RFC5216 日本語訳
5216 The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol. D. Simon, B. Aboba, R.Hurst. March 2008. (Format: TXT=71599 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC2716) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD)
プログラムでの自動翻訳です。
RFC一覧
英語原文
Network Working Group D. Simon
Request for Comments: 5216 B. Aboba
Obsoletes: 2716 R. Hurst
Category: Standards Track Microsoft Corporation
March 2008
Network Working Group D. Simon Request for Comments: 5216 B. Aboba Obsoletes: 2716 R. Hurst Category: Standards Track Microsoft Corporation March 2008
The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol
The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol
Status of This Memo
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748, provides support for multiple authentication methods. Transport Layer Security (TLS) provides for mutual authentication, integrity- protected ciphersuite negotiation, and key exchange between two endpoints. This document defines EAP-TLS, which includes support for certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation.
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748, provides support for multiple authentication methods. Transport Layer Security (TLS) provides for mutual authentication, integrity- protected ciphersuite negotiation, and key exchange between two endpoints. This document defines EAP-TLS, which includes support for certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation.
This document obsoletes RFC 2716. A summary of the changes between this document and RFC 2716 is available in Appendix A.
This document obsoletes RFC 2716. A summary of the changes between this document and RFC 2716 is available in Appendix A.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Requirements ...............................................3
1.2. Terminology ................................................3
2. Protocol Overview ...............................................4
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation .......................4
2.1.1. Base Case ...........................................4
2.1.2. Session Resumption ..................................7
2.1.3. Termination .........................................8
2.1.4. Privacy ............................................11
2.1.5. Fragmentation ......................................14
2.2. Identity Verification .....................................16
2.3. Key Hierarchy .............................................17
2.4. Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation ...................19
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol ...................20
3.1. EAP-TLS Request Packet ....................................20
3.2. EAP-TLS Response Packet ...................................22
4. IANA Considerations ............................................23
5. Security Considerations ........................................24
5.1. Security Claims ...........................................24
5.2. Peer and Server Identities ................................25
5.3. Certificate Validation ....................................26
5.4. Certificate Revocation ....................................27
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks ...............................28
6. References .....................................................29
6.1. Normative References ......................................29
6.2. Informative References ....................................29
Acknowledgments ...................................................31
Appendix A -- Changes from RFC 2716 ...............................32
1. Introduction ....................................................2 1.1. Requirements ...............................................3 1.2. Terminology ................................................3 2. Protocol Overview ...............................................4 2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation .......................4 2.1.1. Base Case ...........................................4 2.1.2. Session Resumption ..................................7 2.1.3. Termination .........................................8 2.1.4. Privacy ............................................11 2.1.5. Fragmentation ......................................14 2.2. Identity Verification .....................................16 2.3. Key Hierarchy .............................................17 2.4. Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation ...................19 3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol ...................20 3.1. EAP-TLS Request Packet ....................................20 3.2. EAP-TLS Response Packet ...................................22 4. IANA Considerations ............................................23 5. Security Considerations ........................................24 5.1. Security Claims ...........................................24 5.2. Peer and Server Identities ................................25 5.3. Certificate Validation ....................................26 5.4. Certificate Revocation ....................................27 5.5. Packet Modification Attacks ...............................28 6. References .....................................................29 6.1. Normative References ......................................29 6.2. Informative References ....................................29 Acknowledgments ...................................................31 Appendix A -- Changes from RFC 2716 ...............................32
1. Introduction
1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), described in [RFC3748], provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication methods. Through the use of EAP, support for a number of authentication schemes may be added, including smart cards, Kerberos, Public Key, One Time Passwords, and others. EAP has been defined for use with a variety of lower layers, including the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [RFC1661], Layer 2 tunneling protocols such as the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [RFC2637] or Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [RFC2661], IEEE 802 wired networks [IEEE-802.1X], and wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11 [IEEE- 802.11] and IEEE 802.16 [IEEE-802.16e].
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), described in [RFC3748], provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication methods. Through the use of EAP, support for a number of authentication schemes may be added, including smart cards, Kerberos, Public Key, One Time Passwords, and others. EAP has been defined for use with a variety of lower layers, including the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [RFC1661], Layer 2 tunneling protocols such as the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [RFC2637] or Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [RFC2661], IEEE 802 wired networks [IEEE-802.1X], and wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11 [IEEE- 802.11] and IEEE 802.16 [IEEE-802.16e].
While the EAP methods defined in [RFC3748] did not support mutual authentication, the use of EAP with wireless technologies such as [IEEE-802.11] has resulted in development of a new set of
While the EAP methods defined in [RFC3748] did not support mutual authentication, the use of EAP with wireless technologies such as [IEEE-802.11] has resulted in development of a new set of
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
requirements. As described in "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless LANs" [RFC4017], it is desirable for EAP methods used for wireless LAN authentication to support mutual authentication and key derivation. Other link layers can also make use of EAP to enable mutual authentication and key derivation.
requirements. As described in "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless LANs" [RFC4017], it is desirable for EAP methods used for wireless LAN authentication to support mutual authentication and key derivation. Other link layers can also make use of EAP to enable mutual authentication and key derivation.
This document defines EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), which includes support for certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual authentication and key management capabilities of the TLS protocol, described in "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1" [RFC4346]. While this document obsoletes RFC 2716 [RFC2716], it remains backward compatible with it. A summary of the changes between this document and RFC 2716 is available in Appendix A.
This document defines EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), which includes support for certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual authentication and key management capabilities of the TLS protocol, described in "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1" [RFC4346]. While this document obsoletes RFC 2716 [RFC2716], it remains backward compatible with it. A summary of the changes between this document and RFC 2716 is available in Appendix A.
1.1. Requirements
1.1. Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Terminology
1.2. Terminology
This document frequently uses the following terms:
This document frequently uses the following terms:
authenticator
The entity initiating EAP authentication.
authenticator The entity initiating EAP authentication.
peer
The entity that responds to the authenticator. In [IEEE-802.1X],
this entity is known as the Supplicant.
peer The entity that responds to the authenticator. In [IEEE-802.1X], this entity is known as the Supplicant.
backend authentication server
A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an
authentication service to an authenticator. When used, this server
typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator. This
terminology is also used in [IEEE-802.1X].
backend authentication server A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an authentication service to an authenticator. When used, this server typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator. This terminology is also used in [IEEE-802.1X].
EAP server
The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the
peer. In the case where no backend authentication server is used,
the EAP server is part of the authenticator. In the case where the
authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is
located on the backend authentication server.
EAP server The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the peer. In the case where no backend authentication server is used, the EAP server is part of the authenticator. In the case where the authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is located on the backend authentication server.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Master Session Key (MSK)
Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and
exported by the EAP method.
Master Session Key (MSK) Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and exported by the EAP method.
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
Additional keying material derived between the EAP peer and server
that is exported by the EAP method.
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Additional keying material derived between the EAP peer and server that is exported by the EAP method.
2. Protocol Overview
2. Protocol Overview
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation
As described in [RFC3748], the EAP-TLS conversation will typically begin with the authenticator and the peer negotiating EAP. The authenticator will then typically send an EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer, and the peer will respond with an EAP-Response/Identity packet to the authenticator, containing the peer's user-Id.
As described in [RFC3748], the EAP-TLS conversation will typically begin with the authenticator and the peer negotiating EAP. The authenticator will then typically send an EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer, and the peer will respond with an EAP-Response/Identity packet to the authenticator, containing the peer's user-Id.
From this point forward, while nominally the EAP conversation occurs between the EAP authenticator and the peer, the authenticator MAY act as a pass-through device, with the EAP packets received from the peer being encapsulated for transmission to a backend authentication server. In the discussion that follows, we will use the term "EAP server" to denote the ultimate endpoint conversing with the peer.
From this point forward, while nominally the EAP conversation occurs between the EAP authenticator and the peer, the authenticator MAY act as a pass-through device, with the EAP packets received from the peer being encapsulated for transmission to a backend authentication server. In the discussion that follows, we will use the term "EAP server" to denote the ultimate endpoint conversing with the peer.
2.1.1. Base Case
2.1.1. Base Case
Once having received the peer's Identity, the EAP server MUST respond with an EAP-TLS/Start packet, which is an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, the Start (S) bit set, and no data. The EAP-TLS conversation will then begin, with the peer sending an EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of that packet will encapsulate one or more TLS records in TLS record layer format, containing a TLS client_hello handshake message. The current cipher spec for the TLS records will be TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL and null
Once having received the peer's Identity, the EAP server MUST respond with an EAP-TLS/Start packet, which is an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, the Start (S) bit set, and no data. The EAP-TLS conversation will then begin, with the peer sending an EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of that packet will encapsulate one or more TLS records in TLS record layer format, containing a TLS client_hello handshake message. The current cipher spec for the TLS records will be TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL and null
compression. This current cipher spec remains the same until the change_cipher_spec message signals that subsequent records will have the negotiated attributes for the remainder of the handshake.
compression. This current cipher spec remains the same until the change_cipher_spec message signals that subsequent records will have the negotiated attributes for the remainder of the handshake.
The client_hello message contains the peer's TLS version number, a sessionId, a random number, and a set of ciphersuites supported by the peer. The version offered by the peer MUST correspond to TLS v1.0 or later.
The client_hello message contains the peer's TLS version number, a sessionId, a random number, and a set of ciphersuites supported by the peer. The version offered by the peer MUST correspond to TLS v1.0 or later.
The EAP server will then respond with an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of this packet will encapsulate one or more TLS records. These will contain a TLS server_hello handshake
The EAP server will then respond with an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of this packet will encapsulate one or more TLS records. These will contain a TLS server_hello handshake
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
message, possibly followed by TLS certificate, server_key_exchange, certificate_request, server_hello_done and/or finished handshake messages, and/or a TLS change_cipher_spec message. The server_hello handshake message contains a TLS version number, another random number, a sessionId, and a ciphersuite. The version offered by the server MUST correspond to TLS v1.0 or later.
message, possibly followed by TLS certificate, server_key_exchange, certificate_request, server_hello_done and/or finished handshake messages, and/or a TLS change_cipher_spec message. The server_hello handshake message contains a TLS version number, another random number, a sessionId, and a ciphersuite. The version offered by the server MUST correspond to TLS v1.0 or later.
