY is available, in the following cases:
Security aware DNS servers include KEY RRs as additional information in responses, where a KEY is available, in the following cases:
(1) On the retrieval of SOA or NS RRs, the KEY RRset with the same name (perhaps just a zone key) SHOULD be included as additional information if space is available. If not all additional information will fit, type A and AAAA glue RRs have higher priority than KEY RR(s).
(1) On the retrieval of SOA or NS RRs, the KEY RRset with the same name (perhaps just a zone key) SHOULD be included as additional information if space is available. If not all additional information will fit, type A and AAAA glue RRs have higher priority than KEY RR(s).
(2) On retrieval of type A or AAAA RRs, the KEY RRset with the same name (usually just a host RR and NOT the zone key (which usually would have a different name)) SHOULD be included if space is available. On inclusion of A or AAAA RRs as additional information, the KEY RRset with the same name should also be included but with lower priority than the A or AAAA RRs.
(2) On retrieval of type A or AAAA RRs, the KEY RRset with the same name (usually just a host RR and NOT the zone key (which usually would have a different name)) SHOULD be included if space is available. On inclusion of A or AAAA RRs as additional information, the KEY RRset with the same name should also be included but with lower priority than the A or AAAA RRs.
4. The SIG Resource Record
4. The SIG Resource Record
The SIG or "signature" resource record (RR) is the fundamental way that data is authenticated in the secure Domain Name System (DNS). As such it is the heart of the security provided.
The SIG or "signature" resource record (RR) is the fundamental way that data is authenticated in the secure Domain Name System (DNS). As such it is the heart of the security provided.
The SIG RR unforgably authenticates an RRset [RFC 2181] of a particular type, class, and name and binds it to a time interval and the signer's domain name. This is done using cryptographic techniques and the signer's private key. The signer is frequently the owner of the zone from which the RR originated.
The SIG RR unforgably authenticates an RRset [RFC 2181] of a particular type, class, and name and binds it to a time interval and the signer's domain name. This is done using cryptographic techniques and the signer's private key. The signer is frequently the owner of the zone from which the RR originated.
The type number for the SIG RR type is 24.
The type number for the SIG RR type is 24.
4.1 SIG RDATA Format
4.1 SIG RDATA Format
The RDATA portion of a SIG RR is as shown below. The integrity of the RDATA information is protected by the signature field.
The RDATA portion of a SIG RR is as shown below. The integrity of the RDATA information is protected by the signature field.
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Eastlake Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| type covered | algorithm | labels |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| original TTL |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| signature expiration |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| signature inception |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| key tag | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ signer's name +
| /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-/
/ /
/ signature /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | type covered | algorithm | labels | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | original TTL | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | signature expiration | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | signature inception | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | key tag | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ signer's name + | / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-/ / / / signature / / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
4.1.1 Type Covered Field
4.1.1 Type Covered Field
The "type covered" is the type of the other RRs covered by this SIG.
The "type covered" is the type of the other RRs covered by this SIG.
4.1.2 Algorithm Number Field
4.1.2 Algorithm Number Field
This octet is as described in section 3.2.
This octet is as described in section 3.2.
4.1.3 Labels Field
4.1.3 Labels Field
The "labels" octet is an unsigned count of how many labels there are in the original SIG RR owner name not counting the null label for root and not counting any initial "*" for a wildcard. If a secured retrieval is the result of wild card substitution, it is necessary for the resolver to use the original form of the name in verifying the digital signature. This field makes it easy to determine the original form.
The "labels" octet is an unsigned count of how many labels there are in the original SIG RR owner name not counting the null label for root and not counting any initial "*" for a wildcard. If a secured retrieval is the result of wild card substitution, it is necessary for the resolver to use the original form of the name in verifying the digital signature. This field makes it easy to determine the original form.
If, on retrieval, the RR appears to have a longer name than indicated by "labels", the resolver can tell it is the result of wildcard substitution. If the RR owner name appears to be shorter than the labels count, the SIG RR must be considered corrupt and ignored. The maximum number of labels allowed in the current DNS is 127 but the entire octet is reserved and would be required should DNS names ever be expanded to 255 labels. The following table gives some examples. The value of "labels" is at the top, the retrieved owner name on the left, and the table entry is the name to use in signature verification except that "bad" means the RR is corrupt.
If, on retrieval, the RR appears to have a longer name than indicated by "labels", the resolver can tell it is the result of wildcard substitution. If the RR owner name appears to be shorter than the labels count, the SIG RR must be considered corrupt and ignored. The maximum number of labels allowed in the current DNS is 127 but the entire octet is reserved and would be required should DNS names ever be expanded to 255 labels. The following table gives some examples. The value of "labels" is at the top, the retrieved owner name on the left, and the table entry is the name to use in signature verification except that "bad" means the RR is corrupt.
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Eastlake Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
labels= | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
--------+-----+------+--------+----------+----------+
.| . | bad | bad | bad | bad |
d.| *. | d. | bad | bad | bad |
c.d.| *. | *.d. | c.d. | bad | bad |
b.c.d.| *. | *.d. | *.c.d. | b.c.d. | bad |
a.b.c.d.| *. | *.d. | *.c.d. | *.b.c.d. | a.b.c.d. |
labels= | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | --------+-----+------+--------+----------+----------+ .| . | bad | bad | bad | bad | d.| *. | d. | bad | bad | bad | c.d.| *. | *.d. | c.d. | bad | bad | b.c.d.| *. | *.d. | *.c.d. | b.c.d. | bad | a.b.c.d.| *. | *.d. | *.c.d. | *.b.c.d. | a.b.c.d. |
4.1.4 Original TTL Field
4.1.4 Original TTL Field
The "original TTL" field is included in the RDATA portion to avoid (1) authentication problems that caching servers would otherwise cause by decrementing the real TTL field and (2) security problems that unscrupulous servers could otherwise cause by manipulating the real TTL field. This original TTL is protected by the signature while the current TTL field is not.
The "original TTL" field is included in the RDATA portion to avoid (1) authentication problems that caching servers would otherwise cause by decrementing the real TTL field and (2) security problems that unscrupulous servers could otherwise cause by manipulating the real TTL field. This original TTL is protected by the signature while the current TTL field is not.
NOTE: The "original TTL" must be restored into the covered RRs when the signature is verified (see Section 8). This generaly implies that all RRs for a particular type, name, and class, that is, all the RRs in any particular RRset, must have the same TTL to start with.
NOTE: The "original TTL" must be restored into the covered RRs when the signature is verified (see Section 8). This generaly implies that all RRs for a particular type, name, and class, that is, all the RRs in any particular RRset, must have the same TTL to start with.
4.1.5 Signature Expiration and Inception Fields
4.1.5 Signature Expiration and Inception Fields
The SIG is valid from the "signature inception" time until the "signature expiration" time. Both are unsigned numbers of seconds since the start of 1 January 1970, GMT, ignoring leap seconds. (See also Section 4.4.) Ring arithmetic is used as for DNS SOA serial numbers [RFC 1982] which means that these times can never be more than about 68 years in the past or the future. This means that these times are ambiguous modulo ~136.09 years. However there is no security flaw because keys are required to be changed to new random keys by [RFC 2541] at least every five years. This means that the probability that the same key is in use N*136.09 years later should be the same as the probability that a random guess will work.
The SIG is valid from the "signature inception" time until the "signature expiration" time. Both are unsigned numbers of seconds since the start of 1 January 1970, GMT, ignoring leap seconds. (See also Section 4.4.) Ring arithmetic is used as for DNS SOA serial numbers [RFC 1982] which means that these times can never be more than about 68 years in the past or the future. This means that these times are ambiguous modulo ~136.09 years. However there is no security flaw because keys are required to be changed to new random keys by [RFC 2541] at least every five years. This means that the probability that the same key is in use N*136.09 years later should be the same as the probability that a random guess will work.
A SIG RR may have an expiration time numerically less than the inception time if the expiration time is near the 32 bit wrap around point and/or the signature is long lived.
A SIG RR may have an expiration time numerically less than the inception time if the expiration time is near the 32 bit wrap around point and/or the signature is long lived.
(To prevent misordering of network requests to update a zone dynamically, monotonically increasing "signature inception" times may be necessary.)
(To prevent misordering of network requests to update a zone dynamically, monotonically increasing "signature inception" times may be necessary.)
A secure zone must be considered changed for SOA serial number purposes not only when its data is updated but also when new SIG RRs are inserted (ie, the zone or any part of it is re-signed).
A secure zone must be considered changed for SOA serial number purposes not only when its data is updated but also when new SIG RRs are inserted (ie, the zone or any part of it is re-signed).
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Eastlake Standards Track [Page 19] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
4.1.6 Key Tag Field
4.1.6 Key Tag Field
The "key Tag" is a two octet quantity that is used to efficiently select between multiple keys which may be applicable and thus check that a public key about to be used for the computationally expensive effort to check the signature is possibly valid. For algorithm 1 (MD5/RSA) as defined in [RFC 2537], it is the next to the bottom two octets of the public key modulus needed to decode the signature field. That is to say, the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the modulus in network (big endian) order. For all other algorithms, including private algorithms, it is calculated as a simple checksum of the KEY RR as described in Appendix C.
The "key Tag" is a two octet quantity that is used to efficiently select between multiple keys which may be applicable and thus check that a public key about to be used for the computationally expensive effort to check the signature is possibly valid. For algorithm 1 (MD5/RSA) as defined in [RFC 2537], it is the next to the bottom two octets of the public key modulus needed to decode the signature field. That is to say, the most significant 16 of the least significant 24 bits of the modulus in network (big endian) order. For all other algorithms, including private algorithms, it is calculated as a simple checksum of the KEY RR as described in Appendix C.
4.1.7 Signer's Name Field
4.1.7 Signer's Name Field
The "signer's name" field is the domain name of the signer generating the SIG RR. This is the owner name of the public KEY RR that can be used to verify the signature. It is frequently the zone which contained the RRset being authenticated. Which signers should be authorized to sign what is a significant resolver policy question as discussed in Section 6. The signer's name may be compressed with standard DNS name compression when being transmitted over the network.
The "signer's name" field is the domain name of the signer generating the SIG RR. This is the owner name of the public KEY RR that can be used to verify the signature. It is frequently the zone which contained the RRset being authenticated. Which signers should be authorized to sign what is a significant resolver policy question as discussed in Section 6. The signer's name may be compressed with standard DNS name compression when being transmitted over the network.
4.1.8 Signature Field
4.1.8 Signature Field
The actual signature portion of the SIG RR binds the other RDATA fields to the RRset of the "type covered" RRs with that owner name and class. This covered RRset is thereby authenticated. To accomplish this, a data sequence is constructed as follows:
The actual signature portion of the SIG RR binds the other RDATA fields to the RRset of the "type covered" RRs with that owner name and class. This covered RRset is thereby authenticated. To accomplish this, a data sequence is constructed as follows:
data = RDATA | RR(s)...
data = RDATA | RR(s)...
where "|" is concatenation,
where "|" is concatenation,
RDATA is the wire format of all the RDATA fields in the SIG RR itself (including the canonical form of the signer's name) before but not including the signature, and
そして署名を含むのが、以前、RDATAがSIG RR(署名者の名前の標準形を含んでいる)自身のすべてのRDATA分野のワイヤ形式ですが、形式でない。
RR(s) is the RRset of the RR(s) of the type covered with the same owner name and class as the SIG RR in canonical form and order as defined in Section 8.
RR(s)はセクション8で定義されるようにSIG RRとして標準形と注文で同じ所有者名とクラスでカバーされたタイプのRR(s)のRRsetです。
How this data sequence is processed into the signature is algorithm dependent. These algorithm dependent formats and procedures are described in separate documents (Section 3.2).
このデータ系列がどう署名に処理されるかは、アルゴリズムに依存しています。 これらのアルゴリズムに依存する形式と手順は別々のドキュメント(セクション3.2)で説明されます。
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SIGs SHOULD NOT be included in a zone for any "meta-type" such as ANY, AXFR, etc. (but see section 5.6.2 with regard to IXFR).
SIG SHOULD NOT、どんな、AXFRなどのどんな「メタタイプ」のためのゾーンでも含められてください。 (IXFRに関してセクション5.6.2を見てください。)
4.1.8.1 Calculating Transaction and Request SIGs
4.1.8.1 計算のトランザクションと要求SIG
A response message from a security aware server may optionally contain a special SIG at the end of the additional information section to authenticate the transaction.
セキュリティの意識しているサーバからの応答メッセージは、トランザクションを認証するために追加情報部の端に任意に特別なSIGを含むかもしれません。
This SIG has a "type covered" field of zero, which is not a valid RR type. It is calculated by using a "data" (see Section 4.1.8) of the entire preceding DNS reply message, including DNS header but not the IP header and before the reply RR counts have been adjusted for the inclusion of any transaction SIG, concatenated with the entire DNS query message that produced this response, including the query's DNS header and any request SIGs but not its IP header. That is
このSIGには、ゼロの「カバーされたタイプ」分野があります。(ゼロは有効なRRタイプではありません)。 全体の先行の「データ」(セクション4.1.8を見る)を使用することによって、IPヘッダーではなく、質問のDNSヘッダーとどんな要求SIGも含んでいて、DNS応答メッセージ、DNSヘッダーを含んでいますが、IPヘッダーと回答RRカウントの前に含んでいるというわけではないのがこの応答を起こした全体のDNS質問メッセージで連結されたどんなトランザクションSIGの包含のためにも調整されたと見込まれます。 すなわち
data = full response (less transaction SIG) | full query
データは完全な応答(より少ないトランザクションSIG)と等しいです。| 完全な質問
Verification of the transaction SIG (which is signed by the server host key, not the zone key) by the requesting resolver shows that the query and response were not tampered with in transit, that the response corresponds to the intended query, and that the response comes from the queried server.