If the peer's sessionId is null or unrecognized by the server, the server MUST choose the sessionId to establish a new session. Otherwise, the sessionId will match that offered by the peer, indicating a resumption of the previously established session with that sessionId. The server will also choose a ciphersuite from those offered by the peer. If the session matches the peer's, then the ciphersuite MUST match the one negotiated during the handshake protocol execution that established the session.
If the peer's sessionId is null or unrecognized by the server, the server MUST choose the sessionId to establish a new session. Otherwise, the sessionId will match that offered by the peer, indicating a resumption of the previously established session with that sessionId. The server will also choose a ciphersuite from those offered by the peer. If the session matches the peer's, then the ciphersuite MUST match the one negotiated during the handshake protocol execution that established the session.
If the EAP server is not resuming a previously established session, then it MUST include a TLS server_certificate handshake message, and a server_hello_done handshake message MUST be the last handshake message encapsulated in this EAP-Request packet.
If the EAP server is not resuming a previously established session, then it MUST include a TLS server_certificate handshake message, and a server_hello_done handshake message MUST be the last handshake message encapsulated in this EAP-Request packet.
The certificate message contains a public key certificate chain for either a key exchange public key (such as an RSA or Diffie-Hellman key exchange public key) or a signature public key (such as an RSA or Digital Signature Standard (DSS) signature public key). In the latter case, a TLS server_key_exchange handshake message MUST also be included to allow the key exchange to take place.
The certificate message contains a public key certificate chain for either a key exchange public key (such as an RSA or Diffie-Hellman key exchange public key) or a signature public key (such as an RSA or Digital Signature Standard (DSS) signature public key). In the latter case, a TLS server_key_exchange handshake message MUST also be included to allow the key exchange to take place.
The certificate_request message is included when the server desires the peer to authenticate itself via public key. While the EAP server SHOULD require peer authentication, this is not mandatory, since there are circumstances in which peer authentication will not be needed (e.g., emergency services, as described in [UNAUTH]), or where the peer will authenticate via some other means.
The certificate_request message is included when the server desires the peer to authenticate itself via public key. While the EAP server SHOULD require peer authentication, this is not mandatory, since there are circumstances in which peer authentication will not be needed (e.g., emergency services, as described in [UNAUTH]), or where the peer will authenticate via some other means.
If the peer supports EAP-TLS and is configured to use it, it MUST respond to the EAP-Request with an EAP-Response packet of EAP- Type=EAP-TLS. If the preceding server_hello message sent by the EAP server in the preceding EAP-Request packet did not indicate the resumption of a previous session, the data field of this packet MUST encapsulate one or more TLS records containing a TLS client_key_exchange, change_cipher_spec, and finished messages. If the EAP server sent a certificate_request message in the preceding EAP-Request packet, then unless the peer is configured for privacy (see Section 2.1.4) the peer MUST send, in addition, certificate and certificate_verify messages. The former contains a certificate for the peer's signature public key, while the latter contains the peer's signed authentication response to the EAP server. After receiving
If the peer supports EAP-TLS and is configured to use it, it MUST respond to the EAP-Request with an EAP-Response packet of EAP- Type=EAP-TLS. If the preceding server_hello message sent by the EAP server in the preceding EAP-Request packet did not indicate the resumption of a previous session, the data field of this packet MUST encapsulate one or more TLS records containing a TLS client_key_exchange, change_cipher_spec, and finished messages. If the EAP server sent a certificate_request message in the preceding EAP-Request packet, then unless the peer is configured for privacy (see Section 2.1.4) the peer MUST send, in addition, certificate and certificate_verify messages. The former contains a certificate for the peer's signature public key, while the latter contains the peer's signed authentication response to the EAP server. After receiving
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
this packet, the EAP server will verify the peer's certificate and digital signature, if requested.
this packet, the EAP server will verify the peer's certificate and digital signature, if requested.
If the preceding server_hello message sent by the EAP server in the preceding EAP-Request packet indicated the resumption of a previous session, then the peer MUST send only the change_cipher_spec and finished handshake messages. The finished message contains the peer's authentication response to the EAP server.
If the preceding server_hello message sent by the EAP server in the preceding EAP-Request packet indicated the resumption of a previous session, then the peer MUST send only the change_cipher_spec and finished handshake messages. The finished message contains the peer's authentication response to the EAP server.
In the case where the EAP-TLS mutual authentication is successful, the conversation will appear as follows:
In the case where the EAP-TLS mutual authentication is successful, the conversation will appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
[TLS server_key_exchange,]
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS certificate,
TLS client_key_exchange,
TLS certificate_verify,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Success
Authenticating Peer Authenticator ------------------- ------------- <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (MyID) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, [TLS server_key_exchange,] TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS certificate, TLS client_key_exchange, TLS certificate_verify, TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Success
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
2.1.2. Session Resumption
2.1.2. Session Resumption
The purpose of the sessionId within the TLS protocol is to allow for improved efficiency in the case where a peer repeatedly attempts to authenticate to an EAP server within a short period of time. While this model was developed for use with HTTP authentication, it also can be used to provide "fast reconnect" functionality as defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748].
The purpose of the sessionId within the TLS protocol is to allow for improved efficiency in the case where a peer repeatedly attempts to authenticate to an EAP server within a short period of time. While this model was developed for use with HTTP authentication, it also can be used to provide "fast reconnect" functionality as defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748].
It is left up to the peer whether to attempt to continue a previous session, thus shortening the TLS conversation. Typically, the peer's decision will be made based on the time elapsed since the previous authentication attempt to that EAP server. Based on the sessionId chosen by the peer, and the time elapsed since the previous authentication, the EAP server will decide whether to allow the continuation or to choose a new session.
It is left up to the peer whether to attempt to continue a previous session, thus shortening the TLS conversation. Typically, the peer's decision will be made based on the time elapsed since the previous authentication attempt to that EAP server. Based on the sessionId chosen by the peer, and the time elapsed since the previous authentication, the EAP server will decide whether to allow the continuation or to choose a new session.
In the case where the EAP server and authenticator reside on the same device, the peer will only be able to continue sessions when connecting to the same authenticator. Should the authenticators be set up in a rotary or round-robin, then it may not be possible for the peer to know in advance the authenticator to which it will be connecting, and therefore which sessionId to attempt to reuse. As a result, it is likely that the continuation attempt will fail. In the case where the EAP authentication is remoted, then continuation is much more likely to be successful, since multiple authenticators will utilize the same backend authentication server.
In the case where the EAP server and authenticator reside on the same device, the peer will only be able to continue sessions when connecting to the same authenticator. Should the authenticators be set up in a rotary or round-robin, then it may not be possible for the peer to know in advance the authenticator to which it will be connecting, and therefore which sessionId to attempt to reuse. As a result, it is likely that the continuation attempt will fail. In the case where the EAP authentication is remoted, then continuation is much more likely to be successful, since multiple authenticators will utilize the same backend authentication server.
If the EAP server is resuming a previously established session, then it MUST include only a TLS change_cipher_spec message and a TLS finished handshake message after the server_hello message. The finished message contains the EAP server's authentication response to the peer.
If the EAP server is resuming a previously established session, then it MUST include only a TLS change_cipher_spec message and a TLS finished handshake message after the server_hello message. The finished message contains the EAP server's authentication response to the peer.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
In the case where a previously established session is being resumed, and both sides authenticate successfully, the conversation will appear as follows:
In the case where a previously established session is being resumed, and both sides authenticate successfully, the conversation will appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS change_cipher_spec
TLS finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- EAP-Success
Authenticating Peer Authenticator ------------------- ------------- <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (MyID) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS change_cipher_spec TLS finished) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) -> <- EAP-Success
2.1.3. Termination
2.1.3. Termination
If the peer's authentication is unsuccessful, the EAP server SHOULD send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, encapsulating a TLS record containing the appropriate TLS alert message. The EAP server SHOULD send a TLS alert message immediately terminating the conversation so as to allow the peer to inform the user or log the cause of the failure and possibly allow for a restart of the conversation.
If the peer's authentication is unsuccessful, the EAP server SHOULD send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, encapsulating a TLS record containing the appropriate TLS alert message. The EAP server SHOULD send a TLS alert message immediately terminating the conversation so as to allow the peer to inform the user or log the cause of the failure and possibly allow for a restart of the conversation.
To ensure that the peer receives the TLS alert message, the EAP server MUST wait for the peer to reply with an EAP-Response packet. The EAP-Response packet sent by the peer MAY encapsulate a TLS client_hello handshake message, in which case the EAP server MAY allow the EAP-TLS conversation to be restarted, or it MAY contain an EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data, in which case the EAP-Server MUST send an EAP-Failure packet and terminate the conversation. It is up to the EAP server whether to allow restarts, and if so, how many times the conversation can be restarted. An EAP Server implementing restart capability SHOULD impose a per-peer limit
To ensure that the peer receives the TLS alert message, the EAP server MUST wait for the peer to reply with an EAP-Response packet. The EAP-Response packet sent by the peer MAY encapsulate a TLS client_hello handshake message, in which case the EAP server MAY allow the EAP-TLS conversation to be restarted, or it MAY contain an EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data, in which case the EAP-Server MUST send an EAP-Failure packet and terminate the conversation. It is up to the EAP server whether to allow restarts, and if so, how many times the conversation can be restarted. An EAP Server implementing restart capability SHOULD impose a per-peer limit
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
on the number of restarts, so as to protect against denial-of-service attacks.
on the number of restarts, so as to protect against denial-of-service attacks.
If the peer authenticates successfully, the EAP server MUST respond with an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, which includes, in the case of a new TLS session, one or more TLS records containing TLS change_cipher_spec and finished handshake messages. The latter contains the EAP server's authentication response to the peer. The peer will then verify the finished message in order to authenticate the EAP server.
If the peer authenticates successfully, the EAP server MUST respond with an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, which includes, in the case of a new TLS session, one or more TLS records containing TLS change_cipher_spec and finished handshake messages. The latter contains the EAP server's authentication response to the peer. The peer will then verify the finished message in order to authenticate the EAP server.