要求しているレゾルバによるトランザクションSIG(ゾーンキーではなく、サーバー・ホストキーによって署名される)の検証は質問と応答がトランジットでいじられないで、応答が意図している質問に対応している、応答が質問されたサーバから来るのを示します。
A DNS request may be optionally signed by including one or more SIGs at the end of the query. Such SIGs are identified by having a "type covered" field of zero. They sign the preceding DNS request message including DNS header but not including the IP header or any request SIGs at the end and before the request RR counts have been adjusted for the inclusions of any request SIG(s).
質問の終わりの1つ以上のSIGを含んでいることによって、DNS要求は任意に署名されるかもしれません。 そのようなSIGは、ゼロの「カバーされたタイプ」分野を持っていることによって、特定されます。 彼らは、前のDNSがDNSヘッダーを含んでいますが、終わり、要求RRカウントがどんな要求SIGの包含のためにも調整される前にIPヘッダーかどんな要求SIGも含まない要求メッセージであると署名します。
WARNING: Request SIGs are unnecessary for any currently defined request other than update [RFC 2136, 2137] and will cause some old DNS servers to give an error return or ignore a query. However, such SIGs may in the future be needed for other requests.
警告: SIGが、アップデート[RFC2136、2137]以外のどんな現在定義された要求にも不要であり、いくつかの古いDNSサーバが誤りリターンを与えるか、または質問を無視することを引き起こすよう要求してください。 しかしながら、そのようなSIGが将来、他の要求に必要であるかもしれません。
Except where needed to authenticate an update or similar privileged request, servers are not required to check request SIGs.
アップデートか同様の特権がある要求を認証するのが必要である以外に、サーバは、要求SIGをチェックするのに必要ではありません。
4.2 SIG RRs in the Construction of Responses
4.2 応答の構造におけるSIG RRs
Security aware DNS servers SHOULD, for every authenticated RRset the query will return, attempt to send the available SIG RRs which authenticate the requested RRset. The following rules apply to the inclusion of SIG RRs in responses:
質問が返すあらゆる認証されたRRsetのために、セキュリティの意識しているDNSサーバSHOULDは、要求されたRRsetを認証する利用可能なSIG RRsを送るのを試みます。 以下の規則は応答でのSIG RRsの包含に適用されます:
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1. when an RRset is placed in a response, its SIG RR has a higher
priority for inclusion than additional RRs that may need to be
included. If space does not permit its inclusion, the response
MUST be considered truncated except as provided in 2 below.
1. RRsetが応答に置かれるとき、SIG RRには、包含のための含まれる必要があるかもしれない追加RRsより高い優先度があります。 スペースが包含を可能にしないなら、2未満に提供するのを除いて、端が欠けていると応答を考えなければなりません。
2. When a SIG RR is present in the zone for an additional
information section RR, the response MUST NOT be considered
truncated merely because space does not permit the inclusion of
the SIG RR with the additional information.
2. SIG RRがゾーンに追加情報部にRRを示すことであるときに、単にスペースが追加情報があるSIG RRの包含を可能にしないので、端が欠けていると応答を考えてはいけません。
3. SIGs to authenticate glue records and NS RRs for subzones at a
delegation point are unnecessary and MUST NOT be sent.
3. 認証するSIGが記録をにかわで接いで、委譲ポイントの「副-ゾーン」のためのNS RRsを不要であり、送ってはいけません。
4. If a SIG covers any RR that would be in the answer section of
the response, its automatic inclusion MUST be in the answer
section. If it covers an RR that would appear in the authority
section, its automatic inclusion MUST be in the authority
section. If it covers an RR that would appear in the additional
information section it MUST appear in the additional information
section. This is a change in the existing standard [RFCs 1034,
1035] which contemplates only NS and SOA RRs in the authority
section.
4. SIGが何か応答の答え部にあるRRをカバーするなら、自動包含が答え部にあるに違いありません。 権威部に現れるRRをカバーしているなら、自動包含が権威部にあるに違いありません。 追加情報部に現れるRRをカバーしているなら、それは追加情報部に現れなければなりません。 これは権威部の既存の規格のNSだけを熟考する[RFCs1034、1035]とSOA RRsで変化です。
5. Optionally, DNS transactions may be authenticated by a SIG RR at
the end of the response in the additional information section
(Section 4.1.8.1). Such SIG RRs are signed by the DNS server
originating the response. Although the signer field MUST be a
name of the originating server host, the owner name, class, TTL,
and original TTL, are meaningless. The class and TTL fields
SHOULD be zero. To conserve space, the owner name SHOULD be
root (a single zero octet). If transaction authentication is
desired, that SIG RR must be considered the highest priority for
inclusion.
5. 任意に、DNSトランザクションが追加情報部で応答の終わりのSIG RRによって認証されるかもしれない、(セクション4.1 .8 .1)。 そのようなSIG RRsは応答を溯源するDNSサーバによって署名されます。 署名者分野は起因しているサーバー・ホスト、クラスという所有者名の名前であるに違いありませんが、TTL、およびオリジナルのTTLは無意味です。 クラスとTTLはSHOULDをさばきます。ゼロになってください。 スペースを保存するために、存在という所有者名のSHOULDは根づきます(シングルは八重奏のゼロに合っています)。 トランザクション認証が望まれているなら、包含のための最優先であるとそのSIG RRを考えなければなりません。
4.3 Processing Responses and SIG RRs
4.3 処理応答とSIG RRs
The following rules apply to the processing of SIG RRs included in a response:
以下の規則は応答にSIG RRsを含む処理に適用されます:
1. A security aware resolver that receives a response from a
security aware server via a secure communication with the AD bit
(see Section 6.1) set, MAY choose to accept the RRs as received
without verifying the zone SIG RRs.
1. セキュリティの意識しているサーバからADビット(セクション6.1を見る)セットとの安全なコミュニケーションで応答を受けるセキュリティの意識しているレゾルバ、ゾーンSIG RRsについて確かめないで受け取るようにRRsを受け入れるのを選ぶかもしれません。
2. In other cases, a security aware resolver SHOULD verify the SIG
RRs for the RRs of interest. This may involve initiating
additional queries for SIG or KEY RRs, especially in the case of
2. 他のケース、レゾルバSHOULDが興味があるRRsのためにSIG RRsについて確かめるのを意識しているセキュリティで。 これは、SIGのための追加質問か特に場合におけるKEY RRsを開始することを伴うかもしれません。
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getting a response from a server that does not implement
security. (As explained in 2.3.5 above, it will not be possible
to secure CNAMEs being served up by non-secure resolvers.)
セキュリティを実装しないサーバから、返事をもらいます。 (説明される、2.3、上の.5、非安全なレゾルバによって供給されるCNAMEsを固定するのが可能でない、)
NOTE: Implementers might expect the above SHOULD to be a MUST.
However, local policy or the calling application may not require
the security services.
以下に注意してください。 Implementersは、aである上のSHOULDがそうしなければならないと予想するかもしれません。しかしながら、ローカルの方針か職業アプリケーションがセキュリティー・サービスを必要としないかもしれません。
3. If SIG RRs are received in response to a user query explicitly
specifying the SIG type, no special processing is required.
3. 明らかにSIGタイプを指定するユーザー・クエリーに対応してSIG RRsを受け取るなら、どんな特別な処理も必要としません。
If the message does not pass integrity checks or the SIG does not check against the signed RRs, the SIG RR is invalid and should be ignored. If all of the SIG RR(s) purporting to authenticate an RRset are invalid, then the RRset is not authenticated.
メッセージが保全チェックを通過しないか、またはSIGが署名しているRRsに対してチェックしないなら、SIG RRは無効であり、無視されるべきです。 RRsetを認証することを意味するSIG RR(s)のすべてが無効であるなら、RRsetは認証されません。
If the SIG RR is the last RR in a response in the additional information section and has a type covered of zero, it is a transaction signature of the response and the query that produced the response. It MAY be optionally checked and the message rejected if the checks fail. But even if the checks succeed, such a transaction authentication SIG does NOT directly authenticate any RRs in the message. Only a proper SIG RR signed by the zone or a key tracing its authority to the zone or to static resolver configuration can directly authenticate RRs, depending on resolver policy (see Section 6). If a resolver does not implement transaction and/or request SIGs, it MUST ignore them without error.
SIG RRが追加情報部での応答における最後のRRであり、ゼロについてタイプをカバーさせるなら、それは応答を起こした応答と質問のトランザクション署名です。 それは任意にチェックされるかもしれません、そして、チェックであるなら拒絶されたメッセージは失敗します。 しかし、チェックが成功しても、そのようなトランザクション認証SIGは直接メッセージの少しのRRsも認証しません。 適切なSIG RRだけがゾーンかキーでたどるのがゾーンへの権威であると署名するか、または直接静的なレゾルバ構成にRRsを認証できます、レゾルバ方針によって(セクション6を見てください)。 レゾルバがトランザクションを実装する、そして/または、SIGを要求しないなら、それは誤りなしでそれらを無視しなければなりません。
If all checks indicate that the SIG RR is valid then RRs verified by it should be considered authenticated.
すべてのチェックが、SIG RRが有効であることを示すなら、それによって確かめられたRRsは認証されていると考えられるべきです。
4.4 Signature Lifetime, Expiration, TTLs, and Validity
4.4 署名生涯、満了、TTLs、および正当性
Security aware servers MUST NOT consider SIG RRs to authenticate anything before their signature inception or after its expiration time (see also Section 6). Security aware servers MUST NOT consider any RR to be authenticated after all its signatures have expired. When a secure server caches authenticated data, if the TTL would expire at a time further in the future than the authentication expiration time, the server SHOULD trim the TTL in the cache entry not to extent beyond the authentication expiration time. Within these constraints, servers should continue to follow DNS TTL aging. Thus authoritative servers should continue to follow the zone refresh and expire parameters and a non-authoritative server should count down the TTL and discard RRs when the TTL is zero (even for a SIG that has not yet reached its authentication expiration time). In addition, when RRs are transmitted in a query response, the TTL
セキュリティの意識しているサーバは、SIG RRsが彼らの署名始まりの前かその満了時間の後に何も認証すると考えてはいけません(また、セクション6を見てください)。 すべての署名が期限が切れた後にセキュリティの意識しているサーバは、どんなRRも認証されると考えてはいけません。 安全なサーバーが認証されたデータをキャッシュするとき、TTLが将来認証満了時間より一度に遠くに期限が切れるなら、サーバSHOULDは認証満了時間、キャッシュエントリーでTTLをどんな範囲までも整えません。 これらの規制の中では、サーバはずっとDNS TTLの年をとることに続くべきです。 したがって、正式のサーバがゾーンがリフレッシュする尾行に続いて、パラメタを吐き出すべきであり、TTLがゼロ(まだ認証満了時間に達していないSIGさえのための)であるときに、非正式のサーバは、TTLの下側まで数えて、RRsを捨てるべきです。 RRsが質問応答で伝えられるときの追加におけるTTL
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should be trimmed so that current time plus the TTL does not extend beyond the authentication expiration time. Thus, in general, the TTL on a transmitted RR would be
整えられるべきであるので、現在の時間とTTLは認証満了時間を超えたところまで広がっていません。 このようにして、そして、一般に、伝えられたRRの上のTTLはそうでしょう。
min(authExpTim,max(zoneMinTTL,min(originalTTL,currentTTL)))
分(authExpTim、最大(zoneMinTTL、分(originalTTL、currentTTL)))
When signatures are generated, signature expiration times should be set far enough in the future that it is quite certain that new signatures can be generated before the old ones expire. However, setting expiration too far into the future could mean a long time to flush any bad data or signatures that may have been generated.
署名が将来発生しているとき、署名満了回数が十分遠くに設定されるべきであるので、古い方が期限が切れる前に新しい署名を生成することができるのはかなり確かです。 しかしながら、あまりにはるかに未来まで満了を設定するのは、長い間、生成されたどんな悪いデータや署名も洗い流すことを意味するかもしれません。
It is recommended that signature lifetime be a small multiple of the TTL (ie, 4 to 16 times the TTL) but not less than a reasonable maximum re-signing interval and not less than the zone expiry time.
署名寿命が少なくともTTL(ie、TTLの4〜16倍)のわずかな倍数にもかかわらず、妥当な最大の再契約間隔と少なくともゾーン満期時間であることはお勧めです。
5. Non-existent Names and Types
5. 実在しない名前とタイプ
The SIG RR mechanism described in Section 4 above provides strong authentication of RRs that exist in a zone. But it is not clear above how to verifiably deny the existence of a name in a zone or a type for an existent name.