If EAP server authentication is unsuccessful, the peer SHOULD delete the session from its cache, preventing reuse of the sessionId. The peer MAY send an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing a TLS Alert message identifying the reason for the failed authentication. The peer MAY send a TLS alert message rather than immediately terminating the conversation so as to allow the EAP server to log the cause of the error for examination by the system administrator.
If EAP server authentication is unsuccessful, the peer SHOULD delete the session from its cache, preventing reuse of the sessionId. The peer MAY send an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing a TLS Alert message identifying the reason for the failed authentication. The peer MAY send a TLS alert message rather than immediately terminating the conversation so as to allow the EAP server to log the cause of the error for examination by the system administrator.
To ensure that the EAP Server receives the TLS alert message, the peer MUST wait for the EAP Server to reply before terminating the conversation. The EAP Server MUST reply with an EAP-Failure packet since server authentication failure is a terminal condition.
To ensure that the EAP Server receives the TLS alert message, the peer MUST wait for the EAP Server to reply before terminating the conversation. The EAP Server MUST reply with an EAP-Failure packet since server authentication failure is a terminal condition.
If the EAP server authenticates successfully, the peer MUST send an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, and no data. The EAP Server then MUST respond with an EAP-Success message.
If the EAP server authenticates successfully, the peer MUST send an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, and no data. The EAP Server then MUST respond with an EAP-Success message.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
In the case where the server authenticates to the peer successfully, but the peer fails to authenticate to the server, the conversation will appear as follows:
In the case where the server authenticates to the peer successfully, but the peer fails to authenticate to the server, the conversation will appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
[TLS server_key_exchange,]
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
Authenticating Peer Authenticator ------------------- ------------- <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (MyID) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, [TLS server_key_exchange,] TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS certificate,
TLS client_key_exchange,
TLS certificate_verify,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS certificate, TLS client_key_exchange, TLS certificate_verify, TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Request
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Alert message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Failure
(User Disconnected)
<- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Request EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Alert message) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Failure (User Disconnected)
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
In the case where server authentication is unsuccessful, the conversation will appear as follows:
In the case where server authentication is unsuccessful, the conversation will appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
[TLS server_key_exchange,]
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Alert message) ->
<- EAP-Failure
(User Disconnected)
Authenticating Peer Authenticator ------------------- ------------- <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (MyID) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, [TLS server_key_exchange,] TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Alert message) -> <- EAP-Failure (User Disconnected)
2.1.4. Privacy
2.1.4. Privacy
EAP-TLS peer and server implementations MAY support privacy. Disclosure of the username is avoided by utilizing a privacy Network Access Identifier (NAI) [RFC4282] in the EAP-Response/Identity, and transmitting the peer certificate within a TLS session providing confidentiality.
EAP-TLS peer and server implementations MAY support privacy. Disclosure of the username is avoided by utilizing a privacy Network Access Identifier (NAI) [RFC4282] in the EAP-Response/Identity, and transmitting the peer certificate within a TLS session providing confidentiality.
In order to avoid disclosing the peer username, an EAP-TLS peer configured for privacy MUST negotiate a TLS ciphersuite supporting confidentiality and MUST provide a client certificate list containing no entries in response to the initial certificate_request from the EAP-TLS server.
In order to avoid disclosing the peer username, an EAP-TLS peer configured for privacy MUST negotiate a TLS ciphersuite supporting confidentiality and MUST provide a client certificate list containing no entries in response to the initial certificate_request from the EAP-TLS server.
An EAP-TLS server supporting privacy MUST NOT treat a certificate list containing no entries as a terminal condition; instead, it MUST bring up the TLS session and then send a hello_request. The handshake then proceeds normally; the peer sends a client_hello and the server replies with a server_hello, certificate, server_key_exchange, certificate_request, server_hello_done, etc.
An EAP-TLS server supporting privacy MUST NOT treat a certificate list containing no entries as a terminal condition; instead, it MUST bring up the TLS session and then send a hello_request. The handshake then proceeds normally; the peer sends a client_hello and the server replies with a server_hello, certificate, server_key_exchange, certificate_request, server_hello_done, etc.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
For the calculation of exported keying material (see Section 2.3), the master_secret derived within the second handshake is used.
For the calculation of exported keying material (see Section 2.3), the master_secret derived within the second handshake is used.
An EAP-TLS peer supporting privacy MUST provide a certificate list containing at least one entry in response to the subsequent certificate_request sent by the server. If the EAP-TLS server supporting privacy does not receive a client certificate in response to the subsequent certificate_request, then it MUST abort the session.
An EAP-TLS peer supporting privacy MUST provide a certificate list containing at least one entry in response to the subsequent certificate_request sent by the server. If the EAP-TLS server supporting privacy does not receive a client certificate in response to the subsequent certificate_request, then it MUST abort the session.
EAP-TLS privacy support is designed to allow EAP-TLS peers that do not support privacy to interoperate with EAP-TLS servers supporting privacy. EAP-TLS servers supporting privacy MUST request a client certificate, and MUST be able to accept a client certificate offered by the EAP-TLS peer, in order to preserve interoperability with EAP- TLS peers that do not support privacy.
EAP-TLS privacy support is designed to allow EAP-TLS peers that do not support privacy to interoperate with EAP-TLS servers supporting privacy. EAP-TLS servers supporting privacy MUST request a client certificate, and MUST be able to accept a client certificate offered by the EAP-TLS peer, in order to preserve interoperability with EAP- TLS peers that do not support privacy.
However, an EAP-TLS peer configured for privacy typically will not be able to successfully authenticate with an EAP-TLS server that does not support privacy, since such a server will typically treat the refusal to provide a client certificate as a terminal error. As a result, unless authentication failure is considered preferable to disclosure of the username, EAP-TLS peers SHOULD only be configured for privacy on networks known to support it.
However, an EAP-TLS peer configured for privacy typically will not be able to successfully authenticate with an EAP-TLS server that does not support privacy, since such a server will typically treat the refusal to provide a client certificate as a terminal error. As a result, unless authentication failure is considered preferable to disclosure of the username, EAP-TLS peers SHOULD only be configured for privacy on networks known to support it.
This is most easily achieved with EAP lower layers that support network advertisement, so that the network and appropriate privacy configuration can be determined. In order to determine the privacy configuration on link layers (such as IEEE 802 wired networks) that do not support network advertisement, it may be desirable to utilize information provided in the server certificate (such as the subject and subjectAltName fields) or within identity selection hints [RFC4284] to determine the appropriate configuration.
This is most easily achieved with EAP lower layers that support network advertisement, so that the network and appropriate privacy configuration can be determined. In order to determine the privacy configuration on link layers (such as IEEE 802 wired networks) that do not support network advertisement, it may be desirable to utilize information provided in the server certificate (such as the subject and subjectAltName fields) or within identity selection hints [RFC4284] to determine the appropriate configuration.
In the case where the peer and server support privacy and mutual authentication, the conversation will appear as follows:
In the case where the peer and server support privacy and mutual authentication, the conversation will appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Anonymous NAI) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start)
Authenticating Peer Authenticator ------------------- ------------- <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (Anonymous NAI) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start)
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
[TLS server_key_exchange,]
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS certificate (no cert),
TLS client_key_exchange,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
finished,
hello_request)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
TLS server_key_exchange,
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS certificate,
TLS client_key_exchange,
TLS certificate_verify,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Success
EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, [TLS server_key_exchange,] TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS certificate (no cert), TLS client_key_exchange, TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, finished, hello_request) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, TLS server_key_exchange, TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS certificate, TLS client_key_exchange, TLS certificate_verify, TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Success
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
2.1.5. Fragmentation
2.1.5. Fragmentation
A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message may in principle be as long as 16 MB. The group of EAP-TLS messages sent in a single round may thus be larger than the MTU size or the maximum Remote Authentication Dail-In User Service (RADIUS) packet size of 4096 octets. As a result, an EAP-TLS implementation MUST provide its own support for fragmentation and reassembly. However, in order to ensure interoperability with existing implementations, TLS handshake messages SHOULD NOT be fragmented into multiple TLS records if they fit within a single TLS record.
A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message may in principle be as long as 16 MB. The group of EAP-TLS messages sent in a single round may thus be larger than the MTU size or the maximum Remote Authentication Dail-In User Service (RADIUS) packet size of 4096 octets. As a result, an EAP-TLS implementation MUST provide its own support for fragmentation and reassembly. However, in order to ensure interoperability with existing implementations, TLS handshake messages SHOULD NOT be fragmented into multiple TLS records if they fit within a single TLS record.
In order to protect against reassembly lockup and denial-of-service attacks, it may be desirable for an implementation to set a maximum size for one such group of TLS messages. Since a single certificate is rarely longer than a few thousand octets, and no other field is likely to be anywhere near as long, a reasonable choice of maximum acceptable message length might be 64 KB.
In order to protect against reassembly lockup and denial-of-service attacks, it may be desirable for an implementation to set a maximum size for one such group of TLS messages. Since a single certificate is rarely longer than a few thousand octets, and no other field is likely to be anywhere near as long, a reasonable choice of maximum acceptable message length might be 64 KB.
Since EAP is a simple ACK-NAK protocol, fragmentation support can be added in a simple manner. In EAP, fragments that are lost or damaged in transit will be retransmitted, and since sequencing information is provided by the Identifier field in EAP, there is no need for a fragment offset field as is provided in IPv4.
Since EAP is a simple ACK-NAK protocol, fragmentation support can be added in a simple manner. In EAP, fragments that are lost or damaged in transit will be retransmitted, and since sequencing information is provided by the Identifier field in EAP, there is no need for a fragment offset field as is provided in IPv4.
EAP-TLS fragmentation support is provided through addition of a flags octet within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets, as well as a TLS Message Length field of four octets. Flags include the Length included (L), More fragments (M), and EAP-TLS Start (S) bits. The L flag is set to indicate the presence of the four-octet TLS Message Length field, and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented TLS message or set of messages. The M flag is set on all but the last fragment. The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent from the EAP server to the peer. The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and provides the total length of the TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies buffer allocation.
EAP-TLS fragmentation support is provided through addition of a flags octet within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets, as well as a TLS Message Length field of four octets. Flags include the Length included (L), More fragments (M), and EAP-TLS Start (S) bits. The L flag is set to indicate the presence of the four-octet TLS Message Length field, and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented TLS message or set of messages. The M flag is set on all but the last fragment. The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent from the EAP server to the peer. The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and provides the total length of the TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies buffer allocation.