上のセクション4で説明されたSIG RRメカニズムはゾーンに存在するRRsの強い認証を提供します。 しかし、上では、目下の名前のためにどのようにゾーンかタイプの名前の存在を証明可能に否定するかが明確ではありません。
The nonexistence of a name in a zone is indicated by the NXT ("next")
RR for a name interval containing the nonexistent name. An NXT RR or
RRs and its or their SIG(s) are returned in the authority section,
along with the error, if the server is security aware. The same is
true for a non-existent type under an existing name except that there
is no error indication other than an empty answer section
accompanying the NXT(s). This is a change in the existing standard
[RFCs 1034/1035] which contemplates only NS and SOA RRs in the
authority section. NXT RRs will also be returned if an explicit query
is made for the NXT type.
ゾーンの名前の非実在は名前間隔の間の実在しない名前を含むNXT(「次」の)RRによって示されます。 権威部でNXT RRかRRsとそれか彼らのSIGを返します、誤りと共に、サーバがセキュリティ意識しているなら。 NXT(s)に同伴する空の答え部以外の誤り表示が全くないのを除いて、実在しないタイプに、同じくらいは既存の名前の下で本当です。 これは権威部の既存の規格のNSだけを熟考する[RFCs1034/1035]とSOA RRsで変化です。 また、NXTタイプのために明白な質問をすると、NXT RRsを返すでしょう。
The existence of a complete set of NXT records in a zone means that any query for any name and any type to a security aware server serving the zone will result in an reply containing at least one signed RR unless it is a query for delegation point NS or glue A or AAAA RRs.
ゾーンの完全なセットのNXT記録の存在は、ゾーンに役立つセキュリティの意識しているサーバへのどんな名前とどんなタイプも少なくとも1つを含む回答をもたらすのでどんな質問もそれが委譲ポイントNS、接着剤AまたはAAAA RRsのための質問でないならRRに署名したことを意味します。
5.1 The NXT Resource Record
5.1 NXTリソース記録
The NXT resource record is used to securely indicate that RRs with an owner name in a certain name interval do not exist in a zone and to indicate what RR types are present for an existing name.
NXTリソース記録は、所有者名が、ある一定の名前間隔にあるRRsがゾーンに存在しないのをしっかりと示して、どんなRRタイプが既存の名前のために出席しているかを示すのに使用されます。
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The owner name of the NXT RR is an existing name in the zone. It's RDATA is a "next" name and a type bit map. Thus the NXT RRs in a zone create a chain of all of the literal owner names in that zone, including unexpanded wildcards but omitting the owner name of glue address records unless they would otherwise be included. This implies a canonical ordering of all domain names in a zone as described in Section 8. The presence of the NXT RR means that no name between its owner name and the name in its RDATA area exists and that no other types exist under its owner name.
所有者名(NXT RR)はゾーンの既存の名前です。 RDATAが「次」の名前とタイプビットマップであるということです。 したがって、ゾーンのNXT RRsはそのゾーンに文字通りの所有者名のすべてのチェーンを創設します、「非-広げ」られたワイルドカードを含んでいますが、そうでなければ、それらが含まれていないなら接着剤アドレス記録の所有者名を省略して。 これはセクション8で説明されるようにゾーンでのすべてのドメイン名の正準な注文を含意します。 NXT RRの存在は、所有者名とRDATA領域の名前の間の名前が全く存在していなくて、また他のどんなタイプも所有者名の下で存在しないことを意味します。
There is a potential problem with the last NXT in a zone as it wants to have an owner name which is the last existing name in canonical order, which is easy, but it is not obvious what name to put in its RDATA to indicate the entire remainder of the name space. This is handled by treating the name space as circular and putting the zone name in the RDATA of the last NXT in a zone.
簡単な正準なオーダーで最後の既存の名前である所有者名が欲しいときに、最後のNXTには潜在的な問題がゾーンにありますが、スペースという名前の全体の残りを示すためにどんな名前をRDATAに置いたらよいかは明白ではありません。 これは、ゾーンでスペースという名前を回覧として扱って、最後のNXTのRDATAにゾーン名を入れることによって、扱われます。
The NXT RRs for a zone SHOULD be automatically calculated and added to the zone when SIGs are added. The NXT RR's TTL SHOULD NOT exceed the zone minimum TTL.
SIGが加えられるとき、ゾーンに計算されて、追加されて、ゾーンSHOULDへのNXT RRsは自動的にそうです。 NXT RRのTTL SHOULD NOTはゾーンの最小のTTLを超えています。
The type number for the NXT RR is 30.
NXT RRの形式数は30です。
NXT RRs are only signed by zone level keys.
NXT RRsはゾーンレベルキーによって署名されるだけです。
5.2 NXT RDATA Format
5.2 NXT RDATA形式
The RDATA for an NXT RR consists simply of a domain name followed by a bit map, as shown below.
NXT RRのためのRDATAは単に同じくらい地図であって、以下に同じくらい示された状態で少し従われたドメイン名から成ります。
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| next domain name /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| type bit map /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | 次のドメイン名/+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++| ビットマップ/+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++をタイプしてください。
The NXT RR type bit map format currently defined is one bit per RR type present for the owner name. A one bit indicates that at least one RR of that type is present for the owner name. A zero indicates that no such RR is present. All bits not specified because they are beyond the end of the bit map are assumed to be zero. Note that bit 30, for NXT, will always be on so the minimum bit map length is actually four octets. Trailing zero octets are prohibited in this format. The first bit represents RR type zero (an illegal type which can not be present) and so will be zero in this format. This format is not used if there exists an RR with a type number greater than
現在定義されているNXT RRタイプビットマップ書式は所有者名のために出席しているRRタイプあたり1ビットです。 1ビットは、そのタイプの少なくとも1RRが所有者名のために存在しているのを示します。 ゼロは、そのようなどんなRRも存在していないのを示します。 ビットマップの終わりに、それらがあるので指定されなかったすべてのビットがゼロであると思われます。 最小のビットマップの長さが実際に4つの八重奏であるためにビット30がいつもNXTにオンになることに注意してください。 ゼロを引きずって、八重奏はこの形式で禁止されています。 最初のビットはRRタイプゼロ(出席するはずがない不法なタイプ)の代理をします、そして、この形式のゼロもそうになるでしょう。 形式数が、より大きいRRが存在しているなら、この形式は使用されていません。
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127. If the zero bit of the type bit map is a one, it indicates that a different format is being used which will always be the case if a type number greater than 127 is present.
127. タイプビットマップのゼロ・ビットが1つであるなら、それは、異なった形式が使用していることにされるのであることを127以上の形式数が存在しているならいつも事実である示します。
The domain name may be compressed with standard DNS name compression when being transmitted over the network. The size of the bit map can be inferred from the RDLENGTH and the length of the next domain name.
ネットワークの上に伝えられると、ドメイン名は標準のDNS名前圧縮で圧縮されるかもしれません。 次のドメイン名のRDLENGTHと長さからビットマップのサイズを推論できます。
5.3 Additional Complexity Due to Wildcards
5.3 ワイルドカードによる追加複雑さ
Proving that a non-existent name response is correct or that a wildcard expansion response is correct makes things a little more complex.
実在しない名前応答が正しいか、またはワイルドカード拡張応答が正しいと立証するのに、事態はもう少し複雑になります。
In particular, when a non-existent name response is returned, an NXT must be returned showing that the exact name queried did not exist and, in general, one or more additional NXT's need to be returned to also prove that there wasn't a wildcard whose expansion should have been returned. (There is no need to return multiple copies of the same NXT.) These NXTs, if any, are returned in the authority section of the response.
実在しない名前応答を返すとき、質問という正確な名前が存在しないで、また一般に、1追加NXTのまた、そこでそれを立証するために返されるべき必要性が拡張が返されるべきであったワイルドカードでなかったのを示しながら、特に、NXTを返さなければなりません。 (同じNXTの複本を返す必要は全くありません。) 応答の権威部でもしあればこれらのNXTsを返します。
Furthermore, if a wildcard expansion is returned in a response, in general one or more NXTs needs to also be returned in the authority section to prove that no more specific name (including possibly more specific wildcards in the zone) existed on which the response should have been based.
その上、応答でワイルドカード拡張を返すなら、一般に、1NXTsが、また、応答が基づくべきであったそれ以上の種名(ゾーンにことによるとより特定のワイルドカードを含んでいる)が全く存在しなかったと立証するために権威部で返される必要があります。
5.4 Example
5.4 例
Assume zone foo.nil has entries for
foo.nilがエントリーを持っているゾーンを仮定してください。
big.foo.nil,
medium.foo.nil.
small.foo.nil.
tiny.foo.nil.
medium.foo.nil small.foo.nil big.foo.nil、tiny.foo.nil。
Then a query to a security aware server for huge.foo.nil would produce an error reply with an RCODE of NXDOMAIN and the authority section data including something like the following:
次に、huge.foo.nilのためのセキュリティの意識しているサーバへの質問は以下のようにNXDOMAINのRCODEと権威セクションデータが何かを含んでいるエラー応答を起こすでしょう:
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foo.nil. NXT big.foo.nil NS KEY SOA NXT ;prove no *.foo.nil
foo.nil. SIG NXT 1 2 ( ;type-cov=NXT, alg=1, labels=2
19970102030405 ;signature expiration
19961211100908 ;signature inception
2143 ;key identifier
foo.nil. ;signer
AIYADP8d3zYNyQwW2EM4wXVFdslEJcUx/fxkfBeH1El4ixPFhpfHFElxbvKoWmvjDTCm
fiYy2X+8XpFjwICHc398kzWsTMKlxovpz2FnCTM= ;signature (640 bits)
)
big.foo.nil. NXT medium.foo.nil. A MX SIG NXT ;prove no huge.foo.nil
big.foo.nil. SIG NXT 1 3 ( ;type-cov=NXT, alg=1, labels=3
19970102030405 ;signature expiration
19961211100908 ;signature inception
2143 ;key identifier
foo.nil. ;signer
MxFcby9k/yvedMfQgKzhH5er0Mu/vILz45IkskceFGgiWCn/GxHhai6VAuHAoNUz4YoU
1tVfSCSqQYn6//11U6Nld80jEeC8aTrO+KKmCaY= ;signature (640 bits)
)
Note that this response implies that big.foo.nil is an existing name
in the zone and thus has other RR types associated with it than NXT.
However, only the NXT (and its SIG) RR appear in the response to this
query for huge.foo.nil, which is a non-existent name.
foo.nil。 NXT big.foo.nil NS KEY SOA NXT; *がないのが.foo.nil foo.nilであると立証してください。 SIG NXT1 2( ;、タイプ-cov=NXT(alg=1)が=をラベルする 2、19970102030405、; 署名満了19961211100908;署名始まり2143; 主要な識別子foo.nil。 ;signer AIYADP8d3zYNyQwW2EM4wXVFdslEJcUx/fxkfBeH1El4ixPFhpfHFElxbvKoWmvjDTCm fiYy2X+8XpFjwICHc398kzWsTMKlxovpz2FnCTM= ;signature (640 bits) ) big.foo.nil。 NXT medium.foo.nil。 MX SIG NXT; huge.foo.nil big.foo.nilを全く立証しないでください。 SIG NXT1 3( ;、タイプ-cov=NXT(alg=1)が=をラベルする 3、19970102030405、; 署名満了19961211100908;署名始まり2143; 主要な識別子foo.nil。 ; 署名者MxFcby9k/yvedMfQgKzhH5er0Mu/vILz45IkskceFGgiWCn/GxHhai6VAuHAoNUz4YoU 1tVfSCSqQYn6//11U6Nld80jEeC8aTrO+KKmCaY=; 署名(640ビット)) この応答には、big.foo.nilがゾーンの既存の名前であることを含意して、その結果、NXT以外のそれに関連しているRRタイプがあることに注意してください。 しかしながら、NXT(そして、SIG)RRだけがhuge.foo.nilに関してこの質問への応答に現れます。(huge.foo.nilは実在しない名前です)。
5.5 Special Considerations at Delegation Points
5.5 委譲ポイントの特別な問題
A name (other than root) which is the head of a zone also appears as the leaf in a superzone. If both are secure, there will always be two different NXT RRs with the same name. They can be easily distinguished by their signers, the next domain name fields, the presence of the SOA type bit, etc. Security aware servers should return the correct NXT automatically when required to authenticate the non-existence of a name and both NXTs, if available, on explicit query for type NXT.
また、ゾーンのヘッドである名前(根を除いた)は葉として「スーパー-ゾーン」に現れます。 両方が安全であるなら、同じ名前がある2異なったNXT RRsがいつもあるでしょう。 彼らの署名者、次のドメイン名分野、SOAタイプビットの存在などは容易にそれらを区別できます。 名前とNXTsの両方の非存在を認証するのが必要であるときに、セキュリティの意識しているサーバは自動的に正しいNXTを返すべきです、利用可能であるなら、タイプNXTのための明白な質問に関して。
Non-security aware servers will never automatically return an NXT and some old implementations may only return the NXT from the subzone on explicit queries.
サーバが自動的にNXTといくつかの古い実装を決して返さないのを意識している非セキュリティは明白な質問のときに「副-ゾーン」からNXTを返すだけであるかもしれません。
5.6 Zone Transfers
5.6 ゾーン転送
The subsections below describe how full and incremental zone transfers are secured.