When an EAP-TLS peer receives an EAP-Request packet with the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Response with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP server MUST wait until it receives the EAP-Response before sending another fragment. In order to prevent errors in processing of fragments, the EAP server MUST increment the Identifier field for each fragment contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this Identifier value in the fragment ACK contained within the EAP-Response. Retransmitted fragments will contain the same Identifier value.
When an EAP-TLS peer receives an EAP-Request packet with the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Response with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP server MUST wait until it receives the EAP-Response before sending another fragment. In order to prevent errors in processing of fragments, the EAP server MUST increment the Identifier field for each fragment contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this Identifier value in the fragment ACK contained within the EAP-Response. Retransmitted fragments will contain the same Identifier value.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives the EAP-Request before sending another fragment. In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP server MUST increment the Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained within an EAP- Response.
Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives the EAP-Request before sending another fragment. In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP server MUST increment the Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained within an EAP- Response.
In the case where the EAP-TLS mutual authentication is successful, and fragmentation is required, the conversation will appear as follows:
In the case where the EAP-TLS mutual authentication is successful, and fragmentation is required, the conversation will appear as follows:
Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start, S bit set)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
[TLS server_key_exchange,]
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
(Fragment 1: L, M bits set)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(Fragment 2: M bit set)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(Fragment 3)
Authenticating Peer Authenticator ------------------- ------------- <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (MyID) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start, S bit set) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, [TLS server_key_exchange,] TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done) (Fragment 1: L, M bits set) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (Fragment 2: M bit set) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (Fragment 3)
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS certificate,
TLS client_key_exchange,
TLS certificate_verify,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)(Fragment 1:
L, M bits set)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(Fragment 2)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Success
EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS certificate, TLS client_key_exchange, TLS certificate_verify, TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished)(Fragment 1: L, M bits set)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (Fragment 2)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Success
2.2. Identity Verification
2.2. Identity Verification
As noted in Section 5.1 of [RFC3748]:
As noted in Section 5.1 of [RFC3748]:
It is RECOMMENDED that the Identity Response be used primarily for
routing purposes and selecting which EAP method to use. EAP
Methods SHOULD include a method-specific mechanism for obtaining
the identity, so that they do not have to rely on the Identity
Response.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Identity Response be used primarily for routing purposes and selecting which EAP method to use. EAP Methods SHOULD include a method-specific mechanism for obtaining the identity, so that they do not have to rely on the Identity Response.
As part of the TLS negotiation, the server presents a certificate to the peer, and if mutual authentication is requested, the peer presents a certificate to the server. EAP-TLS therefore provides a mechanism for determining both the peer identity (Peer-Id in [KEYFRAME]) and server identity (Server-Id in [KEYFRAME]). For details, see Section 5.2.
As part of the TLS negotiation, the server presents a certificate to the peer, and if mutual authentication is requested, the peer presents a certificate to the server. EAP-TLS therefore provides a mechanism for determining both the peer identity (Peer-Id in [KEYFRAME]) and server identity (Server-Id in [KEYFRAME]). For details, see Section 5.2.
Since the identity presented in the EAP-Response/Identity need not be related to the identity presented in the peer certificate, EAP-TLS implementations SHOULD NOT require that they be identical. However, if they are not identical, the identity presented in the EAP- Response/Identity is unauthenticated information, and SHOULD NOT be used for access control or accounting purposes.
Since the identity presented in the EAP-Response/Identity need not be related to the identity presented in the peer certificate, EAP-TLS implementations SHOULD NOT require that they be identical. However, if they are not identical, the identity presented in the EAP- Response/Identity is unauthenticated information, and SHOULD NOT be used for access control or accounting purposes.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
2.3. Key Hierarchy
2.3. Key Hierarchy
Figure 1 illustrates the TLS Key Hierarchy, described in [RFC4346] Section 6.3. The derivation proceeds as follows:
Figure 1 illustrates the TLS Key Hierarchy, described in [RFC4346] Section 6.3. The derivation proceeds as follows:
master_secret = TLS-PRF-48(pre_master_secret, "master secret",
client.random || server.random) key_block =
TLS-PRF-X(master_secret, "key expansion",
server.random || client.random)
master_secret = TLS-PRF-48(pre_master_secret, "master secret", client.random || server.random) key_block = TLS-PRF-X(master_secret, "key expansion", server.random || client.random)
Where:
Where:
TLS-PRF-X = TLS pseudo-random function defined in [RFC4346],
computed to X octets.
TLS-PRF-X = TLS pseudo-random function defined in [RFC4346], computed to X octets.
In EAP-TLS, the MSK, EMSK, and Initialization Vector (IV) are derived from the TLS master secret via a one-way function. This ensures that the TLS master secret cannot be derived from the MSK, EMSK, or IV unless the one-way function (TLS PRF) is broken. Since the MSK and EMSK are derived from the TLS master secret, if the TLS master secret is compromised then the MSK and EMSK are also compromised.
In EAP-TLS, the MSK, EMSK, and Initialization Vector (IV) are derived from the TLS master secret via a one-way function. This ensures that the TLS master secret cannot be derived from the MSK, EMSK, or IV unless the one-way function (TLS PRF) is broken. Since the MSK and EMSK are derived from the TLS master secret, if the TLS master secret is compromised then the MSK and EMSK are also compromised.
The MSK is divided into two halves, corresponding to the "Peer to Authenticator Encryption Key" (Enc-RECV-Key, 32 octets) and "Authenticator to Peer Encryption Key" (Enc-SEND-Key, 32 octets).
The MSK is divided into two halves, corresponding to the "Peer to Authenticator Encryption Key" (Enc-RECV-Key, 32 octets) and "Authenticator to Peer Encryption Key" (Enc-SEND-Key, 32 octets).
The IV is a 64-octet quantity that is a known value; octets 0-31 are known as the "Peer to Authenticator IV" or RECV-IV, and octets 32-63 are known as the "Authenticator to Peer IV", or SEND-IV.
The IV is a 64-octet quantity that is a known value; octets 0-31 are known as the "Peer to Authenticator IV" or RECV-IV, and octets 32-63 are known as the "Authenticator to Peer IV", or SEND-IV.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
| | pre_master_secret |
server| | | client
Random| V | Random
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
+---->| master_secret |<----+
| | (TMS) | |
| | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | |
V V V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| key_block |
| label == "key expansion" |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | | | |
| client | server | client | server | client | server
| MAC | MAC | write | write | IV | IV
| | | | | |
V V V V V V
| | pre_master_secret | server| | | client Random| V | Random | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | | +---->| master_secret |<----+ | | (TMS) | | | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | V V V +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | key_block | | label == "key expansion" | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | | | | client | server | client | server | client | server | MAC | MAC | write | write | IV | IV | | | | | | V V V V V V
Figure 1 - TLS [RFC4346] Key Hierarchy
Figure 1 - TLS [RFC4346] Key Hierarchy
EAP-TLS derives exported keying material and parameters as follows:
EAP-TLS derives exported keying material and parameters as follows:
Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP encryption",
client.random || server.random)
MSK = Key_Material(0,63)
EMSK = Key_Material(64,127)
IV = TLS-PRF-64("", "client EAP encryption",
client.random || server.random)
Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP encryption", client.random || server.random) MSK = Key_Material(0,63) EMSK = Key_Material(64,127) IV = TLS-PRF-64("", "client EAP encryption", client.random || server.random)
Enc-RECV-Key = MSK(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Encryption Key
(MS-MPPE-Recv-Key in [RFC2548]). Also known as the
PMK in [IEEE-802.11].
Enc-SEND-Key = MSK(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Encryption Key
(MS-MPPE-Send-Key in [RFC2548])
RECV-IV = IV(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Initialization Vector
SEND-IV = IV(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Initialization
Vector
Session-Id = 0x0D || client.random || server.random
Enc-RECV-Key = MSK(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Encryption Key (MS-MPPE-Recv-Key in [RFC2548]). Also known as the PMK in [IEEE-802.11]. Enc-SEND-Key = MSK(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Encryption Key (MS-MPPE-Send-Key in [RFC2548]) RECV-IV = IV(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Initialization Vector SEND-IV = IV(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Initialization Vector Session-Id = 0x0D || client.random || server.random
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Where:
Where:
Key_Material(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the key material. IV(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the IV. MSK(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the MSK. EMSK(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the EMSK. TLS-PRF-X = TLS PRF function computed to X octets. client.random = Nonce generated by the TLS client. server.random = Nonce generated by the TLS server.
Key_Material(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the key material. IV(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the IV. MSK(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the MSK. EMSK(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the EMSK. TLS-PRF-X = TLS PRF function computed to X octets. client.random = Nonce generated by the TLS client. server.random = Nonce generated by the TLS server.
| | pre_master_secret |
server| | | client
Random| V | Random
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
+---->| master_secret |<----+
| | | |
| | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | |
V V V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| MSK, EMSK |
| label == "client EAP encryption" |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | |
| MSK(0,31) | MSK(32,63) | EMSK(0,63)
| | |
| | |
V V V
| | pre_master_secret | server| | | client Random| V | Random | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | | +---->| master_secret |<----+ | | | | | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | V V V +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | MSK, EMSK | | label == "client EAP encryption" | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | MSK(0,31) | MSK(32,63) | EMSK(0,63) | | | | | | V V V
Figure 2 - EAP-TLS Key Hierarchy
Figure 2 - EAP-TLS Key Hierarchy
The use of these keys is specific to the lower layer, as described in Section 2.1 of [KEYFRAME].
The use of these keys is specific to the lower layer, as described in Section 2.1 of [KEYFRAME].
2.4. Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation
2.4. Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation
EAP-TLS implementations MUST support TLS v1.0.
EAP-TLS implementations MUST support TLS v1.0.
EAP-TLS implementations need not necessarily support all TLS ciphersuites listed in [RFC4346]. Not all TLS ciphersuites are supported by available TLS tool kits, and licenses may be required in some cases.