以下の小区分は、ゾーン転送がどれくらい完全であるか、そして、増加であるかを機密保護された状態で説明します。
SIG RRs secure all authoritative RRs transferred for both full and incremental [RFC 1995] zone transfers. NXT RRs are an essential element in secure zone transfers and assure that every authoritative name and type will be present; however, if there are multiple SIGs with the same name and type covered, a subset of the SIGs could be
SIG RRsは完全なものと同様に増加[RFC1995]のゾーン転送のために移されたすべての正式のRRsを固定します。 NXT RRsは、安全なゾーン転送における必須元素であり、すべての正式の名前とタイプに出席することを保証します。 しかしながら、同じ名前とタイプが含まれている複数のSIGがあれば、SIGの部分集合はあるかもしれません。
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sent as long as at least one is present and, in the case of unsigned delegation point NS or glue A or AAAA RRs a subset of these RRs or simply a modified set could be sent as long as at least one of each type is included.
少なくとも1つが存在していて、少なくともそれぞれのタイプのひとりが含まれている限り、未署名の委譲ポイントNS、接着剤AまたはAAAA RRsの場合では、これらのRRsか単に変更されたセットの部分集合を送ることができた限り、発信しました。
When an incremental or full zone transfer request is received with the same or newer version number than that of the server's copy of the zone, it is replied to with just the SOA RR of the server's current version and the SIG RRset verifying that SOA RR.
サーバのゾーンのコピーのものより同じであるか新しいバージョン番号で増加の、または、完全なゾーン転送要求を受け取るとき、まさしくサーバの最新版のSOA RRとSIG RRsetがそのSOA RRについて確かめていて、それについて答えます。
The complete NXT chains specified in this document enable a resolver to obtain, by successive queries chaining through NXTs, all of the names in a zone even if zone transfers are prohibited. Different format NXTs may be specified in the future to avoid this.
ゾーン転送が禁止されても、本書では指定された完全なNXTチェーンは、レゾルバがゾーンでNXTsを通して鎖を作る連続した質問で名前のすべてを得るのを可能にします。 異なった形式NXTsは、将来、これを避けるために指定されるかもしれません。
5.6.1 Full Zone Transfers
5.6.1 完全なゾーン転送
To provide server authentication that a complete transfer has occurred, transaction authentication SHOULD be used on full zone transfers. This provides strong server based protection for the entire zone in transit.
それをサーバ証明に提供するために、完全な転送で、完全なゾーン転送のときに起こったトランザクション認証SHOULDを使用します。 これは全体のゾーンのための強いサーバに基づいている保護をトランジットに提供します。
5.6.2 Incremental Zone Transfers
5.6.2 増加のゾーン転送
Individual RRs in an incremental (IXFR) transfer [RFC 1995] can be verified in the same way as for a full zone transfer and the integrity of the NXT name chain and correctness of the NXT type bits for the zone after the incremental RR deletes and adds can check each disjoint area of the zone updated. But the completeness of an incremental transfer can not be confirmed because usually neither the deleted RR section nor the added RR section has a compete zone NXT chain. As a result, a server which securely supports IXFR must handle IXFR SIG RRs for each incremental transfer set that it maintains.
同様に、完全なゾーン転送のように増加の(IXFR)転送[RFC1995]における個々のRRsについて確かめることができます、そして、チェックできるRRが、削除して、言い足す増加だったことの後のゾーンへのチェーンというNXT名の保全とNXTタイプビットの正当性はアップデートされたゾーンの領域をそれぞればらばらにならせます。 しかし、削除されたRR部も加えられたRR部もaを通常競争させないので、増加の転送の完全性を確認できません。ゾーンNXTチェーン。 その結果、しっかりとIXFRをサポートするサーバはそれが維持するそれぞれの増加の転送セットのためにIXFR SIG RRsを扱わなければなりません。
The IXFR SIG is calculated over the incremental zone update collection of RRs in the order in which it is transmitted: old SOA, then deleted RRs, then new SOA and added RRs. Within each section, RRs must be ordered as specified in Section 8. If condensation of adjacent incremental update sets is done by the zone owner, the original IXFR SIG for each set included in the condensation must be discarded and a new on IXFR SIG calculated to cover the resulting condensed set.
IXFR SIGはそれが伝えられるオーダーにおける、RRsの増加のゾーンアップデート収集に関して計算されます: 古いSOA、当時の削除されたRRs、当時の新しいSOA、および加えられたRRs。 各セクションの中では、セクション8で指定されるようにRRsを注文しなければなりません。 ゾーン所有者が隣接しているアップデート増加セットの凝縮を完了しているなら、凝縮に各セットを含んでいるのが捨てなければならなくて、結果になることをカバーするために計算されたIXFR SIGで新しいaが凝縮したので、オリジナルのIXFR SIGはセットしました。
The IXFR SIG really belongs to the zone as a whole, not to the zone name. Although it SHOULD be correct for the zone name, the labels field of an IXFR SIG is otherwise meaningless. The IXFR SIG is only sent as part of an incremental zone transfer. After validation of
IXFR SIGは本当にゾーン名ではなく、全体でゾーンに属します。 ゾーン名に正しくいてください。それである、SHOULD、そうでなければ、IXFR SIGのラベル分野は無意味です。 増加のゾーン転送の一部としてIXFR SIGを送るだけです。 後合法化します。
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the IXFR SIG, the transferred RRs MAY be considered valid without verification of the internal SIGs if such trust in the server conforms to local policy.
IXFR SIG、サーバのそのような信頼がローカルの方針に従うなら、わたっているRRsは内部のSIGの検証なしで有効であると考えられるかもしれません。
6. How to Resolve Securely and the AD and CD Bits
6. どのように、しっかりと決議するか、ADとCDビット
Retrieving or resolving secure data from the Domain Name System (DNS) involves starting with one or more trusted public keys that have been staticly configured at the resolver. With starting trusted keys, a resolver willing to perform cryptography can progress securely through the secure DNS structure to the zone of interest as described in Section 6.3. Such trusted public keys would normally be configured in a manner similar to that described in Section 6.2. However, as a practical matter, a security aware resolver would still gain some confidence in the results it returns even if it was not configured with any keys but trusted what it got from a local well known server as if it were staticly configured.
ドメインネームシステム(DNS)からの安全なデータを検索するか、または決議するのが、1かレゾルバで静的に構成されたさらに信じられた公開鍵から始まることを伴います。始めの信じられたキーと共に、暗号を実行しても構わないと思っているレゾルバはセクション6.3で説明されるように安全なDNS構造を通して興味があるゾーンにしっかりと進歩をすることができます。 そのようなものは、通常、公開鍵がセクション6.2で説明されたそれと同様の方法で構成されると信じました。 しかしながら、実際問題として、セキュリティの意識しているレゾルバはまだまるで静的に構成されるかのようにどんなキーでも構成されませんでしたが、ローカルのよく知られているサーバから得たものを信じたとしてもそれが返す結果における何らかの信用を獲得しているでしょう。
Data stored at a security aware server needs to be internally categorized as Authenticated, Pending, or Insecure. There is also a fourth transient state of Bad which indicates that all SIG checks have explicitly failed on the data. Such Bad data is not retained at a security aware server. Authenticated means that the data has a valid SIG under a KEY traceable via a chain of zero or more SIG and KEY RRs allowed by the resolvers policies to a KEY staticly configured at the resolver. Pending data has no authenticated SIGs and at least one additional SIG the resolver is still trying to authenticate. Insecure data is data which it is known can never be either Authenticated or found Bad in the zone where it was found because it is in or has been reached via a unsecured zone or because it is unsigned glue address or delegation point NS data. Behavior in terms of control of and flagging based on such data labels is described in Section 6.1.
セキュリティの意識しているサーバで保存されたデータは、Authenticated、Pending、またはInsecureとして内部的に分類される必要があります。 また、すべてのSIGチェックがデータで明らかに失敗したのを示すBadの4番目の一時的な州があります。 そのようなBadデータはaセキュリティの意識しているサーバaを通して起因している下のa KEYが鎖を作る有効なSIGがデータでゼロに合わせるか、または、より多くのSIGとKEY RRsがレゾルバで構成されたKEY staticlyへのレゾルバ方針で許容した認証された手段で保有されません。未定のデータには、レゾルバがまだ認証しようとしている認証されたSIGがなくて少なくとも1つの追加SIGがあります。 不安定なデータはそれがそうであるデータが缶がそれが中にあるので見つけられたゾーンのAuthenticatedか決して備え付けることのBadのどちらかでないことを知っているか、または非機密保護しているゾーンを通って達したということであるかそれが未署名であるので、アドレスか委譲ポイントNSデータをにかわで接いでください。 ラベルに制御されて、そのようなデータに基づいて旗を揚げさせることに関する振舞いはセクション6.1で説明されます。
The proper validation of signatures requires a reasonably secure shared opinion of the absolute time between resolvers and servers as described in Section 6.4.
署名の適切な合法化はセクション6.4で説明されるようにレゾルバとサーバの間で絶対時間の合理的に安全な共有された意見を必要とします。
6.1 The AD and CD Header Bits
6.1 ADとCDヘッダービット
Two previously unused bits are allocated out of the DNS query/response format header. The AD (authentic data) bit indicates in a response that all the data included in the answer and authority portion of the response has been authenticated by the server according to the policies of that server. The CD (checking disabled) bit indicates in a query that Pending (non-authenticated) data is acceptable to the resolver sending the query.
DNS質問/応答形式ヘッダーから以前に未使用の2ビットを割り当てます。 AD(典拠のある資料)ビットは、応答でそのサーバの方針によると、応答の答えと権威部分にすべてのデータを含んでいるのがサーバによって認証されたのを示します。CD(身体障害者をチェックする)ビットは、質問で質問を送るレゾルバにおいて、Pending(非認証された)データが許容できるのを示します。
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These bits are allocated from the previously must-be-zero Z field as follows:
これらのビットを割り当てる、以前にゼロでなければならない、以下のZ分野:
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| ID |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|QR| Opcode |AA|TC|RD|RA| Z|AD|CD| RCODE |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| QDCOUNT |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| ANCOUNT |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| NSCOUNT |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| ARCOUNT |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | ID| +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |QR| Opcode|AA|Tc|rd|RA| Z|西暦|CD| RCODE| +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | QDCOUNT| +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | ANCOUNT| +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | NSCOUNT| +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | ARCOUNT| +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
These bits are zero in old servers and resolvers. Thus the responses of old servers are not flagged as authenticated to security aware resolvers and queries from non-security aware resolvers do not assert the checking disabled bit and thus will be answered by security aware servers only with Authenticated or Insecure data. Security aware resolvers MUST NOT trust the AD bit unless they trust the server they are talking to and either have a secure path to it or use DNS transaction security.
これらのビットは古いサーバとレゾルバのゼロです。 したがって、古いサーバの応答は、レゾルバが照合身体障害者について断言しないのを意識している非セキュリティからのレゾルバと質問に噛み付いたのを意識しているセキュリティに認証されるように旗を揚げられないで、その結果、AuthenticatedかInsecureデータだけがあるセキュリティの意識しているサーバによって答えられるでしょう。 セキュリティの意識しているレゾルバは、彼らがそれに彼らが話しているサーバを信じて、安全な経路を持っていないならADビットを信じてはいけませんし、またDNSトランザクションセキュリティを使用してはいけません。
Any security aware resolver willing to do cryptography SHOULD assert the CD bit on all queries to permit it to impose its own policies and to reduce DNS latency time by allowing security aware servers to answer with Pending data.
SHOULDが断言する暗号にCDをしても構わないと思っているどんなセキュリティの意識しているレゾルバも、それ自身の方針を課して、セキュリティの意識しているサーバにPendingデータで答えるのを許容することによってDNS待ち時間を減少させるのを許容するためにすべての質問をかみつきました。
Security aware servers MUST NOT return Bad data. For non-security aware resolvers or security aware resolvers requesting service by having the CD bit clear, security aware servers MUST return only Authenticated or Insecure data in the answer and authority sections with the AD bit set in the response. Security aware servers SHOULD return Pending data, with the AD bit clear in the response, to security aware resolvers requesting this service by asserting the CD bit in their request. The AD bit MUST NOT be set on a response unless all of the RRs in the answer and authority sections of the response are either Authenticated or Insecure. The AD bit does not cover the additional information section.
セキュリティの意識しているサーバはデータをBadに返してはいけません。 非セキュリティの意識しているレゾルバかCDビットを明確にすることによってサービスを要求するセキュリティの意識しているレゾルバに関しては、サーバがADビットで答えと権威部のデータをAuthenticatedかInsecureだけに返さなければならないのを意識しているセキュリティは応答でセットしました。 サーバSHOULDがADビットでデータをPendingに返すのを意識しているセキュリティは応答でクリアされます、彼らの要求でCDビットについて断言することによってこのサービスを要求するセキュリティの意識しているレゾルバに。 応答の答えと権威部のRRsのすべてがAuthenticatedかInsecureのどちらかでないならADビットを応答に設定してはいけません。 ADビットは追加情報部をカバーしません。
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6.2 Staticly Configured Keys
6.2 Staticly構成されたキー
The public key to authenticate a zone SHOULD be defined in local configuration files before that zone is loaded at the primary server so the zone can be authenticated.
そのゾーンがゾーンを認証できるようにプライマリサーバでロードされる前にaを認証する公開鍵は定義されたコネがローカルの構成ファイルであったならSHOULDを区分します。
While it might seem logical for everyone to start with a public key associated with the root zone and staticly configure this in every resolver, this has problems. The logistics of updating every DNS resolver in the world should this key ever change would be severe. Furthermore, many organizations will explicitly wish their "interior" DNS implementations to completely trust only their own DNS servers. Interior resolvers of such organizations can then go through the organization's zone servers to access data outside the organization's domain and need not be configured with keys above the organization's DNS apex.
皆がルートゾーンに関連している公開鍵から始まって、すべてのレゾルバで静的にこれを構成するように論理的に思えるかもしれませんが、これには問題があります。このキーが変化するはずであるなら世界のすべてのDNSレゾルバをアップデートするロジスティクスは厳しいでしょう。 その上、多くの組織が、それら自身のDNSサーバだけを完全に信じるために明らかにそれらの「内部」のDNS実装を願うでしょう。 そのような組織の内部のレゾルバは、次に、組織のドメインの外でデータにアクセスするために組織のゾーンサーバに直面できて、組織のDNS頂点の上のキーで構成される必要はありません。
Host resolvers that are not part of a larger organization may be configured with a key for the domain of their local ISP whose recursive secure DNS caching server they use.
より大きい組織の一部でないホストレゾルバはキーで彼らが再帰的な安全なDNSキャッシュサーバを使用する地元のISPのドメインに構成されるかもしれません。
6.3 Chaining Through The DNS
6.3 DNSを通して鎖を作ること。
Starting with one or more trusted keys for any zone, it should be possible to retrieve signed keys for that zone's subzones which have a key. A secure sub-zone is indicated by a KEY RR with non-null key information appearing with the NS RRs in the sub-zone and which may also be present in the parent. These make it possible to descend within the tree of zones.
1かさらに信じられたキーからどんなゾーンにも始まって、キーを持っているそのゾーンの「副-ゾーン」のために署名しているキーを検索するのは可能であるべきです。 安全なサブゾーンはサブゾーンのNS RRsと共に現れるまた、親に存在するかもしれない非ヌル主要な情報でKEY RRによって示されます。 これらで、ゾーンの木の中を下降するのは可能になります。
6.3.1 Chaining Through KEYs
6.3.1 キーを通して鎖を作ること。
In general, some RRset that you wish to validate in the secure DNS will be signed by one or more SIG RRs. Each of these SIG RRs has a signer under whose name is stored the public KEY to use in authenticating the SIG. Each of those KEYs will, generally, also be signed with a SIG. And those SIGs will have signer names also referring to KEYs. And so on. As a result, authentication leads to chains of alternating SIG and KEY RRs with the first SIG signing the original data whose authenticity is to be shown and the final KEY being some trusted key staticly configured at the resolver performing the authentication.
一般に、あなたが安全なDNSで有効にしたいいくらかのRRsetが1SIG RRsによって署名されるでしょう。 それぞれ、これらのSIG RRsについて、名前がだれのものであるかの下の署名者は、SIGを認証しながら、使用への公共のKEYを蓄えましたか? 一般に、また、それぞれのそれらのKEYsはSIGを契約されるでしょう。 そして、それらのSIGには、また、KEYsについて言及する署名者名があるでしょう。 など。 その結果、認証は最初のSIGが示される信憑性がことであるオリジナルのデータに署名していて、最終的なKEYが認証を実行しているレゾルバで構成されたいくらかの信じられた主要な静的であるのとSIGとKEY RRsを交替するチェーンに通じます。
In testing such a chain, the validity periods of the SIGs encountered must be intersected to determine the validity period of the authentication of the data, a purely algorithmic process. In addition, the validation of each SIG over the data with reference to a KEY must meet the objective cryptographic test implied by the
テストで、正当性を決定するために、データ、純粋にアルゴリズムのプロセスの認証の一区切りは交差しました。 さらに、KEYに関したデータの上のそれぞれのSIGの合法化は暗示していた状態で客観的な暗号のテストに対応しなければなりません。
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cryptographic algorithm used (although even here the resolver may have policies as to trusted algorithms and key lengths). Finally, the judgement that a SIG with a particular signer name can authenticate data (possibly a KEY RRset) with a particular owner name, is primarily a policy question. Ultimately, this is a policy local to the resolver and any clients that depend on that resolver's decisions. It is, however, recommended, that the policy below be adopted:
使用される(レゾルバはここにさえ信じられたアルゴリズムとキー長に関して方針を持っているかもしれませんが)暗号アルゴリズム。 特定の署名者名があるSIGがそうすることができる判断は、最終的に、主として特定の所有者名があるデータ(ことによるとKEY RRset)を認証して、あります。方針問題。 結局、これはそのリゾルバの決定を当てにするレゾルバとどんなクライアントにとっての、ローカルの方針です。 しかしながら、それはお勧めであり、以下の方針は採られます:
Let A < B mean that A is a shorter domain name than B formed by
dropping one or more whole labels from the left end of B, i.e.,
A is a direct or indirect superdomain of B. Let A = B mean that
A and B are the same domain name (i.e., are identical after
letter case canonicalization). Let A > B mean that A is a
longer domain name than B formed by adding one or more whole
labels on the left end of B, i.e., A is a direct or indirect
subdomain of B
AがA<B平均ですが、貸されて、すなわち、B、Aの左の終わりから1個以上の全体のラベルを下げることによって形成されたBより短いドメイン名はB.Let Aの直接の、または、間接的な「スーパー-ドメイン」=Bが、AとBが同じドメイン名(すなわち、レターケースcanonicalizationの後に同じである)であることを意味するということです。 Bの左の終わりの1個以上の全体のラベルであり、すなわち、AがBの直接の、または、間接的なサブドメインであると言い足すことによって、A>BにAがBが形成したより長いドメイン名であることを意味させてください。
Let Static be the owner names of the set of staticly configured
trusted keys at a resolver.
レゾルバでStaticが静的な構成された信じられたキーのセットの所有者名であることをさせてください。
Then Signer is a valid signer name for a SIG authenticating an
RRset (possibly a KEY RRset) with owner name Owner at the
resolver if any of the following three rules apply:
次に、Signerは以下の3つの規則のどれかが適用されるならレゾルバの所有者名前Ownerと共にRRset(ことによるとKEY RRset)を認証するSIGに、妥当な署名者名です:
(1) Owner > or = Signer (except that if Signer is root, Owner
must be root or a top level domain name). That is, Owner is the
same as or a subdomain of Signer.
(1) 所有者>か=署名者(OwnerがSignerが根であるなら、根か最上位ドメイン名であるに違いないのを除いて)。 すなわち、Ownerは同じであって、Signerに関するサブドメインです。
(2) ( Owner < Signer ) and ( Signer > or = some Static ). That
is, Owner is a superdomain of Signer and Signer is staticly
configured or a subdomain of a staticly configured key.
そして、(2)(所有者<Signer)、(署名者>、いくらかのStaticと等しい、) すなわち、OwnerはSignerの「スーパー-ドメイン」です、そして、Signerが静的に構成されたか、または静的サブドメインはキーを構成しました。
(3) Signer = some Static. That is, the signer is exactly some
staticly configured key.
(3) 署名者はいくらかのStaticと等しいです。 すなわち、署名者はちょうどある静的な構成されたキーです。
Rule 1 is the rule for descending the DNS tree and includes a special prohibition on the root zone key due to the restriction that the root zone be only one label deep. This is the most fundamental rule.
規則1は、DNS木を滑降させるための規則であり、ルートゾーンが深く1個のラベルにすぎないという制限のために主要なルートゾーンに特別な禁止を含んでいます。 これは最も基本的な規則です。
Rule 2 is the rule for ascending the DNS tree from one or more staticly configured keys. Rule 2 has no effect if only root zone keys are staticly configured.
規則2は、1個以上の静的な構成されたキーからDNS木を昇るための規則です。 ルートゾーンキーだけが静的に構成されるなら、規則2は効き目がありません。
Rule 3 is a rule permitting direct cross certification. Rule 3 has no effect if only root zone keys are staticly configured.
規則3はダイレクト相互認証を可能にする規則です。 ルートゾーンキーだけが静的に構成されるなら、規則3は効き目がありません。
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 32] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[32ページ]。
Great care should be taken that the consequences have been fully considered before making any local policy adjustments to these rules (other than dispensing with rules 2 and 3 if only root zone keys are staticly configured).
どんな地方の政策調整もする結果が完全に考えられている前高度の注意を取るべきです。これらの規則(ルートゾーンキーだけが静的に構成されるなら規則2と3を省くのを除いた)。
6.3.2 Conflicting Data
6.3.2 闘争データ
It is possible that there will be multiple SIG-KEY chains that appear to authenticate conflicting RRset answers to the same query. A resolver should choose only the most reliable answer to return and discard other data. This choice of most reliable is a matter of local policy which could take into account differing trust in algorithms, key sizes, staticly configured keys, zones traversed, etc. The technique given below is recommended for taking into account SIG-KEY chain length.
RRsetが同じ質問に答える闘争を認証するように見える複数のSIG-KEYチェーンがあるのは、可能です。 レゾルバは、他のデータを返して、捨てるために最も信頼できる答えだけを選ぶはずです。 最も信頼できることのこの選択はアルゴリズムで異なった信頼を考慮に入れることができるだろうローカルの方針、主要なサイズ、静的な構成されたキー、横断されたゾーンなどの問題です。 以下に与えられたテクニックは、SIG-KEYチェーンの長さを考慮に入れるために推薦されます。
A resolver should keep track of the number of successive secure zones traversed from a staticly configured key starting point to any secure zone it can reach. In general, the lower such a distance number is, the greater the confidence in the data. Staticly configured data should be given a distance number of zero. If a query encounters different Authenticated data for the same query with different distance values, that with a larger value should be ignored unless some other local policy covers the case.
レゾルバは静的な構成された主要な出発点から安全なそれが達することができるどんなゾーンまでも横断された連続した安全なゾーンの数の動向をおさえるはずです。 一般に、そのような距離番号が下位であれば下位であるほど、データにおける信用は、よりすごいです。 Staticlyは、ゼロの距離番号がデータに与えられるべきであるのを構成しました。 質問が異なった距離値で同じ質問のための異なったAuthenticatedデータに遭遇して、ある他のローカルの方針がケースをカバーしていない場合、より大きい値があるそれは無視されるべきです。
A security conscious resolver should completely refuse to step from a secure zone into a unsecured zone unless the unsecured zone is certified to be non-secure by the presence of an authenticated KEY RR for the unsecured zone with the no-key type value. Otherwise the resolver is getting bogus or spoofed data.
非機密保護しているゾーンが非機密保護しているゾーンに、認証されたKEY RRの存在でキーがないタイプで非安全な値であることは公認されない場合、セキュリティの意識しているレゾルバが、安全なゾーンから非機密保護しているゾーンに踏むのを完全に拒否するはずです。 さもなければ、レゾルバは、にせになるか、またはデータであると偽造されます。
If legitimate unsecured zones are encountered in traversing the DNS tree, then no zone can be trusted as secure that can be reached only via information from such non-secure zones. Since the unsecured zone data could have been spoofed, the "secure" zone reached via it could be counterfeit. The "distance" to data in such zones or zones reached via such zones could be set to 256 or more as this exceeds the largest possible distance through secure zones in the DNS.
正統の非機密保護しているゾーンがDNS木を横断する際に遭遇するなら、どんなゾーンも安全な状態で信じられて、単にそのような非安全なゾーンからの情報でそれに達することができるということであることができません。 非機密保護しているゾーンデータが偽造されたかもしれないので、それを通して達した「安全な」ゾーンはにせのであるかもしれません。 これがDNSの安全なゾーンを通って可能な限り大きい距離を超えているとき、そのようなゾーンを通って達したそのようなゾーンかゾーンのデータへの「距離」を256以上に設定できました。
6.4 Secure Time
6.4安全な時間
Coordinated interpretation of the time fields in SIG RRs requires that reasonably consistent time be available to the hosts implementing the DNS security extensions.
SIG RRsの時間分野の連携解釈は、DNSセキュリティ拡張子を実装するホストにとって、合理的に一貫した時間が空いているのを必要とします。
A variety of time synchronization protocols exist including the Network Time Protocol (NTP [RFC 1305, 2030]). If such protocols are used, they MUST be used securely so that time can not be spoofed.
Network Timeプロトコル(NTP[RFC1305、2030])を含んでいて、さまざまな時間同期化プロトコルが存在しています。 そのようなプロトコルが使用されているなら、その時を偽造することができないようにしっかりとそれらを使用しなければなりません。
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 33] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[33ページ]。
Otherwise, for example, a host could get its clock turned back and might then believe old SIG RRs, and the data they authenticate, which were valid but are no longer.
そうでなければ、例えば、ホストは、時計を折り返させて、次に、古いSIG RRs、および彼らが認証するデータを信じていますが、もう信じるかもしれません。(データは有効でした)。
7. ASCII Representation of Security RRs
7. セキュリティRRsのASCII表現
This section discusses the format for master file and other ASCII presentation of the three DNS security resource records.