EAP-TLS implementations need not necessarily support all TLS ciphersuites listed in [RFC4346]. Not all TLS ciphersuites are supported by available TLS tool kits, and licenses may be required in some cases.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 19] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 19] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
To ensure interoperability, EAP-TLS peers and servers MUST support the TLS [RFC4346] mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:
To ensure interoperability, EAP-TLS peers and servers MUST support the TLS [RFC4346] mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD also support and be able to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuites:
EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD also support and be able to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuites:
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA [RFC4346]
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC3268]
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA [RFC4346] TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC3268]
In addition, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD support and be able to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuite:
In addition, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD support and be able to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuite:
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 [RFC4346]
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 [RFC4346]
Since TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers completing the TLS negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuite, which includes encryption and hashing methods. Since the ciphersuite negotiated within EAP-TLS applies only to the EAP conversation, TLS ciphersuite negotiation MUST NOT be used to negotiate the ciphersuites used to secure data.
Since TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers completing the TLS negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuite, which includes encryption and hashing methods. Since the ciphersuite negotiated within EAP-TLS applies only to the EAP conversation, TLS ciphersuite negotiation MUST NOT be used to negotiate the ciphersuites used to secure data.
TLS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite negotiation. However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the EAP peer and server MUST NOT request or negotiate compression.
TLS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite negotiation. However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the EAP peer and server MUST NOT request or negotiate compression.
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol
3.1. EAP-TLS Request Packet
3.1. EAP-TLS Request Packet
A summary of the EAP-TLS Request packet format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
A summary of the EAP-TLS Request packet format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Code | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TLS Message Length | TLS Data... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Code | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TLS Message Length | TLS Data... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
Code
1
1
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Identifier
Identifier
The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching responses
with requests. The Identifier field MUST be changed on each
Request packet.
The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching responses with requests. The Identifier field MUST be changed on each Request packet.
Length
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data
fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be
treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on
reception.
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on reception.
Type
Type
13 -- EAP-TLS
13 -- EAP-TLS
Flags
Flags
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M S R R R R R|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |L M S R R R R R| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L = Length included
M = More fragments
S = EAP-TLS start
R = Reserved
L = Length included M = More fragments S = EAP-TLS start R = Reserved
The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the presence of the
four-octet TLS Message Length field, and MUST be set for the first
fragment of a fragmented TLS message or set of messages. The M
bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment. The S
bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start message. This
differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message from a fragment
acknowledgment. Implementations of this specification MUST set
the reserved bits to zero, and MUST ignore them on reception.
The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the presence of the four-octet TLS Message Length field, and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented TLS message or set of messages. The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment. The S bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start message. This differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message from a fragment acknowledgment. Implementations of this specification MUST set the reserved bits to zero, and MUST ignore them on reception.
TLS Message Length
TLS Message Length
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only
if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 21] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 21] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
TLS data
TLS data
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated TLS packet in TLS record
format.
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated TLS packet in TLS record format.
3.2. EAP-TLS Response Packet
3.2. EAP-TLS Response Packet
A summary of the EAP-TLS Response packet format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
A summary of the EAP-TLS Response packet format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Code | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TLS Message Length | TLS Data... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
Code
2
2
Identifier
Identifier
The Identifier field is one octet and MUST match the Identifier
field from the corresponding request.
The Identifier field is one octet and MUST match the Identifier field from the corresponding request.
Length
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data
fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be
treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on
reception.
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on reception.
Type
Type
13 -- EAP-TLS
13 -- EAP-TLS
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 22] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 22] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Flags
Flags
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M R R R R R R|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |L M R R R R R R| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L = Length included
M = More fragments
R = Reserved
L = Length included M = More fragments R = Reserved
The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the presence of the
four-octet TLS Message Length field, and MUST be set for the first
fragment of a fragmented TLS message or set of messages. The M
bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment.
Implementations of this specification MUST set the reserved bits
to zero, and MUST ignore them on reception.
The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the presence of the four-octet TLS Message Length field, and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented TLS message or set of messages. The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment. Implementations of this specification MUST set the reserved bits to zero, and MUST ignore them on reception.
TLS Message Length
TLS Message Length
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only
if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
TLS data
TLS data
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated TLS packet in TLS record
format.
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated TLS packet in TLS record format.
4. IANA Considerations
4. IANA Considerations
IANA has allocated EAP Type 13 for EAP-TLS. The allocation has been updated to reference this document.
IANA has allocated EAP Type 13 for EAP-TLS. The allocation has been updated to reference this document.
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 23] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 23] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
5. Security Considerations
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Security Claims
5.1. Security Claims
EAP security claims are defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748]. The security claims for EAP-TLS are as follows:
EAP security claims are defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748]. The security claims for EAP-TLS are as follows:
Auth. mechanism: Certificates Ciphersuite negotiation: Yes [4] Mutual authentication: Yes [1] Integrity protection: Yes [1] Replay protection: Yes [1] Confidentiality: Yes [2] Key derivation: Yes Key strength: [3] Dictionary attack prot.: Yes Fast reconnect: Yes Crypt. binding: N/A Session independence: Yes [1] Fragmentation: Yes Channel binding: No
Auth. mechanism: Certificates Ciphersuite negotiation: Yes [4] Mutual authentication: Yes [1] Integrity protection: Yes [1] Replay protection: Yes [1] Confidentiality: Yes [2] Key derivation: Yes Key strength: [3] Dictionary attack prot.: Yes Fast reconnect: Yes Crypt. binding: N/A Session independence: Yes [1] Fragmentation: Yes Channel binding: No
Notes -----
Notes -----
[1] A formal proof of the security of EAP-TLS when used with [IEEE-802.11] is provided in [He]. This proof relies on the assumption that the private key pairs used by the EAP peer and server are not shared with other parties or applications. For example, a backend authentication server supporting EAP-TLS SHOULD NOT utilize the same certificate with https.
[1] A formal proof of the security of EAP-TLS when used with [IEEE-802.11] is provided in [He]. This proof relies on the assumption that the private key pairs used by the EAP peer and server are not shared with other parties or applications. For example, a backend authentication server supporting EAP-TLS SHOULD NOT utilize the same certificate with https.
[2] Privacy is an optional feature described in Section 2.1.4.
[2] Privacy is an optional feature described in Section 2.1.4.
[3] Section 5 of BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice on the required RSA or Diffie-Hellman (DH) module and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack resistance in bits. For example, a 2048-bit RSA key is recommended to provide 128-bit equivalent key strength. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in [SP800-57].
[3] BCP86[RFC3766]のセクション5はビットの必要なRSAかディフィー-ヘルマン(DH)モジュールとDigital Signature Algorithm(DSA)サブグループサイズでアドバイスします、ビットにおける、与えられたレベルの攻撃抵抗のために。 例えば、2048年のビットのRSAキーが128ビットの同等な主要な強さを提供することが勧められます。 また、米国商務省標準技術局(NIST)は[SP800-57]の適切な主要なサイズでアドバイスします。
[4] EAP-TLS inherits the secure ciphersuite negotiation features of TLS, including key derivation function negotiation when utilized with TLS v1.2 [RFC4346bis].
[4] EAP-TLSはTLSの安全なciphersuite交渉機能を引き継ぎます、主要な派生機能交渉をTLS v1.2[RFC4346bis]と共に利用されると含んでいて。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 24] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[24ページ]。
5.2. Peer and Server Identities
5.2. 同輩とサーバのアイデンティティ
The EAP-TLS peer name (Peer-Id) represents the identity to be used for access control and accounting purposes. The Server-Id represents the identity of the EAP server. Together the Peer-Id and Server-Id name the entities involved in deriving the MSK/EMSK.
EAP-TLS同輩名(同輩イド)は、アクセスコントロールと会計目的に使用されるためにアイデンティティを表します。 Server-イドはEAPサーバのアイデンティティを表します。Peer-イドとServer-イドはMSK/EMSKを引き出すのにかかわる実体を一緒に、命名します。
In EAP-TLS, the Peer-Id and Server-Id are determined from the subject or subjectAltName fields in the peer and server certificates. For details, see Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC3280]. Where the subjectAltName field is present in the peer or server certificate, the Peer-Id or Server-Id MUST be set to the contents of the subjectAltName. If subject naming information is present only in the subjectAltName extension of a peer or server certificate, then the subject field MUST be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension MUST be critical.
EAP-TLSでは、Peer-イドとServer-イドは同輩とサーバ証明書の対象かsubjectAltName分野から決定しています。 詳細に関して、セクション4.1を見てください。.2 .6[RFC3280。] subjectAltName分野が同輩かサーバ証明書に存在しているところでは、Peer-イドかServer-イドをsubjectAltNameのコンテンツに設定しなければなりません。 対象の命名情報が同輩かサーバ証明書のsubjectAltName拡張子だけで存在しているなら、対象の分野は空の系列であるに違いありません、そして、subjectAltName拡張子は重要であるに違いありません。
Where the peer identity represents a host, a subjectAltName of type dnsName SHOULD be present in the peer certificate. Where the peer identity represents a user and not a resource, a subjectAltName of type rfc822Name SHOULD be used, conforming to the grammar for the Network Access Identifier (NAI) defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC4282]. If a dnsName or rfc822Name are not available, other field types (for example, a subjectAltName of type ipAddress or uniformResourceIdentifier) MAY be used.
同輩のアイデンティティが同輩でのプレゼントが証明書であったならホスト、タイプdnsName SHOULDのsubjectAltNameを表すところで。 同輩のアイデンティティがリソース、subjectAltNameではなく、タイプrfc822Name SHOULDのユーザの代理をするところでは、使用されてください、[RFC4282]のセクション2.1で定義されたNetwork Access Identifier(NAI)のための文法に従って。 dnsNameかrfc822Nameが利用可能でないなら、他のフィールド・タイプ(例えば、タイプipAddressかuniformResourceIdentifierのsubjectAltName)は使用されるかもしれません。
A server identity will typically represent a host, not a user or a resource. As a result, a subjectAltName of type dnsName SHOULD be present in the server certificate. If a dnsName is not available other field types (for example, a subjectAltName of type ipAddress or uniformResourceIdentifier) MAY be used.
サーバのアイデンティティは通常ユーザかリソースではなく、ホストの代理をするでしょう。 a subjectAltName、aとして、なってください。タイプdnsName SHOULDでは、サーバ証明書に存在してください。 dnsNameが利用可能でないなら、他のフィールド・タイプ(例えば、タイプipAddressかuniformResourceIdentifierのsubjectAltName)は使用されるかもしれません。
Conforming implementations generating new certificates with Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) MUST use the rfc822Name in the subject alternative name field to describe such identities. The use of the subject name field to contain an emailAddress Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) is deprecated, and MUST NOT be used. The subject name field MAY contain other RDNs for representing the subject's identity.
Network Access Identifiers(NAIs)に新しい証明書を作る実装を一致させると、rfc822Nameは、そのようなアイデンティティについて説明するのに分野という対象の代替名に使用されなければなりません。 emailAddress Relative Distinguished Name(RDN)を含む対象の名前欄の使用は、推奨しなく、使用されてはいけません。 対象の名前欄は対象のアイデンティティを表すための他のRDNsを含むかもしれません。
Where it is non-empty, the subject name field MUST contain an X.500 distinguished name (DN). If subject naming information is present only in the subject name field of a peer certificate and the peer identity represents a host or device, the subject name field SHOULD contain a CommonName (CN) RDN or serialNumber RDN. If subject naming information is present only in the subject name field of a server certificate, then the subject name field SHOULD contain a CN RDN or serialNumber RDN.
それが非空であるところでは、対象の名前欄はX.500分類名(DN)を含まなければなりません。 対象の命名情報が同輩証明書の対象の名前欄だけに存在していて、同輩のアイデンティティがホストかデバイスの代理をするなら、対象の名前欄SHOULDはCommonName(CN)RDNかserialNumber RDNを含んでいます。 対象の命名情報がサーバ証明書の対象の名前欄だけに存在しているなら、対象の名前欄SHOULDはCN RDNかserialNumber RDNを含んでいます。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 25] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[25ページ]。
It is possible for more than one subjectAltName field to be present in a peer or server certificate in addition to an empty or non-empty subject distinguished name. EAP-TLS implementations supporting export of the Peer-Id and Server-Id SHOULD export all the subjectAltName fields within Peer-Ids or Server-Ids, and SHOULD also export a non-empty subject distinguished name field within the Peer- Ids or Server-Ids. All of the exported Peer-Ids and Server-Ids are considered valid.
1つ以上のsubjectAltName分野が空の、または、非空の対象の分類名に加えた同輩かサーバ証明書で現在は、可能です。 Peer-イドの輸出をサポートするEAP-TLS実装とServer-イドSHOULDはPeer-イドかServer-イドの中ですべてのsubjectAltName分野をエクスポートします、そして、また、SHOULDはPeerイドかServer-イドの中で非人影のない対象の分類名分野をエクスポートします。 エクスポートしているPeer-イドとServer-イドのすべてが有効であると考えられます。
EAP-TLS implementations supporting export of the Peer-Id and Server- Id SHOULD export Peer-Ids and Server-Ids in the same order in which they appear within the certificate. Such canonical ordering would aid in comparison operations and would enable using those identifiers for key derivation if that is deemed useful. However, the ordering of fields within the certificate SHOULD NOT be used for access control.
Peer-イドの輸出をサポートするEAP-TLS実装とServerイドSHOULDはそれらが証明書の中に現れる同次におけるPeer-イドとServer-イドをエクスポートします。 それが役に立つと考えられるなら主要な派生にそれらの識別子を使用する正準な命令が比較操作で支援して、可能にするそのようなもの。 しかしながら、証明書SHOULD NOTの中で分野を注文して、アクセスコントロールに使用されてください。
5.3. Certificate Validation
5.3. 証明書合法化
Since the EAP-TLS server is typically connected to the Internet, it SHOULD support validating the peer certificate using RFC 3280 [RFC3280] compliant path validation, including the ability to retrieve intermediate certificates that may be necessary to validate the peer certificate. For details, see Section 4.2.2.1 of [RFC3280].
以来、EAP-TLSサーバはインターネットに通常関連づけられて、それはRFC3280[RFC3280]の対応する経路合法化を使用することで同輩証明書を有効にするSHOULDサポートです、同輩証明書を有効にするのに必要であるかもしれない中間的証明書を検索する能力を含んでいて。 詳細に関して、セクション4.2を見てください。.2 .1[RFC3280。]
Where the EAP-TLS server is unable to retrieve intermediate certificates, either it will need to be pre-configured with the necessary intermediate certificates to complete path validation or it will rely on the EAP-TLS peer to provide this information as part of the TLS handshake (see Section 7.4.6 of [RFC4346]).
EAP-TLSサーバがどこで中間的証明書を検索できないか、そして、それが必要な中間的証明書であらかじめ設定されて、経路合法化を終了するために必要とするどちらかかそれが、TLS握手の一部としてこの情報を提供するためにEAP-TLS同輩に頼るでしょう(.6セクション7.4[RFC4346]を見てください)。
In contrast to the EAP-TLS server, the EAP-TLS peer may not have Internet connectivity. Therefore, the EAP-TLS server SHOULD provide its entire certificate chain minus the root to facilitate certificate validation by the peer. The EAP-TLS peer SHOULD support validating the server certificate using RFC 3280 [RFC3280] compliant path validation.
EAP-TLSサーバと対照して、EAP-TLS同輩には、インターネットの接続性がないかもしれません。 したがって、EAP-TLSサーバSHOULDは、根を引いて同輩による証明書合法化を容易にするために全体の証明書チェーンを提供します。 EAP-TLS同輩SHOULDは、有効にするのがサーバ証明書であるとRFC3280[RFC3280]対応することの経路合法化を使用することでサポートします。
Once a TLS session is established, EAP-TLS peer and server implementations MUST validate that the identities represented in the certificate are appropriate and authorized for use with EAP-TLS. The authorization process makes use of the contents of the certificates as well as other contextual information. While authorization requirements will vary from deployment to deployment, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations be able to authorize based on the EAP-TLS Peer-Id and Server-Id determined as described in Section 5.2.
TLSセッションがいったん確立されると、アイデンティティが証明書で代理をしたEAP-TLS同輩と実装が有効にしなければならないサーバは、適切であり、EAP-TLSとの使用のために権限を与えられます。 承認プロセスは他の文脈上の情報と同様に証明書のコンテンツを利用します。 セクション5.2の説明されると決定しているEAP-TLS Peer-イドとServer-イドに基づいて認可できる状態で展開によって異なるために望みなさいといって、それが実装があるRECOMMENDEDであるという承認要件をゆったり過ごしてください。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 26] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[26ページ]。
In the case of the EAP-TLS peer, this involves ensuring that the certificate presented by the EAP-TLS server was intended to be used as a server certificate. Implementations SHOULD use the Extended Key Usage (see Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280]) extension and ensure that at least one of the following is true:
EAP-TLS同輩の場合では、これは、サーバ証明書としてEAP-TLSサーバによって提示された証明書が使用されることを意図したのを確実にすることを伴います。 そして、実装SHOULDがExtended Key Usageを使用する、(セクション4.2.1を見てください、.13、[RFC3280)拡大、少なくとも以下の1つが確実に本当になるようにしてください:
1) The certificate issuer included no Extended Key Usage identifiers
in the certificate.
2) The issuer included the anyExtendedKeyUsage identifier in the
certificate (see Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280]).
3) The issuer included the id-kp-serverAuth identifier in the
certificate (see Section 4.2.1.13 [RFC3280]).
1) 証明書発行人は証明書にExtended Key Usage識別子を全く含んでいませんでした。 2) セクション4.2を見てください。発行人が証明書にanyExtendedKeyUsage識別子を含んでいた、(.1 .13[RFC3280。) 3) セクション4.2を見てください。発行人が証明書にイド-kp-serverAuth識別子を含んでいた、(.1 .13[RFC3280)。
When performing this comparison, implementations MUST follow the validation rules specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC2818]. In the case of the server, this involves ensuring the certificate presented by the EAP-TLS peer was intended to be used as a client certificate. Implementations SHOULD use the Extended Key Usage (see Section 4.2.1.13 [RFC3280]) extension and ensure that at least one of the following is true:
この比較を実行するとき、実装は[RFC2818]のセクション3.1で指定された合法化規則に従わなければなりません。 サーバの場合では、これは、クライアント証明書としてEAP-TLS同輩によって提示された証明書が使用されることを意図したのを確実にすることを伴います。 実装SHOULDはExtended Key Usageを使用します。(セクション4.2.1.13[RFC3280)拡大を見てください、そして、少なくとも以下の1つが確実に本当になるようにしてください:
1) The certificate issuer included no Extended Key Usage identifiers
in the certificate.
2) The issuer included the anyExtendedKeyUsage identifier in the
certificate (see Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280]).
3) The issuer included the id-kp-clientAuth identifier in the
certificate (see Section 4.2.1.13 of [RFC3280]).
1) 証明書発行人は証明書にExtended Key Usage識別子を全く含んでいませんでした。 2) セクション4.2を見てください。発行人が証明書にanyExtendedKeyUsage識別子を含んでいた、(.1 .13[RFC3280。) 3) セクション4.2を見てください。発行人が証明書にイド-kp-clientAuth識別子を含んでいた、(.1 .13[RFC3280。)
5.4. Certificate Revocation
5.4. 証明書取消し
Certificates are long-lived assertions of identity. Therefore, it is important for EAP-TLS implementations to be capable of checking whether these assertions have been revoked.
証明書はアイデンティティの長命の主張です。 したがって、EAP-TLS実装が、これらの主張が取り消されたかどうかチェックできるのは、重要です。
EAP-TLS peer and server implementations MUST support the use of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs); for details, see Section 3.3 of [RFC3280]. EAP-TLS peer and server implementations SHOULD also support the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), described in "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP" [RFC2560]. OCSP messages are typically much smaller than CRLs, which can shorten connection times especially in bandwidth-constrained environments. While EAP-TLS servers are typically connected to the Internet during the EAP conversation, an EAP-TLS peer may not have Internet connectivity until authentication completes.