このセクションは基本ファイルと3つのDNSセキュリティリソース記録の他のASCIIプレゼンテーションのために形式について論じます。
The algorithm field in KEY and SIG RRs can be represented as either an unsigned integer or symbolicly. The following initial symbols are defined as indicated:
符号のない整数かシンボリックのどちらかとしてKEYとSIG RRsのアルゴリズム分野を表すことができます。 以下の始発記号は示されると定義されます:
Value Symbol
値のシンボル
001 RSAMD5
002 DH
003 DSA
004 ECC
252 INDIRECT
253 PRIVATEDNS
254 PRIVATEOID
001 RSAMD5 002DH003DSA004ECC252 253間接的なPRIVATEDNS254のPRIVATEOID
7.1 Presentation of KEY RRs
7.1 主要なRRsのプレゼンテーション
KEY RRs may appear as single logical lines in a zone data master file [RFC 1033].
KEY RRsはゾーンデータ基本ファイル[RFC1033]の単一の論理行として現れるかもしれません。
The flag field is represented as an unsigned integer or a sequence of
mnemonics as follows separated by instances of the verticle bar ("|")
character:
verticleバーのインスタンスによって切り離されて、旗の分野が以下のニーモニックの符号のない整数か系列として表される、(「|」、)、キャラクタ:
BIT Mnemonic Explanation
0-1 key type
NOCONF =1 confidentiality use prohibited
NOAUTH =2 authentication use prohibited
NOKEY =3 no key present
2 FLAG2 - reserved
3 EXTEND flags extension
4 FLAG4 - reserved
5 FLAG5 - reserved
6-7 name type
USER =0 (default, may be omitted)
ZONE =1
HOST =2 (host or other end entity)
NTYP3 - reserved
8 FLAG8 - reserved
9 FLAG9 - reserved
BIT Mnemonic Explanation0-1の主要なタイプNOCONF=1秘密性使用は予約された3EXTENDが4FLAG4--予約された5FLAG5--拡大予約された6-7名前1 0(デフォルト、省略されるかもしれない)タイプUSER=ZONE=HOST=2(ホストか他の終わりの実体)NTYP3--予約された8FLAG8--予約された9FLAG9に旗を揚げさせるという3ノー主要な現在の2禁止されたNOKEY=FLAG2が控えたNOAUTH=2認証使用を禁止しました。
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 34] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[34ページ]。
10 FLAG10 - reserved
11 FLAG11 - reserved
12-15 signatory field, values 0 to 15
can be represented by SIG0, SIG1, ... SIG15
10 FLAG10--予約された11FLAG11--12-15の予約された署名者分野、SIG0は値0〜15を表すことができます、SIG1… SIG15
No flag mnemonic need be present if the bit or field it represents is zero.
どんな旗のニーモニックもそれが表すビットか分野がゼロであるなら存在している必要はありません。
The protocol octet can be represented as either an unsigned integer or symbolicly. The following initial symbols are defined:
符号のない整数かシンボリックのどちらかとしてプロトコル八重奏を表すことができます。 以下の始発記号は定義されます:
000 NONE
001 TLS
002 EMAIL
003 DNSSEC
004 IPSEC
255 ALL
000 なにもに、001TLS002が003DNSSEC004IPSEC255にすべてをメールします。
Note that if the type flags field has the NOKEY value, nothing appears after the algorithm octet.
旗がさばくタイプがNOKEY値を持っているなら、何もアルゴリズム八重奏の後に現れないことに注意してください。
The remaining public key portion is represented in base 64 (see Appendix A) and may be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings, down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full signature. These substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis.
残っている公開鍵部分は、ベース64(Appendix Aを見ます)で表されて、いろいろな余白の切り離されたサブストリングに分割されるかもしれません、単独ベース64ケタまで。(ケタは、完全な署名を得るために連結されます)。 標準の挿入句を使用することでこれらのサブストリングは系列にかかることができます。
Note that the public key may have internal sub-fields but these do not appear in the master file representation. For example, with algorithm 1 there is a public exponent size, then a public exponent, and then a modulus. With algorithm 254, there will be an OID size, an OID, and algorithm dependent information. But in both cases only a single logical base 64 string will appear in the master file.
公開鍵には内部のサブ分野があるかもしれませんが、これらが基本ファイル表現では現れないことに注意してください。 例えば、アルゴリズム1で、公共の解説者サイズ、次に、公共の解説者、および次に係数があります。 アルゴリズム254で、OIDサイズ、OID、およびアルゴリズムに依存する情報があるでしょう。 しかし、どちらの場合も、ただ一つの論理的なベース64ストリングだけが基本ファイルに現れるでしょう。
7.2 Presentation of SIG RRs
7.2 SIG RRsのプレゼンテーション
A data SIG RR may be represented as a single logical line in a zone data file [RFC 1033] but there are some special considerations as described below. (It does not make sense to include a transaction or request authenticating SIG RR in a file as they are a transient authentication that covers data including an ephemeral transaction number and so must be calculated in real time.)
データSIG RRはゾーンデータファイル[RFC1033]の単一の論理行として表されるかもしれませんが、いくつかの特別な問題が以下で説明されるようにあります。 (それはトランザクションを含んでいるか、またははかないトランザクション番号を含んでいるのでリアルタイムでそれらがデータをカバーする一時的な認証であるのでファイルでSIG RRを認証するのと計算しなければならないよう要求する意味になりません。)
There is no particular problem with the signer, covered type, and times. The time fields appears in the form YYYYMMDDHHMMSS where YYYY is the year, the first MM is the month number (01-12), DD is the day of the month (01-31), HH is the hour in 24 hours notation (00-23), the second MM is the minute (00-59), and SS is the second (00-59).
署名者、カバーされたタイプ、および回に関するどんな特定の問題もありません。 時間野原はYYYYが年であるフォームYYYYMMDDHHMMSSに現れます、そして、最初のMMは月の番号(01-12)です、そして、DDは月(01-31)の日です、そして、24時間の記法(00-23)でHHは時間です、そして、第2MMは分(00-59)です、そして、SSは2番目の(00-59)です。
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 35] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[35ページ]。
The original TTL field appears as an unsigned integer.
元のTTL野原は符号のない整数として現れます。
If the original TTL, which applies to the type signed, is the same as the TTL of the SIG RR itself, it may be omitted. The date field which follows it is larger than the maximum possible TTL so there is no ambiguity.
オリジナルのTTL(署名されるタイプに適用する)がSIG RR自身のTTLと同じであるなら、それは省略されるかもしれません。 それに続く年月日欄が最大の可能なTTLより大きいので、あいまいさが全くありません。
The "labels" field appears as an unsigned integer.
「ラベル」野原は符号のない整数として現れます。
The key tag appears as an unsigned number.
キー・タグは符号のない数として現れます。
However, the signature itself can be very long. It is the last data field and is represented in base 64 (see Appendix A) and may be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings, down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full signature. These substrings can be split between lines using the standard parenthesis.
しかしながら、署名自体は非常に長い場合があります。 それは、最後のデータ・フィールドであり、ベース64(Appendix Aを見ます)で表されて、いろいろな余白の切り離されたサブストリングに分割されるかもしれません、単独ベース64ケタまで。(ケタは、完全な署名を得るために連結されます)。 標準の挿入句を使用する系列の間でこれらのサブストリングを分けることができます。
7.3 Presentation of NXT RRs
7.3 NXT RRsのプレゼンテーション
NXT RRs do not appear in original unsigned zone master files since they should be derived from the zone as it is being signed. If a signed file with NXTs added is printed or NXTs are printed by debugging code, they appear as the next domain name followed by the RR type present bits as an unsigned interger or sequence of RR mnemonics.
NXT RRsは、それに署名しているときゾーンからそれらを得るべきであるので、オリジナルの未署名のゾーン基本ファイルに現れません。 NXTsが加えられている署名しているファイルが印刷されるか、またはNXTsがデバッグコードによって印刷されるなら、次のドメイン名がタイプがRRニーモニックの未署名のintergerか系列としてビットを寄贈するRRで従ったので、彼らは現れます。
8. Canonical Form and Order of Resource Records
8. リソース記録の標準形と注文
This section specifies, for purposes of domain name system (DNS) security, the canonical form of resource records (RRs), their name order, and their overall order. A canonical name order is necessary to construct the NXT name chain. A canonical form and ordering within an RRset is necessary in consistently constructing and verifying SIG RRs. A canonical ordering of types within a name is required in connection with incremental transfer (Section 5.6.2).
このセクションは指定します、ドメイン名システム(DNS)セキュリティの目的、正準なフォームに関するリソース記録(RRs)、彼らの名前注文、および彼らの総合的な注文のために。 正準な名前オーダーが、チェーンというNXT名を構成するのに必要です。 標準形とRRsetの中で注文するのが一貫してSIG RRsを組み立てて、確かめるのにおいて必要です。 増加の転送(セクション5.6.2)に関して名前の中のタイプの正準な注文を必要とします。
8.1 Canonical RR Form
8.1 正準なRRは形成します。
For purposes of DNS security, the canonical form for an RR is the wire format of the RR with domain names (1) fully expanded (no name compression via pointers), (2) all domain name letters set to lower case, (3) owner name wild cards in master file form (no substitution made for *), and (4) the original TTL substituted for the current TTL.
DNSセキュリティの目的のために、RRのための標準形はドメイン名(1)が完全に広げられているRR(指針を通した名前圧縮がない)のワイヤ形式です、すべてのドメイン名手紙がケースを下ろすように設定する(2)、オリジナルのTTLが現在のTTLに代入した基本ファイルフォーム(代替は全く*にならなかった)、および(4)の(3)所有者名前ワイルドカード。
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 36] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[36ページ]。
8.2 Canonical DNS Name Order
8.2 正準なDNS名前オーダー
For purposes of DNS security, the canonical ordering of owner names is to sort individual labels as unsigned left justified octet strings where the absence of a octet sorts before a zero value octet and upper case letters are treated as lower case letters. Names in a zone are sorted by sorting on the highest level label and then, within those names with the same highest level label by the next lower label, etc. down to leaf node labels. Within a zone, the zone name itself always exists and all other names are the zone name with some prefix of lower level labels. Thus the zone name itself always sorts first.
DNSセキュリティの目的のために、所有者名の正準な注文はゼロが八重奏を評価する前に八重奏の欠如が分類して、大文字アルファベットが扱われる左の未署名の正当な八重奏ストリングがケース手紙を下ろすとき個々のラベルを分類することです。 ゾーンの名前は最高水準ラベルの上と、そして、次に、それらの名前の中の同じ最高水準ラベルによるソーティングで葉のノードラベルまでの次の低級ラベルなどによって分類されます。 ゾーンの中では、ゾーン名自体はいつも存在しています、そして、他のすべての名前が下のレベルラベルの何らかの接頭語のゾーン名です。 したがって、ゾーン名自体はいつも1番目を分類します。
Example:
foo.example
a.foo.example
yljkjljk.a.foo.example
Z.a.foo.example
zABC.a.FOO.EXAMPLE
z.foo.example
*.z.foo.example
\200.z.foo.example
例: foo.example a.foo.example yljkjljk.a. foo.example Z.a.foo.example zABC.a. FOO.EXAMPLE z.foo.example*.z. foo.example\200.z. foo.example
8.3 Canonical RR Ordering Within An RRset
8.3 RRsetの中で注文する正準なRR
Within any particular owner name and type, RRs are sorted by RDATA as a left justified unsigned octet sequence where the absence of an octet sorts before the zero octet.
aが正当な未署名の八重奏系列にどこを出たかのでどんな特定の所有者名とタイプの中ではも、RRsがRDATAによって分類される、八重奏の欠如が以前分類する、八重奏がありません。
8.4 Canonical Ordering of RR Types
8.4 RRタイプの正準な注文
When RRs of the same name but different types must be ordered, they are ordered by type, considering the type to be an unsigned integer, except that SIG RRs are placed immediately after the type they cover. Thus, for example, an A record would be put before an MX record because A is type 1 and MX is type 15 but if both were signed, the order would be A < SIG(A) < MX < SIG(MX).
同じ名前にもかかわらず、異なったタイプのRRsを注文しなければならないとき、タイプは彼らを注文します、タイプが符号のない整数であると考える場合、SIG RRsが彼らがカバーするタイプ直後置かれるのを除いて。このようにして、例えば、Aがタイプ1とMXであるのでMX記録がタイプにな15る前でA記録は置かれるでしょうが、両方が署名されるなら、オーダーはA<SIG(A)<MX<SIG(MX)でしょうに。
9. Conformance
9. 順応
Levels of server and resolver conformance are defined below.
サーバとレゾルバ順応のレベルは以下で定義されます。
9.1 Server Conformance
9.1 サーバ順応
Two levels of server conformance for DNS security are defined as follows:
DNSセキュリティのためのサーバ順応の2つのレベルが以下の通り定義されます:
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 37] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[37ページ]。
BASIC: Basic server compliance is the ability to store and retrieve (including zone transfer) SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs. Any secondary or caching server for a secure zone MUST have at least basic compliance and even then some things, such as secure CNAMEs, will not work without full compliance.