EAP-TLSはじっと見ます、そして、サーバ実装はCertificate Revocation Lists(CRLs)の使用をサポートしなければなりません。 詳細に関しては、[RFC3280]のセクション3.3を見てください。 EAP-TLSはじっと見ます、そして、また、サーバ実装SHOULDはOnline Certificate Statusが「X.509のインターネットの公開鍵暗号基盤のオンライン証明書状態は議定書を作ります--OCSP」という[RFC2560]で説明されたプロトコル(OCSP)であるとサポートします。 通常、OCSPメッセージはCRLsよりはるかに小さいです。(CRLsは特に帯域幅で強制的な環境における接続時間を短くすることができます)。 EAP-TLSサーバはEAPの会話の間インターネットに通常関連づけられますが、EAP-TLS同輩は関連づけられているかもしれないというわけではありません。認証までのインターネットの接続性は完成します。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 27] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[27ページ]。
In the case where the peer is initiating a voluntary Layer 2 tunnel using PPTP [RFC2637] or L2TP [RFC2661], the peer will typically already have a PPP interface and Internet connectivity established at the time of tunnel initiation.
同輩がPPTP[RFC2637]かL2TP[RFC2661]を使用することで自発的のLayer2トンネルを開始している場合では、同輩はトンネル開始の時代既にPPPインタフェースとインターネットの接続性を通常確立させるでしょう。
However, in the case where the EAP-TLS peer is attempting to obtain network access, it will not have network connectivity and is therefore not capable of checking for certificate revocation until after authentication completes and network connectivity is available. For this reason, EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD implement Certificate Status Request messages, as described in "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions", Section 3.6 of [RFC4366]. To enable revocation checking in situations where servers do not support Certificate Status Request messages and network connectivity is not available prior to authentication completion, peer implementations MUST also support checking for certificate revocation after authentication completes and network connectivity is available, and they SHOULD utilize this capability by default.
しかしながら、EAP-TLS同輩がネットワークアクセスを得るのを試みている場合では、ネットワークの接続性を持たないで、したがって、認証の後の取消しが完成する証明書がないかどうかチェックできません、そして、ネットワークの接続性は利用可能です。 この理由で、EAP-TLS同輩とサーバSHOULDはCertificate Status Requestにメッセージを実装します、「トランスポート層セキュリティ(TLS)拡大」で説明されるように、[RFC4366]のセクション3.6。 可能にする、認証完成、後認証が終了する証明書取消しがないかどうかチェックするまた実装がサポートしなければならない同輩、およびネットワークの接続性が手があいている前サーバがCertificate Status Requestにメッセージをサポートしないで、またネットワークの接続性が入手できないところに状況を預ける取消し、およびそれら、SHOULDはデフォルトでこの能力を利用します。
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks
5.5. パケット変更攻撃
The integrity protection of EAP-TLS packets does not extend to the EAP header fields (Code, Identifier, Length) or the Type or Flags fields. As a result, these fields can be modified by an attacker.
EAP-TLSパケットの保全保護はEAPヘッダーフィールド(コード、Identifier、Length)、TypeまたはFlags野原に達しません。 その結果、攻撃者はこれらの分野を変更できます。
In most cases, modification of the Code or Identifier fields will only result in a denial-of-service attack. However, an attacker can add additional data to an EAP-TLS packet so as to cause it to be longer than implied by the Length field. EAP peers, authenticators, or servers that do not check for this could be vulnerable to a buffer overrun.
多くの場合、CodeかIdentifier分野の変更はサービス不能攻撃をもたらすだけでしょう。 しかしながら、攻撃者は、それがLength分野によって含意されるより長いことを引き起こすためにEAP-TLSパケットに追加データを加えることができます。 これがないかどうかチェックしないEAP同輩、固有識別文字、またはサーバがバッファ超過に被害を受け易いかもしれません。
It is also possible for an attacker to modify the Type or Flags fields. By modifying the Type field, an attacker could cause one TLS-based EAP method to be negotiated instead of another. For example, the EAP-TLS Type field (13) could be changed to indicate another TLS-based EAP method. Unless the alternative TLS-based EAP method utilizes a different key derivation formula, it is possible that an EAP method conversation altered by a man-in-the-middle could run all the way to completion without detection. Unless the ciphersuite selection policies are identical for all TLS-based EAP methods utilizing the same key derivation formula, it may be possible for an attacker to mount a successful downgrade attack, causing the peer to utilize an inferior ciphersuite or TLS-based EAP method.
また、攻撃者がTypeかFlags分野を変更するのも、可能です。 Type分野を変更することによって、攻撃者は1つの別のものの代わりに交渉されるべきTLSベースのEAPメソッドを引き起こす場合がありました。 例えば、別のTLSベースのEAPメソッドを示すためにEAP-TLS Type分野(13)を変えることができました。 代替のTLSベースのEAPメソッドが異なった主要な派生公式を利用しない場合、中央の男性によって変更されたEAPメソッドの会話が検出なしで完成にはるばる駆けつけるかもしれないのは、可能です。 同じ主要な派生公式を利用するすべてのTLSベースのEAPメソッドには、ciphersuite選択方針が同じでない場合、攻撃者がうまくいっているダウングレード攻撃を仕掛けるのは、可能であるかもしれません、同輩が粗悪なciphersuiteかTLSベースのEAPメソッドを利用することを引き起こして。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 28] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[28ページ]。
6. References
6. 参照
6.1. Normative References
6.1. 引用規格
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119] ブラドナー、S.、「Indicate Requirement LevelsへのRFCsにおける使用のためのキーワード」、BCP14、RFC2119、1997年3月。
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and
C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
June 1999.
[RFC2560] マイアーズ、M.、Ankney、R.、Malpani、A.、ガリペリン、S.、およびC.アダムス、「X.509のインターネットの公開鍵暗号基盤のオンライン証明書状態は議定書を作ります--OCSP」、RFC2560、1999年6月。
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC2818]レスコラ(E.、「TLSの上のHTTP」、RFC2818)は2000がそうするかもしれません。
[RFC3268] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC
3268, June 2002.
[RFC3268]Chown、2002年6月のP.、「トランスポート層セキュリティ(TLS)のためのエー・イー・エス(AES)Ciphersuites」RFC3268。
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC
3280, April 2002.
[RFC3280] Housley、R.、ポーク、W.、フォード、W.、および一人で生活して、「インターネットX.509公開鍵暗号基盤証明書と証明書失効リスト(CRL)は輪郭を描く」D.、RFC3280(2002年4月)。
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
H. Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC3748] AbobaとB.とBlunkとL.とVollbrechtとJ.とカールソン、J.とH.Levkowetz、エド、「拡張認証プロトコル(EAP)」、RFC3748(2004年6月)
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
2005年12月の[RFC4282]AbobaとB.と用務員とM.とArkko、J.とP.Eronen、「ネットワークアクセス識別子」RFC4282。
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April
2006.
[RFC4346] Dierks、T.、およびE.レスコラ、「トランスポート層セキュリティ(TLS)は2006年4月にバージョン1.1インチ、RFC4346について議定書の中で述べます」。
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen,
J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.
[RFC4366]ブレーク-ウィルソン、S.、ニストロム、M.、Hopwood(D.、ミッケルセン、J.、およびT.ライト)は「層のセキュリティ(TLS)拡大を輸送します」、RFC4366、2006年4月。
6.2. Informative References
6.2. 有益な参照
[IEEE-802.1X] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based
Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2004,
December 2004.
[IEEE-802.1X]米国電気電子技術者学会、「地方とメトロポリタンエリアネットワーク:」 「ポートベースのネットワークアクセスコントロール」、IEEEの標準の802.1X-2004、2004年12月。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 29] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[29ページ]。
[IEEE-802.11] Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific Requirements
Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, IEEE Std.
802.11-2007, 2007.
[IEEE-802.11]情報技術--システムの間のテレコミュニケーションと情報交換--地方とメトロポリタンエリアネットワーク--特定のRequirements Part11: ワイヤレスのLAN媒体アクセス制御(MAC)と物理的な層(PHY)の仕様、IEEE Std。 802.11-2007, 2007.
[IEEE-802.16e] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks: Part 16: Air Interface for Fixed and Mobile
Broadband Wireless Access Systems: Amendment for
Physical and Medium Access Control Layers for Combined
Fixed and Mobile Operations in Licensed Bands", IEEE
802.16e, August 2005.
[IEEE-802.16e]米国電気電子技術者学会、「地方とメトロポリタンエリアネットワークのIEEE規格:」 パート16: 修理されてモバイルの広帯域のワイヤレス・アクセスシステムのためにインタフェースを放送してください: 「物理的で中型のアクセスコントロールのための修正は結合した修理されてモバイルの操作のために認可されたバンドで層にされます」、IEEE 802.16e、2005年8月。
[He] He, C., Sundararajan, M., Datta, A., Derek, A. and J.
Mitchell, "A Modular Correctness Proof of IEEE 802.11i
and TLS", CCS '05, November 7-11, 2005, Alexandria,
Virginia, USA
[彼] 彼とC.とSundararajanとM.とダッタとA.とデリックとA.とJ.ミッチェル、「IEEE 802.11iとTLSのモジュールの正当性の証明」、CCS'05、2005年11月7日〜11日、アレキサンドリア(ヴァージニア)、米国'
[KEYFRAME] Aboba, B., Simon, D. and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management
Framework", Work in Progress, November 2007.
[KEYFRAME] 「拡張認証プロトコル(EAP)Key Managementフレームワーク」というAboba、B.、サイモン、D.、およびP.Eronenは進歩、2007年11月に働いています。
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., Ed., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)",
STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994.
[RFC1661] シンプソン、W.、エド、「二地点間プロトコル(ppp)」、STD51、RFC1661、7月1994日
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS
Attributes", RFC 2548, March 1999.
[RFC2548] ゾルン、G.、「マイクロソフトのベンダー特有の半径属性」、RFC2548、1999年3月。
[RFC2637] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., Taarud, J.,
Little, W., and G. Zorn, "Point-to-Point Tunneling
Protocol (PPTP)", RFC 2637, July 1999.
[RFC2637] Hamzeh、K.、祭服、G.、Verthein、W.、Taarud、J.、少し、w.、およびG.ゾルン、「二地点間トンネリングプロトコル(PPTP)」、RFC2637(1999年7月)。
[RFC2661] Townsley, W., Valencia, A., Rubens, A., Pall, G.,
Zorn, G., and B. Palter, "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol
"L2TP"", RFC 2661, August 1999.