基本的: 基幹サーバコンプライアンスはSIG、KEY、およびNXT RRsを保存して、検索する(ゾーン転送を含んでいます)能力です。 安全なゾーンへのどんなセカンダリかキャッシュサーバにも、少なくとも基本的なコンプライアンスがなければなりません、そして、その時でさえ、安全なCNAMEsなどのいくつかのものは完全な承諾なしで働かないでしょう。
FULL: Full server compliance adds the following to basic compliance: (1) ability to read SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs in zone files and (2) ability, given a zone file and private key, to add appropriate SIG and NXT RRs, possibly via a separate application, (3) proper automatic inclusion of SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs in responses, (4) suppression of CNAME following on retrieval of the security type RRs, (5) recognize the CD query header bit and set the AD query header bit, as appropriate, and (6) proper handling of the two NXT RRs at delegation points. Primary servers for secure zones MUST be fully compliant and for complete secure operation, all secondary, caching, and other servers handling the zone SHOULD be fully compliant as well.
完全: 完全なサーバコンプライアンスは基本的な承諾に以下を加えます: (1) ゾーンファイルと秘密鍵を考えて、KEY、および応答、セキュリティの検索のときにタイプRRs、(5)に続くCNAMEの(4)抑圧におけるNXT RRsが、CD質問ヘッダーが別々のアプリケーション、ことによるとSIGの(3)の適切な自動包含で噛み付いたと認める適切なSIGとNXT RRsを加えるためにゾーンファイルと(2)能力でSIG、KEY、およびNXT RRsを読んで、適宜噛み付かれたAD質問ヘッダーを設定する能力、および委譲ポイントの2NXT RRsの(6)の適切な取り扱い。 安全なゾーンへのプライマリサーバも、完全に対応であり、完全な安全な操作、ゾーンSHOULDを扱うすべてのセカンダリの、そして、キャッシュしていて、他のサーバにおいて、また、完全に対応でなければなりません。
9.2 Resolver Conformance
9.2 レゾルバ順応
Two levels of resolver compliance (including the resolver portion of a server) are defined for DNS Security:
レゾルバコンプライアンスの2つのレベルがDNS Securityのために定義されます(サーバのレゾルバ部分を含んでいます):
BASIC: A basic compliance resolver can handle SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs when they are explicitly requested.
基本的: 彼らが明らかに要求されているとき、基本的な承諾レゾルバはSIG、KEY、およびNXT RRsを扱うことができます。
FULL: A fully compliant resolver (1) understands KEY, SIG, and NXT RRs including verification of SIGs at least for the mandatory algorithm, (2) maintains appropriate information in its local caches and database to indicate which RRs have been authenticated and to what extent they have been authenticated, (3) performs additional queries as necessary to attempt to obtain KEY, SIG, or NXT RRs when needed, (4) normally sets the CD query header bit on its queries.
完全: 完全に言いなりになっているレゾルバ(1)は少なくとも義務的なアルゴリズムのためのSIGの検証を含むKEY、SIG、およびNXT RRsを理解しています、そして、(2)はどのRRsが認証されたかを示すためにそのローカルなキャッシュとデータベースの適切な情報を保守します、そして、必要であると、彼らが認証されたというどんな範囲に、(3)はKEY、SIG、またはNXT RRsを入手するのを試みるために必要に応じて追加質問を実行するか、そして、通常、(4)は質問のCD質問ヘッダービットを設定します。
10. Security Considerations
10. セキュリティ問題
This document specifies extensions to the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to provide data integrity and data origin authentication, public key distribution, and optional transaction and request security.
このドキュメントは、データ保全、データ発生源認証、公開鍵分配、および任意のトランザクションを提供して、セキュリティを要求するためにドメインネームシステム(DNS)プロトコルに拡大を指定します。
It should be noted that, at most, these extensions guarantee the validity of resource records, including KEY resource records, retrieved from the DNS. They do not magically solve other security problems. For example, using secure DNS you can have high confidence in the IP address you retrieve for a host name; however, this does not stop someone for substituting an unauthorized host at that
これらの拡大が大部分でリソース記録の正当性を保証することに注意されるべきです、DNSから検索されたKEYリソース記録を含んでいて。 彼らは魔法にかかったように他の警備上の問題を解決しません。例えば、安全なDNSを使用して、あなたはあなたがホスト名のために検索するIPアドレスにおける高い信用を持つことができます。 しかしながら、これは、おまけに権限のないホストを代入するためにだれかを止めません。
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address or capturing packets sent to that address and falsely responding with packets apparently from that address. Any reasonably complete security system will require the protection of many additional facets of the Internet beyond DNS.
アドレスかパケットをキャプチャするのがそのアドレスと明らかにそのアドレスからのパケットで間違って応じるのに発信しました。 どんな合理的に完全なセキュリティシステムもDNSを超えてインターネットの多くの追加一面の保護を必要とするでしょう。
The implementation of NXT RRs as described herein enables a resolver to determine all the names in a zone even if zone transfers are prohibited (section 5.6). This is an active area of work and may change.
ゾーン転送が禁止されても(セクション5.6)、説明されるとしてのNXT RRsの実装は、レゾルバがゾーンですべての名前を決定するのをここに可能にします。 これは、仕事の活動領域であり、変化するかもしれません。
A number of precautions in DNS implementation have evolved over the years to harden the insecure DNS against spoofing. These precautions should not be abandoned but should be considered to provide additional protection in case of key compromise in secure DNS.
DNS実装における多くの注意が、スプーフィングに対して不安定なDNSを堅くするために数年間発展しています。 これらの注意を捨てるべきではありませんが、安全なDNSの主要な感染の場合に追加保護を提供すると考えるべきです。
11. IANA Considerations
11. IANA問題
KEY RR flag bits 2 and 8-11 and all flag extension field bits can be assigned by IETF consensus as defined in RFC 2434. The remaining values of the NAMTYP flag field and flag bits 4 and 5 (which could conceivably become an extension of the NAMTYP field) can only be assigned by an IETF Standards Action [RFC 2434].
IETFコンセンサスはRFC2434で定義されるようにKEY RRフラグビット2と8-11とすべての旗の拡大分野ビットを割り当てることができます。 IETF Standards Action[RFC2434]はNAMTYP旗の分野とフラグビット4と5(多分NAMTYP分野の拡大になることができました)の残余価値を割り当てることができるだけです。
Algorithm numbers 5 through 251 are available for assignment should sufficient reason arise. However, the designation of a new algorithm could have a major impact on interoperability and requires an IETF Standards Action [RFC 2434]. The existence of the private algorithm types 253 and 254 should satify most needs for private or proprietary algorithms.
十分な理由が起こるなら、アルゴリズムNo.5〜251は課題に有効です。 しかしながら、新しいアルゴリズムの名称は、相互運用性に強い影響を持つことができて、IETF Standards Action[RFC2434]を必要とします。 個人的なアルゴリズムタイプ253と254の存在は個人的であるか独占であるアルゴリズムのほとんどの必要性をsatifyするべきです。
Additional values of the Protocol Octet (5-254) can be assigned by IETF Consensus [RFC 2434].
IETF Consensus[RFC2434]はプロトコルOctet(5-254)の加算値を割り当てることができます。
The meaning of the first bit of the NXT RR "type bit map" being a one can only be assigned by a standards action.
規格動作で1つであるNXT RR「タイプビットマップ」の最初のビットの意味を割り当てることができるだけです。
References
参照
[RFC 1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide", RFC
1033, November 1987.
[RFC1033] Lottor、M.、「操作が誘導するドメイン管理者」、RFC1033、1987年11月。
[RFC 1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and
Facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
Mockapetris、[RFC1034]P.、「ドメイン名--、概念と施設、」、STD13、RFC1034、11月1987日
[RFC 1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and
Specifications", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
Mockapetris、[RFC1035]P.、「ドメイン名--、実装と仕様、」、STD13、RFC1035、11月1987日
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[RFC 1305] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (v3)", RFC 1305, March
1992.
[RFC1305] 1992年3月の工場、D.、「ネットワーク時間プロトコル(v3)」RFC1305。
[RFC 1530] Malamud, C. and M. Rose, "Principles of Operation for the
TPC.INT Subdomain: General Principles and Policy", RFC
1530, October 1993.
[RFC1530] マラマッド、C.、およびM.が上昇した、「TPC.INTサブドメインのための操作のプリンシプルズ:」 「綱領と方針」、RFC1530、10月1993日
[RFC 2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2401] ケントとS.とR.アトキンソン、「インターネットプロトコルのためのセキュリティー体系」、RFC2401、1998年11月。
[RFC 1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC
1982, September 1996.
[RFC1982] ElzとR.とR.ブッシュ、「通し番号演算」、RFC1982、1996年9月。
[RFC 1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
August 1996.
[RFC1995] 太田、M.、「DNSの増加のゾーン転送」、RFC1995、1996年8月。
[RFC 2030] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 2030, October 1996.
[RFC2030] 工場、D.、「IPv4、IPv6、およびOSIのための簡単なネットワーク時間プロトコル(SNTP)バージョン4」、RFC2030、1996年10月。
[RFC 2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
解放された[RFC2045]、N.、およびN.Borenstein、「マルチパーパスインターネットメールエクステンション(MIME)は1つを分けます」。 「インターネットメッセージ本体の形式」、RFC2045、1996年11月。
[RFC 2065] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security
Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997.
[RFC2065] イーストレークとD.とC.コーフマン、「ドメインネームシステムセキュリティ拡大」、RFC2065、1997年1月。
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119] ブラドナー、S.、「Indicate Requirement LevelsへのRFCsにおける使用のためのキーワード」、BCP14、RFC2119、1997年3月。
[RFC 2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, April 1997.
[RFC2136] VixieとP.とトムソンとS.、RekhterとY.とJ.バウンド、「ドメインネームシステム(DNSアップデート)におけるダイナミックなアップデート」RFC2136(1997年4月)。
[RFC 2137] Eastlake, D., "Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update",
RFC 2137, April 1997.
[RFC2137] イーストレーク、1997年4月のD.、「安全なドメインネームシステムダイナミック・アップデート」RFC2137。
[RFC 2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, July 1997.
[RFC2181] ElzとR.とR.ブッシュ、「DNS仕様への明確化」、RFC2181、1997年7月。
[RFC 2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC2434] Narten、T.とH.Alvestrand、「RFCsにIANA問題部に書くためのガイドライン」BCP26、RFC2434(1998年10月)。
[RFC 2537] Eastlake, D., "RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 2537, March 1999.
[RFC2537] イーストレーク、D.と、「ドメインネームシステム(DNS)におけるRSA/MD5キーとSIG」(RFC2537)は1999を行進させます。
[RFC 2539] Eastlake, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.
[RFC2539] イーストレーク、D.、「ドメインネームシステム(DNS)における、ディフィー-ヘルマンKeysのストレージ」、RFC2539、1999年3月。
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[RFC 2536] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[RFC2536] イーストレーク、D.と、「ドメインネームシステム(DNS)におけるDSAキーとSIG」(RFC2536)は1999を行進させます。
[RFC 2538] Eastlake, D. and O. Gudmundsson, "Storing Certificates in
the Domain Name System", RFC 2538, March 1999.
[RFC2538] イーストレークとD.とO.グドムンソン、「ドメインネームシステムに証明書を格納します」、RFC2538、1999年3月。
[RFC 2541] Eastlake, D., "DNS Operational Security Considerations",
RFC 2541, March 1999.
[RFC2541] イーストレーク、D.、「DNSの操作上のセキュリティ問題」、RFC2541、1999年3月。
[RSA FAQ] - RSADSI Frequently Asked Questions periodic posting.
[RSA FAQ]--RSADSIのFrequentlyのAskedのQuestionsの周期的な任命。
Author's Address
作者のアドレス
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd IBM 65 Shindegan Hill Road RR #1 Carmel, NY 10512
カーメル、ドナルドE.イーストレーク3番目のIBM65Shindeganヒル道路RR#1ニューヨーク 10512
Phone: +1-914-784-7913 (w)
+1-914-276-2668 (h)
Fax: +1-914-784-3833 (w-fax)
EMail: dee3@us.ibm.com
以下に電話をしてください。 +1-914-784-7913 (w)+1-914-276-2668(h)Fax: +1-914-784-3833(w-ファックス)に、メールしてください: dee3@us.ibm.com
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Appendix A: Base 64 Encoding
付録A: 基地64のコード化
The following encoding technique is taken from [RFC 2045] by N. Borenstein and N. Freed. It is reproduced here in an edited form for convenience.
以下のコード化のテクニックはN.BorensteinとN.フリードによって[RFC2045]から取られます。 それはここ、便宜のための編集されたフォームで再生します。
A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=", is used to signify a special processing function.)
6ビットが印刷可能なキャラクタ単位で表されるのを可能にして、米国-ASCIIの65文字サブセットが使用されています。 (「=」という65番目の余分なキャラクタは特別な処理機能を意味するのに使用されます。)
The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups. These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each of which is translated into a single digit in the base 64 alphabet.
4の出力ストリングがキャラクタをコード化したので、コード化の過程は入力ビットの24ビットのグループを代表します。 左から右まで続いて、24ビットの入力グループは、3の8ビットの入力グループを連結することによって、結成されます。 そして、4が6ビットのグループ(それのそれぞれがベース64アルファベットの一桁に翻訳される)を連結したので、これらの24ビットは扱われます。
Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the output string.
それぞれの6ビットのグループはインデックスとして64の印刷可能なキャラクタのアレイに使用されます。 インデックスによって参照をつけられるキャラクタは出力ストリングに置かれます。
Table 1: The Base 64 Alphabet
テーブル1: 基地の64アルファベット
Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding
0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z
1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0
2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1
3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2
4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3
5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4
6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5
7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6
8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7
9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8
10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9
11 L 28 c 45 t 62 +
12 M 29 d 46 u 63 /
13 N 30 e 47 v
14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) =
15 P 32 g 49 x
16 Q 33 h 50 y
評価..18秒間..C..44秒間..パッド..33時間
Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available at the end of the data being encoded. A full encoding quantum is always completed at the end of a quantity. When fewer than 24 input bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Padding at the end of the data is performed using the '=' character. Since all base 64 input is an integral number of octets, only the following cases
24ビット未満がコード化されるデータの終わりで有効であるなら、特別な処理は実行されます。 完全なコード化量子はいつも量の終わりに完成します。 24入力ビット未満が入力グループで有効であるときに、ゼロ・ビットは、整数の6ビットのグループを結成するために加えられます(右で)。 データの終わりでそっと歩くのは、'='キャラクタを使用することで実行されます。 すべてのベース64入力が整数の八重奏、以下のケースにすぎないので
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can arise: (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters with no "=" padding, (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be two characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be three characters followed by one "=" padding character.
起こることができます: (1) 入力をコード化する最終的な量子は24ビットの不可欠の倍数です。 (2) ここで、コード化された出力の最終的なユニットが「=」が全くそっと歩いていない4つのキャラクタの不可欠の倍数になる、入力をコード化する最終的な量子はちょうど8ビットです。 (3) ここで、コード化された出力の最終的なユニットは2人の「=」暫定記号によっていうことになられた2つのキャラクタになるだろうか、入力をコード化する最終的な量子はまさに16ビットです。 ここで、コード化された出力の最終的なユニットは1人の「=」暫定記号によっていうことになられた3つのキャラクタになるでしょう。
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Appendix B: Changes from RFC 2065
付録B: RFC2065からの変化
This section summarizes the most important changes that have been made since RFC 2065.
このセクションはRFC2065以来行われている中で最も重要な変更をまとめます。
1. Most of Section 7 of [RFC 2065] called "Operational
Considerations", has been removed and may be made into a separate
document [RFC 2541].
1. [RFC2065]のセクション7の大部分を「操作上の問題」と呼んで、移して、別々のドキュメント[RFC2541]にするかもしれません。
2. The KEY RR has been changed by (2a) eliminating the "experimental"
flag as unnecessary, (2b) reserving a flag bit for flags
expansion, (2c) more compactly encoding a number of bit fields in
such a way as to leave unchanged bits actually used by the limited
code currently deployed, (2d) eliminating the IPSEC and email flag
bits which are replaced by values of the protocol field and adding
a protocol field value for DNS security itself, (2e) adding
material to indicate that zone KEY RRs occur only at delegation
points, and (2f) removing the description of the RSA/MD5 algorithm
to a separate document [RFC 2537]. Section 3.4 describing the
meaning of various combinations of "no-key" and key present KEY
RRs has been added and the secure / unsecure status of a zone has
been clarified as being per algorithm.
2. KEY RRによって変えられました。(2a)が不要であるとして「実験的な」旗を排除して、変わりのないビットを現在実際に限られたコードによって使用されたままにして、よりコンパクトにそのような方法で分野を多くのビットコード化しながら旗拡大、(2c)をフラグビット取っておく(2b)が展開しました; IPSECを排除する(2d)とメールはプロトコル分野とDNSセキュリティ自体のためのプロトコル分野価値を高めるゾーンKEY RRsが別々のドキュメントRFC2537にRSA/MD5アルゴリズムの記述を移しながら代表団ポイント、および(2f)だけに起こるのを示すために材料を加える(2e)値に取り替えられるビットに旗を揚げさせます。 「いいえ主要で」主要な現在のKEY RRsの様々な組み合わせの意味について説明するセクション3.4が加えられます、そして、ゾーンの安全な/unsecure状態はアルゴリズム単位であるとしてはっきりさせられました。
3. The SIG RR has been changed by (3a) renaming the "time signed"
field to be the "signature inception" field, (3b) clarifying that
signature expiration and inception use serial number ring
arithmetic, (3c) changing the definition of the key footprint/tag
for algorithms other than 1 and adding Appendix C to specify its
calculation. In addition, the SIG covering type AXFR has been
eliminated while one covering IXFR [RFC 1995] has been added (see
section 5.6).
3. SIG RRによって変えられました。(3a)が「署名始まり」分野になるように「時間はサインした」という分野を改名して、その署名満了と始まりをはっきりさせて(3b)、通し番号リング演算を使用してください、1とAppendix Cを加えるのを除いたアルゴリズムが計算を指定するように(3c)が主要な足跡/タグの定義を変えて。 さらに、1覆いIXFR[RFC1995]が加えられますが(セクション5.6を見てください)、タイプAXFRを覆うSIGは排除されました。
4. Algorithm 3, the DSA algorithm, is now designated as the mandatory
to implement algorithm. Algorithm 1, the RSA/MD5 algorithm, is
now a recommended option. Algorithm 2 and 4 are designated as the
Diffie-Hellman key and elliptic cryptography algorithms
respectively, all to be defined in separate documents. Algorithm
code point 252 is designated to indicate "indirect" keys, to be
defined in a separate document, where the actual key is elsewhere.
Both the KEY and SIG RR definitions have been simplified by
eliminating the "null" algorithm 253 as defined in [RFC 2065].
That algorithm had been included because at the time it was
thought it might be useful in DNS dynamic update [RFC 2136]. It
was in fact not so used and it is dropped to simplify DNS
security. Howver, that algorithm number has been re-used to
indicate private algorithms where a domain name specifies the
algorithm.
4. アルゴリズム3(DSAアルゴリズム)は、現在、アルゴリズムを実行するために義務的として指定されます。 現在、アルゴリズム1(RSA/MD5アルゴリズム)はお勧めのオプションです。 アルゴリズム2と4はディフィー-ヘルマンの主要で楕円形の暗号アルゴリズムとしてそれぞれ指定されます、別々のドキュメントで定義されるべきすべて。 アルゴリズムコード・ポイント252は、「間接的な」キーを示して、別々のドキュメントで定義されるために指定されます。(そこに、実際のキーがほかの場所にあります)。 KEYとSIG RR定義の両方が、[RFC2065]で定義されるように「ヌル」のアルゴリズム253を排除することによって、簡素化されました。 それがDNSのダイナミックなアップデート[RFC2136]で役に立つかもしれないと当時、思われたので、そのアルゴリズムは含まれていました。 事実上、それはそのように使用されませんでした、そして、DNSセキュリティを簡素化するために、落とされます。 Howver、そのアルゴリズム番号は、ドメイン名がアルゴリズムを指定する個人的なアルゴリズムを示すのに再使用されました。
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5. The NXT RR has been changed so that (5a) the NXT RRs in a zone
cover all names, including wildcards as literal names without
expansion, except for glue address records whose names would not
otherwise appear, (5b) all NXT bit map areas whose first octet has
bit zero set have been reserved for future definition, (5c) the
number of and circumstances under which an NXT must be returned in
connection with wildcard names has been extended, and (5d) in
connection with the bit map, references to the WKS RR have been
removed and verticle bars ("|") have been added between the RR
type mnemonics in the ASCII representation.
5. NXT RRが変えられたそう、それ、(拡大のない文字通りの名前としてワイルドカードを含んでいて、ゾーンカバーのNXT RRsがすべて、命名する5a)、そうでなければ名前が現れない接着剤アドレス記録を除いて、最初の八重奏がセットに全く噛み付いていないすべての(5b)NXTビットマップ領域が今後の定義のために予約されました; (5c)番号、どれに関してNXTを返さなければならないかの下でワイルドカード名を広げてあるか、そして、ビットマップの(5d)がWKS RRに参照をつける事情が取り除かれて、バーをverticleする、(「|」、)、ASCII表現におけるRRタイプニーモニックの間で加えられてください。
6. Information on the canonical form and ordering of RRs has been
moved into a separate Section 8.
6. RRsの標準形と注文に関する情報は別々のセクション8に動かされました。
7. A subsection covering incremental and full zone transfer has been
added in Section 5.
7. 増加の、そして、完全なゾーン転送を覆う小区分はセクション5で加えられます。
8. Concerning DNS chaining: Further specification and policy
recommendations on secure resolution have been added, primarily in
Section 6.3.1. It is now clearly stated that authenticated data
has a validity period of the intersection of the validity periods
of the SIG RRs in its authentication chain. The requirement to
staticly configure a superzone's key signed by a zone in all of
the zone's authoritative servers has been removed. The
recommendation to continue DNS security checks in a secure island
of DNS data that is separated from other parts of the DNS tree by
insecure zones and does not contain a zone for which a key has
been staticly configured was dropped.
8. DNS推論に関して: 安全な解決のさらなる仕様と政策提言は主としてセクション6.3.1で加えられます。 現在、認証されたデータが認証チェーンでSIG RRsの有効期間の交差点の有効期間を持っていると明確に述べられます。 静的にゾーンによってゾーンの正式のサーバのすべてにサインされた「スーパー-ゾーン」のキーを構成するという要件を取り除いてあります。 不安定なゾーンによってDNS木の他の部分と切り離されて、キーが静的に構成されたゾーンを含まないDNSデータの安全な島の中でDNSセキュリティチェックを続けているという推薦は落とされました。
9. It was clarified that the presence of the AD bit in a response
does not apply to the additional information section or to glue
address or delegation point NS RRs. The AD bit only indicates
that the answer and authority sections of the response are
authoritative.
9. それははっきりさせられました。応答における、ADビットの存在が追加情報収集部門、または、接着剤アドレスか代表団に適用しないのがNS RRsを指します。 ADビットは、応答の答えと権威部が正式であることを示すだけです。
10. It is now required that KEY RRs and NXT RRs be signed only with
zone-level keys.
10. 現在、KEY RRsとNXT RRsが単にゾーンレベルキーでサインされるのが必要です。
11. Add IANA Considerations section and references to RFC 2434.
11. IANA Considerations部と参照をRFC2434に加えてください。
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 45] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[45ページ]。
Appendix C: Key Tag Calculation
付録C: キー・タグ計算
The key tag field in the SIG RR is just a means of more efficiently selecting the correct KEY RR to use when there is more than one KEY RR candidate available, for example, in verifying a signature. It is possible for more than one candidate key to have the same tag, in which case each must be tried until one works or all fail. The following reference implementation of how to calculate the Key Tag, for all algorithms other than algorithm 1, is in ANSI C. It is coded for clarity, not efficiency. (See section 4.1.6 for how to determine the Key Tag of an algorithm 1 key.)
例えば署名について確かめる際に手があいている1人以上のKEY RR候補がいるとき、SIG RRのキー・タグ分野はただ使用するより効率的に正しいKEY RRを選択する手段です。 1人以上の候補にとって、同じタグを持つために主要です、その場合、1個の作品かすべてが失敗するまでそれぞれを試みなければならないのは可能です。 Key Tagがアルゴリズム1以外のすべてのアルゴリズムのためにANSI C.Itにあるとどう見込むかに関する以下の参照実現は効率ではなく、明快ためにコード化されます。 (セクション4.1.6を見て、どうアルゴリズム1キーのKey Tagを決定してくださいか。)
/* assumes int is at least 16 bits
first byte of the key tag is the most significant byte of return
value
second byte of the key tag is the least significant byte of
return value
*/
/*は、intによるキー・タグの最初のバイトが少なくとも16ビット、キー・タグのリターン価値2番目のバイトの最も重要なバイトがリターン値*/の最も重要でないバイトであるということであるということであると仮定します。
int keytag (
int keytag、(
unsigned char key[], /* the RDATA part of the KEY RR */
unsigned int keysize, /* the RDLENGTH */
)
{
long int ac; /* assumed to be 32 bits or larger */
無記名の炭のキー[]、RDATAが分けるKEY RR*/無記名のint keysizeの/*、/*、RDLENGTH*/) int acを切望してください; *が32ビットであると仮定した/か、より大きい*/
for ( ac = 0, i = 0; i < keysize; ++i )
ac += (i&1) ? key[i] : key[i]<<8;
ac += (ac>>16) & 0xFFFF;
return ac & 0xFFFF;
}
(i=0 ; ac=0、i<はkeysizeされます; + + i)というac+=(iと1)? キー[i]のために: キー[i]<<8。 ac+=(ac>>16)と0xFFFF。 リターンacと0xFFFF。 }
Eastlake Standards Track [Page 46] RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
イーストレークStandardsは1999年のDNSセキュリティ拡大行進のときにRFC2535を追跡します[46ページ]。
Full Copyright Statement
完全な著作権宣言文
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Copyright(C)インターネット協会(1999)。 All rights reserved。
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
上に承諾された限られた許容は、永久であり、インターネット協会、後継者または案配によって取り消されないでしょう。
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