[RFC2661]Townsley、W.、バレンシア、A.、ルーベン、A.、祭服、G.、ゾルン、G.、およびB.はあしらいます、「層Twoはプロトコル"L2TP"にトンネルを堀っ」て、RFC2661、1999年8月。
[RFC2716] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.
[RFC2716] AbobaとB.とD.サイモン、「ppp EAP TLS認証プロトコル」、RFC2716、1999年10月。
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP
86, RFC 3766, April 2004.
[RFC3766] OrmanとH.とP.ホフマン、「対称鍵を交換するのに使用される公開鍵のために強さを測定する」BCP86、RFC3766、2004年4月。
[RFC4017] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for
Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.
[RFC4017] スタンリー、D.、ウォーカー、J.、およびB.Aboba、「ワイヤレスのLANのための拡張認証プロトコル(EAP)メソッド要件」、RFC4017(2005年3月)。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 30] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[30ページ]。
[RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen,
"Identity Selection Hints for the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 4284, January
2006.
[RFC4284] Adrangi、F.、ロルツ、V.、バリ、F.、およびP.Eronen、「アイデンティティ選択は拡張認証プロトコル(EAP)のために暗示します」、RFC4284、2006年1月。
[SP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Key Management", Special
Publication 800-57, May 2006.
[SP800-57]米国商務省標準技術局(「Key Managementのための推薦」、特別な公表800-57)は2006がそうするかもしれません。
[RFC4346bis] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version
1.2", Work in Progress, February 2008.
[RFC4346bis] Dierks、T.、およびE.レスコラ、「TLSは2008年2月にバージョン1.2インチ、処理中の作業について議定書の中で述べます」。
[UNAUTH] Schulzrinne. H., McCann, S., Bajko, G. and H.
Tschofenig, "Extensions to the Emergency Services
Architecture for dealing with Unauthenticated and
Unauthorized Devices", Work in Progress, November
2007.
[UNAUTH]Schulzrinne。 Progress(2007年11月)のH.とマッキャンとS.とBajkoとG.とH.Tschofenig、「UnauthenticatedとUnauthorized Devicesに対処するためのEmergency Services Architectureへの拡大」、Work。
Acknowledgments
承認
Thanks to Terence Spies, Mudit Goel, Anthony Leibovitz, and Narendra Gidwani of Microsoft, Glen Zorn of NetCube, Joe Salowey of Cisco, and Pasi Eronen of Nokia for useful discussions of this problem space.
この問題スペースの役に立つ議論のためのテレンス・シュピース、Muditゴエル、アンソニー・リーボビッツ、およびマイクロソフトのNarendra Gidwani、NetCubeのGlenゾルン、シスコ、およびノキアのパシEronenのジョーSaloweyをありがとうございます。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 31] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[31ページ]。
Appendix A -- Changes from RFC 2716
付録A--RFC2716からの変化
This appendix lists the major changes between [RFC2716] and this document. Minor changes, including style, grammar, spelling, and editorial changes, are not mentioned here.
この付録は[RFC2716]とこのドキュメントの間の大きな変化を記載します。 スタイル、文法、スペル、および編集の変化を含むマイナーチェンジがここに言及されません。
o As EAP is now in use with a variety of lower layers, not just PPP
for which it was first designed, mention of PPP is restricted to
situations relating to PPP-specific behavior and reference is made
to other lower layers such as IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, etc.
o EAPが今、それが最初に設計されたPPPだけではなく、さまざまな下層で使用中であり、PPPの言及をPPP-特異的行動に関連する状況に制限して、IEEE802.11などの他の下層を参照するので、IEEE802.16ですなど。
o The document now cites TLS v1.1 as a normative reference (Sections
1 and 6.1).
o ドキュメントは現在、引用規格(セクション1と6.1)にTLS v1.1を挙げます。
o The terminology section has been updated to reflect definitions
from [RFC3748] (Section 1.2), and the EAP Key Management Framework
[KEYFRAME] (Section 1.2).
o [RFC3748](セクション1.2)、およびEAP Key Management Framework[KEYFRAME](セクション1.2)から定義を反映するために用語部をアップデートしました。
o Use for peer unauthenticated access is clarified (Section 2.1.1).
o 同輩がアクセスを非認証したので、使用ははっきりさせられます(セクション2.1.1)。
o Privacy is supported as an optional feature (Section 2.1.4).
o プライバシーはオプション機能(セクション2.1.4)としてサポートされます。
o It is no longer recommended that the identity presented in the
EAP-Response/Identity be compared to the identity provided in the
peer certificate (Section 2.2).
o アイデンティティと比べて、EAP-応答/アイデンティティで提示されたアイデンティティが同輩証明書(セクション2.2)に供給されたのは、もうお勧めではありません。
o The EAP-TLS key hierarchy is defined, using terminology from
[RFC3748]. This includes formulas for the computation of TEKs as
well as the MSK, EMSK, IV, and Session-Id (Section 2.3).
o [RFC3748]から用語を使用して、EAP-TLSの主要な階層構造は定義されます。 これはMSK、EMSK、IV、およびSession-イド(セクション2.3)と同様にTEKsの計算のための定石を含んでいます。
o Mandatory and recommended TLS ciphersuites are provided. The use
of TLS ciphersuite negotiation for determining the lower layer
ciphersuite is prohibited (Section 2.4).
o 義務的でお勧めのTLS ciphersuitesを提供します。 TLS ciphersuite交渉の下層ciphersuiteを決定する使用は禁止されています(セクション2.4)。
o The Start bit is not set within an EAP-Response packet (Section
3.2).
o StartビットはEAP-応答パケット(セクション3.2)の中に設定されません。
o A section on security claims has been added and advice on key
strength is provided (Section 5.1).
o セキュリティクレームでのセクションを加えました、そして、(セクション5.1)に主要な強さに関するアドバイスを提供します。
o The Peer-Id and Server-Id are defined (Section 5.2), and
requirements for certificate validation (Section 5.3) and
revocation (Section 5.4) are provided.
o Peer-イドとServer-イドを定義します、そして、(セクション5.2)証明書合法化(セクション5.3)と取消し(セクション5.4)のための要件を提供します。
o Packet modification attacks are described (Section 5.5).
o パケット変更攻撃は説明されます(セクション5.5)。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 32] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[32ページ]。
o The examples have been updated to reflect typical messages sent in
the described scenarios. For example, where mutual authentication
is performed, the EAP-TLS server is shown to request a client
certificate and the peer is shown to provide a certificate_verify
message. A privacy example is provided, and two faulty examples
of session resume failure were removed.
o 説明されたシナリオで送られた典型的なメッセージを反映するために例をアップデートしました。 例えば、互いの認証が実行されるところでは、EAP-TLSサーバは、クライアント証明書を要求して、メッセージについて確かめるために同輩が証明書_を提供するために示される示されます。 プライバシーの例を提供しました、そして、セッション履歴書失敗の2つの不完全な例を取り除きました。
Authors' Addresses
作者のアドレス
Dan Simon Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052-6399
ダンサイモンマイクロソフト社1マイクロソフト道、レッドモンド、ワシントン98052-6399
Phone: +1 425 882 8080 Fax: +1 425 936 7329 EMail: dansimon@microsoft.com
以下に電話をしてください。 +1 425 882、8080Fax: +1 7329年の425 936メール: dansimon@microsoft.com
Bernard Aboba Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052-6399
バーナードAbobaマイクロソフト社1マイクロソフト道、レッドモンド、ワシントン98052-6399
Phone: +1 425 706 6605 Fax: +1 425 936 7329 EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
以下に電話をしてください。 +1 425 706、6605Fax: +1 7329年の425 936メール: bernarda@microsoft.com
Ryan Hurst Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052-6399
ライアンハーストマイクロソフト社1マイクロソフト道、レッドモンド、ワシントン98052-6399
Phone: +1 425 882 8080 Fax: +1 425 936 7329 EMail: rmh@microsoft.com
以下に電話をしてください。 +1 425 882、8080Fax: +1 7329年の425 936メール: rmh@microsoft.com
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 33] RFC 5216 EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol March 2008
サイモン、他 規格は2008年のEAP-TLS認証プロトコル行進のときにRFC5216を追跡します[33ページ]。
Full Copyright Statement
完全な著作権宣言文
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
IETFが信じる著作権(C)(2008)。
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
このドキュメントはBCP78に含まれた権利、ライセンス、および制限を受けることがあります、そして、そこに詳しく説明されるのを除いて、作者は彼らのすべての権利を保有します。
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
このドキュメントとここに含まれた情報はその人が代理をするか、または(もしあれば)後援される組織、インターネットの振興発展を目的とする組織、「そのままで」という基礎と貢献者の上で提供していて、IETFはそして、インターネット・エンジニアリング・タスク・フォースがすべての保証を放棄すると信じます、急行である、または暗示していて、他を含んでいて、情報の使用がここに侵害しないどんな保証も少しもまっすぐになるということであるかいずれが市場性か特定目的への適合性の黙示的な保証です。
Intellectual Property
知的所有権
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
IETFはどんなIntellectual Property Rightsの正当性か範囲、実装に関係すると主張されるかもしれない他の権利、本書では説明された技術の使用またはそのような権利の下におけるどんなライセンスも利用可能であるかもしれない、または利用可能でないかもしれない範囲に関しても立場を全く取りません。 または、それはそれを表しません。どんなそのような権利も特定するどんな独立している取り組みも作りました。 BCP78とBCP79でRFCドキュメントの権利に関する手順に関する情報を見つけることができます。
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
IPR公開のコピーが利用可能に作られるべきライセンスの保証、または一般的な免許を取得するのが作られた試みの結果をIETF事務局といずれにもしたか、または http://www.ietf.org/ipr のIETFのオンラインIPR倉庫からこの仕様のimplementersかユーザによるそのような所有権の使用のために許可を得ることができます。
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
IETFはこの規格を実装するのに必要であるかもしれない技術をカバーするかもしれないどんな著作権もその注目していただくどんな利害関係者、特許、特許出願、または他の所有権も招待します。 ietf-ipr@ietf.org のIETFに情報を扱ってください。
Simon, et al. Standards Track [Page 34]
サイモン、他 標準化過程[34ページ]
一覧
スポンサーリンク
